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Introduction
This article discusses the "new" due process. Perhaps new
is a misnomer. Due process was not discovered recently. It has
been around a long time protecting varying interests from arbitrary action. The discovery called the "new" due process is
merely that procedural protections are not so limited as previously thought. This article will examine the interests encompassed by the new due process and the remedial apparatus now
being developed to protect those interests.
PART I-RIGHTS
In recent years, the Supreme Court has decided a number
of cases construing the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. These appeals have dealt with procedures for seizing chattels purchased by time payments,' garnishing wages
before judgment, 2 suspending a driver's license,' evicting a tenant,4 terminating public assistance5 or public employment,6
depriving a person of local access to alcoholic beverages7 and
removing children from their parents' home.' Additionally
* Associate Professor of Law, College of William and Mary; Visitor at University
of North Carolina School of Law 1974-75. Gary F. Roth contributed to the research and
assisted with the footnotes herein. Shortly after I began this article, I realized that I
had taken on an imposing task. A lot of law existed; more law was being made. As the
advance sheet cases piled up, the law, I concluded, was so volatile that anything
written was obsolete before it could be published. Events, however, ameliorated this
conclusion; the due process doctrine began to match previously developed remedial
doctrine, and the new cases increasingly replicated previously developed points.
I completed a "final" draft in June 1974. Since then the editors in Lexington and
the author in Williamsburg and Chapel Hill have added cases and other matter. In
general, we think this was successful. But the burgeoning law created two consequences and a caveat. First, it was difficult to arrive at a "final" draft: several things
came unraveled between the summer of 1974 and 1975. Second, because of the timedistance problem, changes may have occurred which the article fails fully to reflect.
That it is difficult to publish anything completely current on this topic does not mean
that one should refrain from trying.
I Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S.
67 (1973).
2 Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 534 (1971).
Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972).
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1969).
Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971).
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967). See also Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972);
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there have been many such cases in state appellate courts.'
Procedures recently assailed include impounding trespassing
cattle" and "abandoned" automobiles," sterilizing mental retardates," applying for a chauffeur's license,1 3 withdrawing
patients from a nursing home,1 4 terminating township poor relief,1 5 destroying a public nuisance without notice to the mortgagee"6 or compensation to the landowner,17 impounding allegedly infringing articles,1 8 ejecting a tenant from public housing, 9 terminating disability benefits,'0 expelling a student from
West Point Military Academy,2 ' terminating unemployment
compensation,' 2 excluding a person from a college campus,2
and requiring a bond for costs in a personal injury lawsuit24
Creditors' remedies assailed include the mechanic's lien,2
Newton v. Burgin, 363 F. Supp. 782 (W.D. N.C. 1973).
1 See, e.g., Arnold v. Knettle, 460 P.2d 45 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1969); C.V.C. v. Superior Ct., 106 Cal. Rptr. 123 (Ct. App. 1973); Inter City Motor Sales v. Szymanski, 201
N.W.2d 378 (Mich. Ct. App. 1972); Jones Press, Inc. v. Motor Travel Serv., Inc., 176
N.W.2d 87 (Minn. 1970); Lucas v. Stapp, 487 P.2d 250 (Wash. Ct. App. 1972).
" McVay v. United States, 481 F.2d 615 (5th Cir. 1973); Jones v. Freeman, 400
F.2d 383 (8th Cir. 1968).
" Graff v. Nicholl, 370 F. Supp. 974 (N.D. Ill. 1974).
" Wyatt v. Aderholdt, 368 F. Supp. 1382 (M.D. Ala. 1973).
" Freitag v. Carter, 489 F.2d 1377 (7th Cir. 1973); Raper v. Lucey, 488 F.2d 748
(1st Cir. 1973) (driver's license); Jones v. Penny, 387 F. Supp. 383 (M.D.N.C. 1974).
" Ross v. Wisconsin Dep't of Health & Social Serv., 369 F. Supp. 570 (E.D. Wisc.
1973).
, Brooks v. Center Township, 485 F.2d 383 (7th Cir. 1973).
" Pioneer Sav. & Loan Co. v. City of Cleveland, 479 F.2d 595 (6th Cir. 1973).
" Traylor v. City of Amarillo, 492 F.2d 1156 (5th Cir. 1974).
,Jondora Music Publ. Co. v. Melody Recordings, Inc., 362 F. Supp. 494, 499
(D.N.J. 1973).
" Caulder v. Durham Housing Auth., 433 F.2d 998 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 401
U.S. 1003 (1970).
" Williams v. Weinberger, 360 F. Supp. 1349 (N.D. Ga. 1973).
21 Hagopian v. Knowlton, 470 F.2d 201 (2d Cir. 1972); Brown v. Knowlton, 370 F.
Supp. 1119 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
= Crow v. California Dep't of Human Resources Dev., 490 F.2d 580 (9th Cir. 1973);
Pregent v. New Hampshire Dep't of Employment Sec., 361 F. Supp. 782 (D.N.H.
1973).
Braxton v. Municipal Court, 514 P.2d 697, 109 Cal. Rptr. 897 (1973).
24 Nork v. Superior Court, 109 Cal. Rptr. 428 (Ct. App. 1973).
Ceasar v. Kiser, 387 F. Supp. 645 (M.D.N.C. 1975); Cook v. Carlson, 364 F.
Supp. 24 (S.D.S.D. 1973); Mason v. Garris, 360 F. Supp. 420 (N.D. Ga.), modified,
364 F. Supp. 452 (1973); Adams v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 520 P.2d 961, 113
Cal. Rptr. 145 (1974).
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landlord's lien,2" banker's lien,2 garnishment,28 attachment, 2
foreclosure, lis pendens," attachment of real estate, 2 distress,3 detinue,34 possessory liens,35 and wage assignment.36
Several features strike one who considers changes in due
process in the last few years. Probably most important among
these is the concept's burgeoning expansiveness-due process
has been extended into many spheres which had previously
escaped its influence. Part I of this article will trace that extension and develop a comprehensive pattern for judging due process interests. In addition to broadening the application of due
process constraints, the deluge of liability opinions has brought
remedial issues out of the region of abstractions and into the
realm of reality, where basic decisions are inevitable. As the
opportunities for legal ex parte procedures dwindle, remedies
must be fashioned to vindicate those deprived of due process;
Part II of this article will deal with those remedial issues. The
26 Hall v. Garson, 468 F.2d 845 (5th Cir. 1972); Adams v. Joseph F. Sanson Inv.
Co., 376 F. Supp. 61 (D. Nev. 1974); Stots v. Media Real Estate Co., 355 F. Supp. 240
(E.D. Pa. 1973); Klim v. Jones, 315 F. Supp. 109 (N.D. Cal. 1970); Blye v. GlobeWernicke Realty Co., 300 N.E.2d 710, 347 N.Y.S.2d 170 (1973).
Kruger v. Wells Fargo Bank, 521 P.2d 441, 113 Cal. Rptr. 449 (1974).
28 Stackers v. Thomas, 374 F. Supp. 178 (D.S.D. 1974); Union Barge Line Corp.
v. Marble Cliff Quarries Co., 374 F. Supp. 834 (S.D.W. Va. 1974); Morrow Elec. Co.
v. Cruse, 370 F. Supp. 639 (N.D. Ga. 1974); Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 360 F.
Supp. 720 (D. Conn. 1973); Raigoza v. Sperl, 110 Cal. Rptr. 296 (Ct. App. 1973).
29 Harrison v. Morris, 370 F. Supp. 142 (D.S.C. 1974); In re Northwest Homes of
Chehalis, Inc., 363 F. Supp. 725 (W.D. Wash. 1973); Clement v. Four North State St.
Corp., 360 F. Supp. 933 (D.N.H. 1973); McClellan v. Commercial Credit Corp., 360
F. Supp. 1013 (D.R.I. 1972), affd, 409 U.S. 1120 (1973); Rlndone v. Appellate Dep't,
488 P.2d 13, 96 Cal. Rptr. 709 (1971).
" Garner v. Tri State Development Co., 382 F. Supp. 377 (E.D. Mich 1974);
Northrip v. Federal Nat'l Mtg. Ass'n, 372 F. Supp. 594 (E.D. Mich. 1974); Johnson v.
Glenn's Furniture Co., 372 F. Supp. 56 (N.D. Ga. 1974); Law v. United States Dep't
of Ag., 366 F. Supp. 1233 (N.D. Ga. 1973).
36 Gunter v. Merchants Warren Nat'l Bank, 360 F. Supp. 1085 (S.D. Me. 1973).
12 Bay State Harness Horse Racing &Breeding Ass'n, Inc. v. PPG Industries, Inc.,
365 F. Supp. 1299 (D. Mass. 1973).
" Shaffer v. Holbrook, 346 F. Supp. 762 (S.D.W. Va. 1972); Holt v. Brown, 336
F. Supp. 2 (W.D. Ky. 1971).
3 Yates v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 362 F. Supp. 520 (M.D. Ala. 1973).
31Huber v. Union Planters Nat'l Bank, 491 F.2d 846 (6th Cir. 1974); Hernandez
v. European Auto Collision, Inc., 487 F.2d 378 (2d Cir. 1973); Adams v. Department
of Motor Vehicles, 520 P.2d 961, 113 Cal. Rptr. 145 (1974). See also Cockerel v. Caldwell, 378 F. Supp. 491 (W.D. Ky. 1974).
36 Bond v. Dentzer, 362 F. Supp. 1373 (N.D.N.Y. 1973), rev'd, 494 F.2d 302 (2d
Cir. 1974).
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focus will be on the interplay between the theory of due process
and various remedial devices.
Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act,3 sometimes known as
the Ku Klux Klan Act, is the major vehicle for due process
suits. Coupled with § 1343(3), it provides federal jurisdiction
in such actions. 8 The Civil Rights Act is a versatile tool which
has had a vast civilizing influence, reaching beyond due process to encompass any situation in which a person has been
deprived of a consitutional right under color of law."
Nevertheless, a study of due process is inevitably a study of the
Civil Rights Act. In addition, federal jurisdiction problems and
overlapping state common law and statutory remedies often
arise in the due process context and will be dealt with as they
appear.
A short review of recent legal history is useful in understanding the new due process. Lawyers have always known that
a court should not constrict liberty or take property without
notice and a hearing. Yet in many provisonal and nonjudicial
procedures, the interests protected were hazy and the procedure required was unknown. In the late 1960's, the Supreme
Court began to consider these interests.
The intellectual foundation of the new due process was
laid in the late Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in Sniadach
v. Family Finance Corp.4" There, the majority opinion, stressing the particular issues in the appeal, struck down a wage
garnishing scheme which allowed the plaintiff to seize wages
from the defendant's employer without notice and a hearing.
Justice Harlan, meanwhile, formulated some general principles. First, he identified the interest affected as a "property"
interest protected by the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment in "the use of the garnished portion of her wages
during the interim period between the garnishment and the

"

42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1970). Sections 1983 and 1343(3) will be referred to herein-

after as the Civil Rights Acts.
1, For an excellent recent article with more general analysis of the Civil Rights
Act, see McCormack, Federalismand Section 1983: Limitations on JudicialEnforcement of ConstitutionalProtections, 60 VA. L. REv. 1 (1974). See also C. ANTMU,
FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS AcTs: CxvI, PCAcnE (1971).
'

395 U.S. 337, 342 (1969).

KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 63

culmination of the main suit." 4 ' This interest was not "de
minimus." There was no "vital governmental interest" which
would allow the state, in an emergency, to take property "by
summary administrative action taken before hearing."42
Having found that due process applied, Justice Harlan
discussed what due process required. He stated it in a sentence:
"[D]ue process is afforded only by the kinds of 'notice' and
'hearing' which are aimed at establishing the validity, or at
least the probable validity, of the underlying claim against the
alleged debtor before he can be deprived of his property or its
unrestricted use.

43

When the threshold interest and the re-

quirement of due process were established, it made no difference that the loss was not permanent, that interim relief was
possible, or that notice was received when the property was
taken. If a constitutionally cognizable interest in the use of
property was affected, prior notice and an opportunity for a
hearing were required.
After Sniadach, the advance of due process marked the
steady encroachments of a rising tide. The Supreme Court defined constitutionally cognizable interests in liberty and property in a variety of situations.44 The lower courts absorbed wave
after wave of lawsuits.
The new due process reached intellectual fullness in
Fuentes v. Shevin,4' which like Sniadach,was a debtor-creditor
case. In that action a due process attack was mounted against
statutes which allowed a plaintiff, without notice and a hearing, to secure an order requiring a state official to seize property
from a defendant. Notice and an opportunity for a hearing were
necessary, it was argued, to protect individual privacy and
property. For, absent these protections, the adversary system
cannot sort valid from invalid seizures. The state must hear
both sides first because the applicant may be mistaken, overzealous or dishonest. Due process, in short, prevents litigants
from misusing state machinery.
41 Id.
42

Id. at 343.

43 Id.

41 Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593
(1972); Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535
(1971).
5 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
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The majority of the Court, persuaded by this logic, invalidated the statutes. In so doing, it articulated the intellectual
underpinning of the new due process in response to several
arguments in favor of the statutes. To the proposition that the
statutes were permissible because if property were wrongfully
taken, damages could be awarded, the Court stated that afterthe-fact damages were insufficient. Undoing a consummated
wrong was not enough especially when notice and a hearing
before the taking could prevent that wrong from occurring in
the first place. Similarly, the applicant's bond was an inadequate check-the decision to use state power still turned on the
applicant's possibly biased judgment."6
The proponents of the statutes also argued that an emergency obviated notice and a hearing. The Court, however, held
that emergency cases dealt with more importunate matters
than defaulting installment buyers, matters such as spoiled or
mislabeled food and bank failures. The cases before the Court
interposed state power into private disputes and, because there
was not notice to one disputant, the state acted without adequate information."
To the argument that the installment buyers had waived
their right to due process, the Court tendered two responses.
First, the agreement was an unexplained, small-type form and
difficult to elevate to an informed waiver. Second, the form
said merely that the seller might retake the merchandise but
did not say how. This, said the Court, did not constitute a
conscious waiver of a legal right to notice and a hearing.48
Finally, it was asserted that the statutes were constitutional because: (1) the taking was not final, (2) the conditionalseller applicants had financial interests in the items, and (3)
the property was not a necessity of life. The Court rejected each
of these interrelated arguments. First, it declared, due process
is necessary before the state disturbs any significant property
interest. Second, installment buyers have a constitutionally
cognizable property interest, established by contract, in possessing the property. Third, even though the taking was temporary, the interest protected was in using the property. Even a
"Id. at 80-86.
Id. at 73-94.
"Id. at 94-97.
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"temporary" taking disturbed that interest. Last, there are no
degrees of property interests; instead, due process protects all
property interests, luxuries as well as necessities.49
The Fuentes majority owed a palpable intellectual debt to
Justice Harlan's concurrence in Sniadach.0 If an interest is
defined at the threshold as constitutionally cognizable, due
process mandates notice and an opportunity to be heard before
the state, at a private party's behest, disturbs that interest.
Moreover, the Court marshalled prior cases to show the thrust
of due process, and that more recent developments were in the
mainstream of due process.5'
Justice White, dissenting, rejected the Harlan-Stewart
method of delimiting constitutionally cognizable interests by
defining property. Instead, he adduced a different analysis of
fourteenth amendment property interests: "[I]n the typical
installment sale of personal property both the seller and the
buyer have interests in the property until the purchase price if
fully paid.
...
5 Thus, Justice White narrowed the issue to
secured consumer transactions and perceived the interests to
be less clearcut. The questioned procedures accommodated the
interests of both parties to the tranaction: "[Tihe buyer loses
use of the property temporarily but is protected against loss;
the seller is protected against deterioration of the property but
most undertake by bond to make the buyer whole in the event
the latter prevails.""3 To invalidate these procedures, Justice
White observed, "represents no more than ideological tinkering
with state law." 4
It may be argued that Fuentes' principles apply only to
"property" interests, but that limited view is difficult to conceive. 5 "Liberty" is difficult to distinguish from "property"
and if the two can be distinguished, it is incongruous to exalt
one over the other." The idea underlying Fuentes, simply
' Id. at 85-91.

The short concurrence is cited for at least four major points. See 407 U.S. 67,
85 n.15, 86, 90 n.21, 91 n.23, 97 (1972).
Id. at 88-89.
'z Id. at 99.
53

Id. at 100.

-4 Id. at 102.
" Cf. Murphy, Free Speech and the Interest in Local Law and Order, 1 J. PuB.
L. 40, 58 (1952).
58See Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 552 (1972):
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stated, is that it is alien to our political and legal traditions for
people to be governed in their daily lives by decisions in which
they have had no voice. This idea springs from an increasing
awareness of individual dignity and worth and of the value of
citizens participating in the process of government. As this idea
advances, whim, caprice and secrecy will decline. Procedural
fairness is, above all, a conservative doctrine because it exacts
cautious, deliberate decision-making and serves as a brake on
rapid change. At the same time, fair procedure insures rule by
law. "The history of liberty," Justice Frankfurter wrote, "has
largely been the history of observance of procedural safeguards." 57
Fuentes, a four to three decision by a court of seven, hung
by a thread for almost two years. The tide of lower court cases
became a torrent. Then in December of 1973, attorneys argued
Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co. before the Supreme Court.
Mitchell concerned the constitutionality of repossessing consumer collateral by sequestering the property under the Louisiana vendor's privilege. The assailed procedure varied only in
detail from the replevin statutes struck down in Fuentes but
counsel for the seller argued that Fuentes could be distinguished without being overruled. 8
The decision in Mitchell59 was ultimately rendered in May
of 1974. Justice White authored the majority opinion; Justice
Powell wrote a concurring opinion; Justice Stewart dissented
for himself and two others; and Justice Brennan dissented separately. The Louisiana procedure, the Court held, did not deny
due process. Fuentes was not overruled but distinguished. NevSuch difficulties indicate that the dichotomy between personal liberties and
property rights is a false one. Property does not have rights. People have
rights. The right to enjoy property without unlawful deprivation, no less than
the right to speak or the right to travel, is in truth, a "personal" right,
whether the "property" in question be a welfare check, a home, or a savings
account. In fact, a fundamental interdependence exists between the personal
right to liberty and the personal right in property. Neither could have meaning without the other.
See also Kenyon v. City of Chicopee, 70 N.E.2d 241 (Mass. 1946); Cohen, Transcendental Nonescence and the FunctionalApproach, 35 COLUM. L. Rsv. 809, 815-16
(1935).
" McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 347 (1943).
Arguments before the Court: Installment Sales, 42 U.S.L.W. 3345 (U.S. Dec.
11, 1973).
51416 U.S. 600 (1974).
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ertheless, as is always true when a case is "distinguished" in a
later decision by a dissenter in the original case, both opinions
must be examined carefully to determine whether the earlier
opinion's continuing vitality is real or merely apparent."
The Mitchell majority opinion, properly conceived, turns
on a narrow question. In a consumer credit transaction, does
the debtor-buyer or the creditor-seller have a right to the secured property? Under state law, the majority stated "both the
seller and buyer had current real interests in the property."6
Under Louisiana law, the debtor-buyer may transfer the property to a bona fide purchaser and if the transferee takes possession of the property, the creditor-seller loses his vendor's lien
or privilege against the property, retaining only an in personam
right against the debtor-buyer."2
Given the dual interests and the ease with which the
debtor-buyer might prejudice or destroy the creditor-seller's
rights by transferring the property to a bona fide purchaser,
hiding it or destroying it, the constitutional question was
whether the procedural scheme accorded due process to the
debtor-buyer. Several factors strengthened the majority's conclusion that it did. Even though the provisional writ issued
upon ex parte application, the creditor-applicant was required
to post a bond and allege specific facts. Further, the issuesdebt, default, and possession-were capable of documentary
proof; a judge issued the writ; the sheriff retained the property for ten days; the debtor could apply immediately to dissolve the writ; and if the writ were improperly issued, the
debtor would be entitled to damages, attorney's fees, and the
property.63
How Mitchell will affect Fuentes remains to be determined, especially since Mitchell rests on the premise that Justice White expressed in his Fuentes dissent. Since in a secured
transaction both the debtor and the creditor have a property
interest in the secured property, the procedures involved must
accommodate both these interests. Fuentes rests on the thresh6 See id. at 623 (Powell, J., concurring).
" Id. at 604.
62 In re Trahan, 283 F. Supp. 620 (W.D. La.), aff'd per curiam, 402 F.2d 796 (5th
Cir. 1968), cert. denied sub noma.Berhard v. Beneficial Fin.. 394 U.S. 930 (1969).
" 416 U.S. 600, 604-06 (1974).
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old premise that the debtors contractual right to possess the
property is a constitutionally cognizable property interest and
the mere possession cannot be disturbed without notice and a
hearing. Particular procedural protections may vary depending
on the interests at stake, but notice and an opportunity for a
hearing are mandated before this interest may be disturbed.84
There is, it is true, a basis in legal reality to distinguish
Louisiana law from that of the other 49 states. In Louisiana,
the vendor's privilege is defeated when a bona fide purchaser
possesses the secured property. In jurisdictions which have
enacted the Uniform Commercial Code, an installment seller
who files properly does not lose his security interest in the
property even though the transferee from the debtor possesses
it.6" Thus, in Louisiana, as distinguished from commercial code
jurisdictions, the interests are truly dual. However, Justice
White first developed his dual interest analysis in Fuentes
which did not involve Louisiana personal property law. Therefore, while the creditor's rights against the secured property
possessed by third parties is a factor in Mitchell, it is not the
sole basis for the decision.
The principal doctrinal difference between Mitchell and
Fuentes, however, flows from the way this threshold interest is
conceived. Doctrinally, Mitchell only affects due process in
repossessing secured personal property. Justice Stewart, dissenting, stated that "the deprivation of property in this case is
identical to that at issue in Fuentes."8 He criticized the majority for approving factors in Mitchell which were disapproved in
Fuentes: the allegations were specific but nonetheless could not
be contradicted; a judge is required but unless both sides are
heard the act is not considered; and the issues are relatively
simple but that is irrelevant to notice and a hearing. 7 But the
result appears to flow from the majority's view that the interests in secured property were dual, an issue which Justice
Stewart does not confront.
The majority can be criticized for a more fundamental
Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 82, 87 n.18, 90 n.21 (1972).
UNIFORM COMMERICAL CODE

§ 9-307(2) (1972 text). See also LA. REV.

STAT. §

9:5354 (1950)(comparable protection by chattel mortgage).
' Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 631 (1974) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
"Id. at 631-34.
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reason. From Justice Harlan's concurrence in Sniadach
through Fuentes, the Supreme Court's due process analysis
entailed a two-step inquiry. The first question was whether
there was a constitutionally cognizable interest. If the answer
to the first question was yes, the Court then asked the second
question: What procedural protections does due process require? But under the approach in Mitchell, if the interests are
dual, the Court must combine the two questions"8 and weigh
the interests against one another. This dilutes Fuentes' "first
define, then balance" approach and may diffuse analysis of due
process interests.
In future decisions, Mitchell may be read broadly or, alternatively, confined to its rather narrow and unique set of
facts-sequestration of personal property-security by means of
judge-issued writs in Orleans Parish. If the former, then
Mitchell may well sound a requiem for the new due process; a
signal to lower courts and legislatures that the due process tide
has turned. On the other hand, if the latter more nearly approximates reality, Mitchell may become no more than a mere
aberration, little affecting the two-step 9 Fuentes "constitutionally congnizable interest" due process analysis. The observer can only speculate.70 This article, though advocating a
broad construction of Fuentes and due process, proceeds in the
face of uncertainty, and attempts to limn prior cases and discern the trend of the future. The recent case of North Georgia
Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc.7" suggests that Mitchell was
not in fact the death knell of Fuentes. There, in an opinion by
Justice White, author of the Mitchell opinion, the Court relied
upon Fuentes to hold a prejudgement garnishment invalid.
Mitchell was distinguished because the supportive affidavit
was merely conclusory in form, and there was no judge to over" See, e.g., id. at 624, 625 (Powell, J., concurring).
"9 Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 405 U.S. 538 (1972); Board of Regents v.
Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972); Perry v. -Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
70Early commentary on Fuentes emphasized the financial situations of the parties. See, e.g., Countryman, The Bill of Rights and the Bill Collector, 15 Am. L. Rnv.
521 (1973); Note, Cumulative Remedies Under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial
Code: An Answer to Fuentes v. Shevin, 14 WM. & MARY L. REv. 213 (1972). But
obviously the case meant much more. Perhaps like Fuentes, early commentary on
Mitchell might focus upon the wrong issues.
7' 95 S. Ct. 719 (1975).
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see the entire matter. Thus, while there still is uncertainty in
the area, it is too early to sound the requiem for the new due
process.
To understand the new due process it is necessary to examine several threshold ideas. Before due process guarantees attach, there must be state action which affects a constitutionally cognizable interest. In addition, only liberty and property
interests may not be affected without due process. There is also
an exception. Even though there is state action which affects
a recognized interest, due process is not required in an emergency. It thus becomes crucial to consider liberty, property,
state action and emergency.
A.

Constitutionally Cognizable Interests: Liberty and
Property

It is difficult to include the social and economic meaning
of liberty and property within the ambit of a word formula.
Liberty comprehends more than freedom from bodily restraint,
while property encompasses more than conventional real and
personal property. Both are growing and mobile concepts. 2
Older definitions of liberty tend to be circular and are not
particularly helpful. In 1923, the Supreme Court defined liberty as the right "generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of
happiness by free men."73 Thirty years later the Court said
"liberty under law extends to the full range of conduct which
the individual is free to pursue."74 The "property" interest is
easier to grasp for it turns on the "paper" record and mutually
held, objectively discernable understanding.7 5 But forty years
ago, Felix Cohen taught that "property" as a legal conclusion
is useless." Perhaps imprecision is salutary. It allows courts the
requisite flexibility to adopt the concepts to a changing soBoard of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
74 Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 479, 499 (1954). See also Grosjean v. American Press
Co., 297 U.S. 233, 244 (1935); Richards v. Thurston, 424 F.2d 1281-85 (1st Cir. 1970);
Madiera v. Board of Educ., 386 F.2d 778, 783-84 (2d Cir. 1967).
Is Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
19 Cohen, supranote 56, at 814-17. See also Note, Entitlement Enjoyment ahd Due
Process of Law, 1974 DuKE L.J. 89 (accurate description: questionable prescription).
72
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ciety's needs and aspirations. Nevertheless, the outside boundaries of the terms liberty and property are murky.
Some uncertainties may be summarized. It is not clear
whether certain conduct or interests are liberty or property, nor
is it clear whose interest is protected. For example, In re Gault"
requires due process before a child is committed as a juvenile
delinquent. Yet it is not certain whether the interest protected
is the child's interest in being free from restraint or the parents'
interest in retaining custody of the child. It is, moreover, not
certain whether a posited interest is sufficient to be constitutionally cognizable. Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co. introduced yet
another complicating factor, dual property interests. Liberty,
it has been frequently stated, varies with the setting.78 Even if
the interest is constitutionally cognizable, it is not clear what,
in practical terms, due process requires. 9 A major source of
uncertainty is that ours is a complex, pluralistic and changing
society; the problems litigated deal with fundamental values.
Due process aims to control private abuse of public power and
to reconcile individual freedom with the social service state. It
seems inevitable, then, that major differences of opinion and
periodic changes in emphasis will be encountered. But, as time
passes, more clarity may be anticipated. The generalizations
already available will become more precise as the decided cases
place fact patterns in and out of the categories.
The above-discussed uncertainties notwithstanding, some
general conclusions about liberty and property interests can be
drawn. "Liberty" refers to status and conduct. Liberty interests are the leftovers, those not protected under the Bill of
Rights or fourteenth amendment "life" or "property." The liberty concept is currently growing because of due process and
other lawsuits postulating intangible and novel interests
against the state or other citizens. The difficulty of developing
an intelligible frame of reference around the liberty concept is
apparent. Still more apparent is the necessity of so doing, for
- 387 U.S. 1 (1967). See also Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); Newton v.
Burgin, 363 F. Supp. 782 (W.D.N.C. 1973); McGee v. Moyer, 60 F.R.D. 578 (W.D. Va.
1973); C.V.C. v. Superior Ct., 106 Cal. Rptr. 123 (Ct. App. 1973).
79 See, e.g., Lansdale v. Tyler Junior College, 470 F.2d 659, 662 (5th Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 411 U.S. 986 (1973).
" The Supreme Court 1971 Term, 86 HARv. L. REv. 1, 90-91 (1972).
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liberty is vital to our notion of a limited government and our
preference for individual decision-making, unfettered by governmental constraints."°
Where liberty interests are involved, there are three possible results, the differences- in which flow from the varied
magnitude of the interests the citizens postulate as liberty. In
the first class, the citizens interest is so significant that the
government cannot interfere at all. This is where Judge Clark,
quoting Faulkner, said "the Law stops and just people
starts."'" This class now includes such disparate interests as a
pregnant female's interest in terminating a pregnancy during
the thirteen weeks following conception82 and a college student's interest in remaining unshorn. s3 Procedural due process
is not involved in this class of liberty interests.
The second class of liberty interests is generic. It includes
economic, expressive and locomotive conduct. Examples are
boycotting, picketing and demonstrating. These interests must
be protected as liberty because it is generally held that they are
not entitled to full fledged first amendment status. 4 This second class also includes other interests such as freedom from
government action which attaches a stigma, restrains personal
freedom or works a hardship. Examples are branding a person
a drunk, committing an individual as mentally ill and impos10Meyer v.

Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).

8,Lansdale v. Tyler Junior College, 470 F.2d 659, 662 (5th Cir. 1972) (en banc),
cert. denied, 411 U.S. 986 (1973).
2 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153-54 (1973) (constitutional privacy founded upon
fourteenth amendment liberty). See also Justice Stewart concurring id. at 167-71.
Wellington, Common Law Rules and ConstitutionalDouble Standards: Some Notes
on Adjudication, 83 YALE L.J. 221, 299-311 (1973).
93 Lansdale v. Tyler Junior College, 470 F.2d 659, 662 (5th Cir. 1972) (en banc),
cert. denied, 411 U.S. 986 (1973); See also Dwen v. Barry, 483 F.2d 1126 (2d Cir. 1973)
(patrolman); Black v. Rizzo, 360 F. Supp. 648 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (fireman); Harris v.
Kaine, 352 F. Supp. 769, 775-77 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (army reserve haircut; wearing wig
at reserve meetings); Smith v. Sampson, 349 F. Supp. 268 (D.N.H. 1972) (pretrial
detainee's haircut); Chambers v. California Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd., 109 Cal.
Rptr. 413 (Ct. App. 1973) (mechanic unemployed for length of hair could continue
receiving unemployment even though continued unemployment caused by refusal to
cut hair).
" See, e.g., Mims v. Duvall County School Bd., 350 F. Supp. 553 (M.D. Fla. 1972);
Sumbry v. Land, 195 S.E.2d 228, 234 (Ga. Ct. App. 1972); Board of Educ. v. Kankakee
Fed. of Teachers Local 886, 264 N.E.2d 18, 21 (Ill.
1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 904
(1971).
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ing discipline in prison. In this class, the state may regulate
after according procedural due process.
In the third group of cases in which a liberty interest is
asserted, the claim is rejected. The interest is so small, the
court holds that no liberty is involved. Therefore, the person
has no constitutionally cognizable interest and the state may
proceed without concern for procedural due process.
Fourteenth amendment property interests are also expanding. The courts are developing the concept of property in
a novel way, a type of "new property. '8 5 The "new property"
is analogous to the second class of liberty interests and perhaps
overlaps somewhat. But this overlap creates few problems, because if an interest in either liberty or property is found the
result is the same. The interests may be affected only after
extending procedural due process. There is also a class of property cases where, as in the third class of liberty cases, a property interest is asserted but rejected. Here, too, the state may
proceed without due process.
In Board of Regents v. Roth" and Perry v. Sindermann,8 7
the Court examined the minimum interest in both liberty and
property. The question in each was whether a college teacher's
employment could be terminated without a hearing. Both district courts decided the teacher's claim without a plenary hearing on motion for summary judgment. In both cases the Court
first considered the property issue, i.e., whether the teachers
had a reasonable expectancy of continued employment. In
Perry the Court found an arguable de facto tenure policy, and
this interest could be sufficiently cognizable as property.
Though Robert Sindermann had not been extended tenure, the
school officials may have created a reasonable expectancy of
continued employment. Since Mr. Sindermann alleged a cognizable property interest, that interest could not be dismissed
without according Sindermann an opportunity to prove de
facto terms. Though a liberty interest had been asserted, the
13Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1972); Brooks v. Center Township, 485 F.2d
383 (7th Cir. 1973); In re Ming, 469 F.2d 1352, 1355-56 (7th Cir. 1972); Ross v. Wisconsin Dep't of Health and Social Serv., 369 F. Supp. 570 (E.D. Wis. 1973). See Reich,
The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964).
" 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
408 U.S. 593 (1972).
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Court found it unnecessary to pursue that issue. But in Roth,
the teacher had been explicitly employed for a single academic
year and had no promise of reemployment. The Court predictably found no sufficient expectancy of continued employment to
amount to property, and then went on to consider the asserted
"liberty" interest. The issue was whether any reasons were
given for the failure to reemploy which would be stigmatic
enough to interfere with the teacher's search for future employment. At the summary judgment stage in the litigation, the
Court found none. But Roth was remanded to build a record
on that issue. Thus, both cases were sent back to district court.
In deciding whether due process was compelled, the Court
looked to the presence, not the magnitude, of the citizen interest. It refused to balance state and citizen interests, observing
"[W]e must look not to the 'weight' but to the nature of the
interest at stake."88 Of course, the demonstration of liberty or
property is a question of fact, 9 and if either is shown, the state
cannot act without due process." Once it has been determined
that due process applies, i.e., that there is a cognizable liberty
or property interest, the Court will "weigh" the citizen and
state interests to determine what particular procedures due
process requires. 9
In Roth, the Court explicitly repudiated the "wooden" distinction between "rights" which give rise to procedural protections and "privileges" which do not.2 Fundamentally the Roth" Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570-71 (1972). This threshold interest
test was followed in Fuentes v. Shevin. The majority found a contractual interest in
possessing the property which was a constitutionally cognizable property interest
under the fourteenth amendment. 407 U.S. 67 (1972). But Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co.
found dual interests in a similar secured transaction. Goss v. Lopez, 95 S.Ct. 729, 739
(1975) (grievous loss test rejected by majority of five). See also Morrissey v. Brewer,
408 U.S. 471, 480, 482 (1972) (grievous loss balancing test); City of Kenosha v. Bruno,
412 U.S. 507, 515 (1973) (Roth-Perry analysis suggested); Ross v. Wisconsin Dep't of
Health and Social Serv., 369 F. Supp. 570, 571 (E.D. Wis. 1973); McCormack, 60 VA.
L. Rav. 1, 65 (1974).
" Moore v. Knowles, 482 F.2d 1069, 1072 (5th Cir. 1973).
See McDowell v. Texas, 465 F.2d 1342, 1347-50 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 410
U.S. 943 (1972).
" Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 491, 492 (1972). See also Graham v. Knutzen, 351
F. Supp. 652, 664-66 (N.D. Ill.
1972). Cf. Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 151-58
(1974).
32 408 U.S. 564, 573 (1972). See generally Van Alstyne, The Demise of the RightPrivilege Distinction in ConstitutionalLaw, 81 HARv. L. Rav. 1439 (1968); K. DAVIS,

KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 63

Perry idea is that if there is a cognizable liberty or property
interest, the authorities are compelled to accord due process
before the interest may be affected. If, however, there is no
interest, the government may proceed without due process
even though the individual is adversely affected.13 The libertyproperty test, it may be argued, resurrects the repudiated
right-privilege distinction-in a new guise. The Roth-Perryanalysis and the right-privilege dichotomy do in fact have one thing
in common: both formulate a cut-off. If the interest postulated
does not meet this minimum, it is wasteful to require a hearing.
The Roth-Perry test, however, is an advance over the rightprivilege distinction because it is a fresh start. The "learning"
accumulated around the right-privilege doctrine can be discarded and the courts can begin anew to sort out those interests
felt to be important enough for due process.
Like Perry and Roth, many recent liberty-property cases
have arisen in educational settings. In fact, several recent opinions have applied the Roth-Perry test to teacher terminations
and found no cognizable interest. 4 Typically, a contract for a
term is not renewed and no opprobrious reasons are given. In
such cases, there is neither an objective expectancy of continued employment nor an interference with future employment
prospects. The teacher lacks recourse unless the decision
turned on an impermissible basis such as dismissal due to the
§§ 7.12-7.14 (3d ed. 1972). Cases rejecting the distinction
include, e.g., Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972) (parole revocation); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 374 (1971) (government employment); Goldberg v.
Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 (1970) (public assistance); Sands v. Wainwright, 357 F. Supp.
1062, 1079 (M.D. Fla. 1973)(prison discipline).
'1 See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 575 (1972):
It stretches the concept too far to suggest that a person is deprived of "liberty" when he simply is not rehired in one job but remains as free as before
to seek another. . . . Mere proof, for example, that his record of nonretention in one job taken alone, might make him somewhat less attractive to
some other employers would hardly establish the kind of foreclosure of opportunties amounting to a deprivation of liberty.
1, See, e.g., Bradford v. Tarrant County Jr. College Dist., 492 F.2d 133 (5th Cir.
1974); Jeffries v. Turkey Run Consol. School Dist., 492 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1974); Robbinson v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 485 F.2d 1381 (5th Cir. 1973); Lipp v. Board of
Educ., 470 F.2d 802 (7th Cir. 1972); Fisher v. Snyder, 476 F.2d 375 (8th Cir. 1973);
Donahue v. Staunton, 471 F.2d 475 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 955 (1972); Watts
v. Board of Curators, 363 F. Supp. 883 (W.D. Mo. 1973); Moore v. Gaston County Bd.
of Educ., 357 F. Supp. 1037 (W.D.N.C. 1973).
ADMINSTRATwE LAW TExT
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exercise of first amendment rights." Even so, freedom to speak
out may be construed narrowly to advance a presumed interest
in harmony." A teacher, finally, has an insufficient interest to
compel a hearing upon failure to promote. 7
The property cases from educational institutions are fairly
straightforward. If an objectively discernable, mutual understanding of continued employment based on a "paper" record
of some kind is found, the teacher has a constitutionally cognizable property interest. Statutory tenure is an adequate expectancy of continued employment," and since property grows
out of both contractual arrangements and implied mutual understandings,0 0 de facto tenure has been recognized as a property interest. 10' In contrast, a unilateral, subjective hope is an
insufficient property interest.1 2 In the absence of a contract,
understanding or statutory tenure, there is no property interest. 113 Due process requirements attach not only to dismissal or
11See, e.g., Fisher v. Snyder, 476 F.2d 375 (8th Cir. 1973); Donahue v. Staunton,
471 F.2d 475 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 955 (1972); Moore v. Gaston County Bd.
of Educ., 357 F. Supp. 1087 (W.D.N.C. 1973). But see Amburgey v. Cassady, 370 F.
Supp. 571 (E.D. Ky. 1974).
"1See Hetrick v. Martin, 480 F.2d 705 (6th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1075
(1973); Vanderzahden v. Lowell School Dist. No. 71, 369 F. Supp. 67 (D. Ore. 1973).
See also Rowe v. Forrester, 368 F. Supp. 1355, 1357 (M.D. Ala. 1974); Abbott v.
Tetford, 354 F. Supp.'1280 (M.D. Ala. 1973).
" Olson v. Trustees of Cal. State Univ., 351 F. Supp. 430 (C.D. Cal. 1972). See
also Schwartz v. Thompson, 497 F.2d 430 (2d Cir. 1974)(merely failing to promote,
with no discharge or demotion, does not affect liberty or property); Green v. Board of
Regents, 474 F.2d 594 (5th Cir. 1973); Rowe v. Forrester, 363 F. Supp. 1355 (M.D. Ala.
1974) (teaching assignment); Zumalt v. Trustees of Cal. State Colleges, 107 Cal. Rptr.
573 (removal of department chairman), aff'd, 109 Cal. Rptr. 344, 351 (Ct. App. 1973).
' See, e.g., Ortwein v. Mackey, 358 F. Supp. 705, 710-11 (M.D. Cal. 1973).
" See, e.g., Lyman v. Swartley, 385 F. Supp. 661, 665 (D. Idaho 1974); Peacock
v. Board of Regents, 380 F. Supp. 1081, 1087 (D. Ariz. 1974); Bowing v. Board of
Trustees of Green River Com. Col., 521 P.2d 220, 225 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974).
IN Soni v. Board of Trustees of the Univ. of Tenn., 376 F. Supp. 289 (E.D. Tenn.
1974) (professor allowed to exercise rights and privileges ordinarily only given to tenured faculty, told he would be recommended for tenure upon attaining citizenship);
Thomas v. Ward, 374 F. Supp. 206 (M.D.N.C. 1974) (language in teacher's handbook
could lead teacher to believe tenure automatic after 3 years).
"I Huntley v. North Carolina Bd. of Educ., 493 F.2d 1016, 1021 (4th Cir. 1974);
Pelisek v. Trevor State Graded School Dist. No. 7, 371 F. Supp. 1064 (E.D. Wis. 1974);
Chung v. Park, 369 F. Supp. 959 (M.D. Pa. 1974); Ward v. Board of Regents, 360 F.
Supp. 1179 (E.D. Ky. 1973); See also Anderson v. Denny, 365 F. Supp. 1254, 1260
(W.D. Va. 1973) (custom of tenant permanency).
"7 Schultz v. School Dist., 367 F. Supp. 467, 471 (D.Nev.1973).
"7 McNeill v. Butz, 480 F.2d 314, 320 (4th Cir. 1973); Hirsch v. Green, 368 F.

KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 63

failure to rehire. A demotion also affects a property right, and
the procedure used to demote must comply with due process." 4
The "liberty" interest is more difficult. Liberty as used
here embodies two similar ideas." 5 The first is the citizen's
interest in relations with the community at large,0 ' which is
injured by damage to good name, reputation, honor and integrity. 1 7 In Perry, the Supreme Court defined "liberty" in such
a way as to closely parallel the Restatement of Torts definition
of defamation. At § 559, the Restatement says that a statement
defames if it will "deter third parties from . . . dealing" with
the object of the statement. The second is the interest in economic or employment relations which is injured by events or
disparagement which hamper freedom to take advantage of
economic opportunities." °' The clearest injury to community
and economic relations is to be accused of dishonesty.0 9 Teachers are particularly vulnerable to charges of sexual improprieties."1 Others are conclusory charges of racism, disloyalty, misconduct, improper conduct, insubordination, or hostility."'
Supp. 1061 (D. Md. 1973); Velger v. Cawley, 366 F. Supp. 874,877-78 (S.D.N.Y. 1973);
Snead v. Department of Social Serv., 355 F. Supp. 764, 771 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). Cf.
Johnson v. Fraley, 470 F.2d 179 (4th Cir. 1972) (29 years service gives rise to something); Perkins v. Regents, 353 F. Supp. 618 (C.D. Cal. 1973) (7 years).
I" Davis v. Barr, 373 F. Supp. 740 (E.D. Tenn. 1973) (tenured teacher-coach
removed from coaching position, though remaining on faculty as teacher).
101Cf. Green, Basic Concepts: Persons,Property,Relations, 24 A.B.A.J. 65 (1938)
in LrrIGATION PROCESs IN TORT LAw 413 (L. Green ed. 1965).
10 Pelisek v. Trevoe Graded School Dist., 371 F. Supp. 1064 (E. D. Wis. 1974).
1* Lengthy service alone is not enough; some stigma must attach. Cannady v.
Person County Bd. of Educ., 375 F. Supp. 689 (M.D.N.C. 1974). There the plaintiff
had been teaching in the school system for 19 years. The stated reason for the removal
was ineffectiveness in team teaching. The court analyzed the case on the issue of denial
of liberty, and held that in order to be a denial there must be a stigma or other
disability attaching to the dismissal, or injury to the teacher's good name, which was
lacking in this case. Id. at 699-700.
I' Manos v. City of Green Bay, 372 F. Supp. 40 (E.D. Wis. 1974); Velger v.
Cawley, 366 F. Supp. 874, 878 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
I" Huntley v. North Carolina Bd. of Educ., 493 F.2d 1016, 1019 (4th Cir. 1974);
McNeill v. Butz, 480 F.2d 314, 319-20 (4th Cir. 1973); Hirsch v. Green, 368 F. Supp.
1061 (D. Md. 1973); Schunemann v. United States, 358 F. Supp. 875 (N.D. Ill. 1973).
See also Hostrop v. Board of Junior College, 471 F.2d 488, 494 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
412 U.S. 939 (1972) (veracity).
11*Drake v. Covington County Bd. of Educ., 371 F. Supp. 974 (M.D. Ala. 1974);
Dause v. Bates, 369 F. Supp. 139, 149 (W.D. Ky. 1973).
I Wellner v. Minnesota State Junior College Bd., 487 F.2d 153, 158 (8th Cir.
1973); Wilderman v. Nelson, 467 F.2d 1173, 1176 (8th Cir. 1972); Amburgey v. Cas-
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General accusations such as "lack of performance in the
functional program" and "failure to contribute to general -program" are sufficiently stigmatic to impinge on liberty.112 Likewise, a charge of mental illness diminishes employment
opportunities 13 and impairs economic prospects. The charge
made need not be specific-summary firing plus factual testimony that the teacher was unable to secure employment may
be adequate."' Moreover, even scheduling a "probable cause"
hearing may "dampen the reputation of an educator.""' 5 And,
as one lawsuit demonstrated, actions may speak louder than
words. In that case, a department chairman who had no "property" interest in continuing in office was removed without written reason. Subsequent to his departure, campus policemen
changed the locks and sealed the filing cabinets. The court
found interference with a constitutionally cognizable interest,
stating "the show of force implied that force was necessary:
resort to locks implied that locks were necessary." '
Other courts construe liberty differently. For example, a
single charge by a superior of being "anti-establishment" not
accompanied by further action was not considered sufficiently
damaging to impair the charged teacher's liberty."7 Also, "failure to coordinate efforts,""' "general ineffectiveness as an
sady, 370 F. Supp. 571 (E.D. Ky. 1974); Larkin v. Withrow, 367 F. Supp. 796 (E.D.
Wis. 1973); Buggs v. City of Minneapolis, 358 F. Supp. 1340, 1343 (D. Minn. 1973).
"' Ortwein v. Mackey, 358 F. Supp. 705, 713 (M.D. Fla. 1973).
", Lombard v. Board of Education of the City of New York, 502 F.2d 631 (2d Cir.
1974); Stewart v. Pearce, 484 F.2d 1031 (9th Cir. 1973); Snead v. Department of Social
Serv., 355 F. Supp. 764, 771 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
1
"' Rafferty v. Philadelphia Psychiatric Center, 356 F. Supp. 500, 510-11 (E.D. Pa.
1973). See also the factual testimony in Ortwein v. Mackey, 358 F. Supp. 705, 713
(M.D. Fla. 1973).
"' Haines v. Askew, 386 F. Supp. 369, 373 (M.D. Fla. 1973).
Zumwalt v. Trustees of the Cal. State Colleges, 109 Cal. Rptr. 344, 353 (Ct.
App. 1973).
"I Lipp v. Board of Educ., 470 F.2d 802, 805 (7th Cir. 1972). Compare Snead v.
Department of Social Serv., 355 F. Supp. 764, 771 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). Some courts give
rather short shrift to the issue of denial of liberty. In Frazier v. Curators of the Univ.
of Mo., 495 F.2d 1149 (8th Cir. 1974), the court turned the case on the lack of tenure,
saying that a non-tenured professor can be dismissed for any reason that is not constitutionally impermissible. This resulted even though a letter to Dr. Frazier, included
in her file, was severely critical of her emotional stability and scholarly ability.
"S Shrick v. Thomas, 486 F.2d 691 (7th Cir. 1973), aff'd, 408 U.S. 940 (1973). See
also Irby v. McGowam, 380 F. Supp. 1024 (S.D. Ala. 1974) (charge of being "noncooperative" does not deprive individual of liberty without further proof of injury to
reputation).
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"insufficient academic performance,"'120 and

other serious professional criticism1 2' were held not to injure the
employee's liberty interest. Allegations that future employ22
ment prospects were impaired were held to be insufficient.
These cases extend the statement in Roth that being less desirable for employment because of "nonretention" is not, standing alone, a constitutionally cognizable interest. 23 Yet they are
difficult to reconcile with the decisions in the preceding paragraphs which place primary emphasis upon the effect that the
charges have upon future employment possibilities.
To some courts, an opprobrious basis for possible adverse
24
action in the future is sufficient to require due process.' If
there are letters in the "file" which may be based on false
information, and which may diminish future opportunities,
due process attaches. 125 If this interest is to be meaningful,
2
there should be a supporting right to examine that "file."'
This approach is not without merit. Secrecy's decorous equivocation is without virture to those who feel that secrecy may be
a mask for callous exploitation.'2 They assert that the authorities "only concealed what they would have blushed to disclose"' 2 and feel that honest people do not keep cards up their
"' Robinson v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 485 F.2d 1381 (5th Cir. 1973). See
also Pavlov v. Martin, 381 F. Supp. 707 (D. Del. 1974), which held that a charge of
"incompetence" does not damage the individual's good name, and thus constitute a
denial of liberty.
"' Jablon v. Trustees of Cal. State Colleges, 482 F.2d 997 (9th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 1163 (1974).
2I Schultz v. School Dist., 367 F. Supp. 467, 473 (D.Neb. 1973). See also Blair v.
Board of Regents, 496 F.2d 322 (6th Cir. 1974), which held that damage to reputation
arising from dismissal due to failure to meet minimum requirements for a teacher's
professional relationships with students does not violate due process.
" Perkins v. Regents, 353 F. Supp. 618, 622-24 (C.D. Cal. 1973).
' Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 575 (1972).
,2,
Buggs v. City of Minneapolis, 358 F. Supp. 1340, 1343 (D. Minn. 1973). But
cf. Whatley v. Price, 368 F. Supp. 336, 339, (M.D. Ala. 1973); Kennedy v. Engle, 348
F. Supp. 1142, 1148 (E.D. N.Y. 1972).
I' Wellner v. Minnesota State Junior College Bd., 487 F.2d 153, 158 (8th Cir.
1973); Bottcher v. Florida Dep't of Ag. & Cons. Servs., 361 F. Supp. 1123, 1129 (N.D.
Fla. 1973).
' Norlander v. Schleck, 345 F. Supp. 595 (D.Minn. 1972).
": Sparrow v. Goodman, 361 F. Supp. 567, 585-86 (W.D.N.C. 1973); Wickham,
Let the Sun Shine In, 68 Nw. U.L. REv. 480 (1973).
1211 E. GIBBON, THE DECLINE AN FALL OF THE RoMAN EMPIR, 452 (Modem Lib.
Ed. 1963).
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sleeves. Some, on the other hand, think that a certain amount
of decorum may occasionally be mandated. 2 '
Non-employment cases also refine the interest necessary
to require due process. For example, a citizen's interest in the
length of his hair, it seems, is not property but rather liberty.3 0
This is true even though the sheriff who promulgated the rule
is named Sampson.' 3' A tenant in a government housing project
has a sufficient property interest to compel notice and a hearing before failing to renew.' In prisons, forfeiture of "good
time" or any significant time in "segregation" constricts liberty
sufficiently to require due process. 33 If a student is to be suspended from school for 10 days or more, his interest in securing
an education is affected and the authorities must accord a prior
hearing.'34 A student's liberty is also interfered with if he is
dismissed from an honor society for misconduct, and the disI' Haines v. Askew, 368 F. Supp. 369, 376 (M.D. Fla. 1973). But the mere lodging
of unfavorable memoranda in a file is not alone sufficient to give rise to a constitutionally cognizable grievance. There must be allegations that the entry of these memoranda has or is likely to lead to disciplinary action or sanctions; will delay or prevent
later favorable action; chill the exercise of first amendment rights; or in some other
way damage or threaten to damage the complainant. Collins v. Wolfson, 498 F.2d 1100,
1104 (5th Cir. 1974); see also Sims v. Fox, 505 F.2d 857, 863-64 (5th Cir. 1974).
"I
Dwen v. Barry, 483 F.2d 1126, 1130 (2d Cir. 1973); Black v. Rizzo, 360 F. Supp.
648, 651 (E.D. Pa. 1973); Harris v. Kaine, 352 F. Supp. 769, 775-76 (S.D.N.Y. 1972);
Chambers v. California Unemployment Ins. App. Bd., 109 Cal. Rptr. 413, 415 (Ct.
App. 1973); Finot v. Pasadena City Bd. of Educ., 58 Cal. Rptr. 520, 526-27 (Ct. App.
1967). But cf. Rinehart v. Brewer, 360 F. Supp. 105, 112 (S.D. Iowa 1973), afl'd, 491
F.2d 705 (8th Cir. 1974). The Seventh Circuit of the United States Court of Appeals
has taken a position that will perhaps make dismissals due to the personal appearance
of the employee not cognizable in federal courts. In Miller v. School District No. 167,
Cook County, Illinois, 495 F.2d 658 (7th Cir. 1974), the court held that even if the
plaintiff could prove that dislike for his appearance was a factor in the school board's
decision to dismiss him, such claim did not allege a violation of deprivation of liberty
forbidden by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. The court said that
the board had a legitimate interest in protecting the image projected by school teachers, and to protect the students from being subjected to teachers whose appearance
they deemed harmful. Additionally, the court suggested that the board's discretion
would not be over-turned unless it was acting without good faith.
"I, Smith v. Sampson, 349 F.2d 1236 (4th Cir. 1973).
, Joy v. Daniels, 479 F.2d 1236 (4th Cir. 1973).
13 Braxton v. Carlson, 483 F.2d 933, 937 (3d Cir. 1973); Johnson v. Anderson, 370
F. Supp. 1373 (D. Del. 1974); Diamond v. Thompson, 364 F. Supp. 659, 664-65 (M.D.
Ala. 1973); United States ex rel. Jones v. Rundle, 358 F. Supp. 939, 944 (E.D. Pa.
1973).
,u Goss v. Lopez, 95 S. Ct. 729 (1975); Strickland v. Inlow, 485 F.2d 186, 190 (8th
Cir. 1973), vacated and remanded sub nom. Wood v. Strickland, 95 S. Ct. 992 (1975).
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missal procedure does not conform to due process requirements. This dismissal is a blackmark on his educational record
that is an injury to his integrity and good name and can adversely affect his future. 135 Similarly, liberty is hindered when
a driver's license application is denied without reasons.' 6 The
California Court of Appeals held that prospective adoptive parents have an interest in the custody of an adoptable child suffi3
cient to compel notice and a hearing before the child is taken.' 1
In addition, serious charges against a physician impinge upon
a constitutionally cognizable interest and give rise to due process. 38' Finally, the next of kin of soldiers "missing in action"
have a cognizable interest in proceedings which may deprive
them of statutory benefits and, accordingly, have a right to due
process.'3 9
Mitchell's view that both the buyer-debtor and the sellercreditor have an interest in secured personal property may create difficulties in defining constitutionally cognizable "old"
property interests. Litigants have questioned various legally
and statutorily created liens. After Fuentes, many courts followed the Harlan-Stewart analysis and found that an owner or
one entitled to possession has a constitutionally cognizable interest in using and alienating property and that this interest is
sufficient to compel notice or an opportunity to be heard before
possession or liquidity is circumscribed."' Mitchell's dual in" Warren v. National Ass'n of Secondary School Principals, 375 F. Supp. 1043
(N.D. Tex. 1974).
11 Freitag v. Carter, 489 F.2d 1377 (7th Cir. 1973); Raper v. Lacey, 488 F.2d 748,
752 (1st Cir. 1973).
131 C.V.C. v. Superior Court, 106 Cal. Rptr. 123 (Ct. App. 1973).
' Suarez v. Weaver, 484 F.2d 678 (7th Cir. 1973); Larkin v. Withrow, 368 F.
Supp. 796 (E.D.Wis. 1973); Suckle v. Madison Gen. Hosp., 362 F. Supp. 1196, 1209
(W.D. Wis. 1973). Additionally, a physician's staff privileges in a hospital are a constitutionally cognizable interest, and the procedures used for denying or rescinding them
must meet due process requirements. Christhilf v. Annapolis Emergency Hosp. Ass'n,
496 F.2d 174 (4th Cir. 1974); Poe v. Charlotte Mem. Hosp., Inc., 374 F. Supp. 1302
(W.D.N.C. 1974).
"' McDonald v. McLucas, 371 F. Supp. 831 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
10 Graff v. Nicholl, 370 F. Supp. 974 (N.D. Ill. 1974); Bay State Harness Horse
Racing & Breeding Ass'n Inc. v. PPG Industries, Inc., 365 F. Supp. 1299, 1304-05 (D.
Mass. 1973); Gunter v. Merchants Warren Nat'l Bank, 360 F. Supp. 1085, 1090 (S.D.
Me. 1973); Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 360 F. Supp. 720, 723 (D. Conn. 1973);
Mason v. Garris, 360 F. Supp. 420, 423 (N.D. Ga. 1973), modified, 364 F. Supp. 452
(1973); Nork v. Superior Court, 109 Cal. Rptr. 428, 432 (Ct. App. 1973). But cf. Harri-
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terest analysis leaves these cases in doubt. In answer to counsel's concern that affirming Mitchell "would set off a rip tide,"
the Court stated that "our decision will not affect recent cases
dealing with garnishment or summary self-help remedies of
secured creditors or landlords.""'4 But the Court also noted that
it "had unanimously approved prejudgment attachment liens
effected by creditors without notice, hearing or judicial
order."' 4 2
The better course of decision is to resolve these incongruous statements by limiting Mitchell's dual interest analysis
to consensually created written security interests.' The owner
or possessor should have a cognizable, due process interest in
using or alienating property unless the property was subject to
a consensual security agreement. Attaching property to accomplish jurisdiction may have been acceptable before in personam jurisdiction was expanded by long-arm statutes. Today,
however, personal jurisdiction is almost always available.,
Attachment accomplishes jurisdiction but may also cause the
defendant to lose a sale or require him to borrow money. Also,
when a creditor moves to foreclose a consensual security agreement, the written agreement itself is some evidence of the debt.
But when property previously unrelated to the controversy is
attached at the beginning of a lawsuit, the plaintiff's allega4
tions are the only evidence of the claim's validity."
son v. Morris, 370 F. Supp. 142 (D.S.C. 1974); Cook v. Carlson, 364 F. Supp. 24
(S.D.S.D. 1973) (mechanics lien de minimus because value of property enhanced by
improvement).
"' Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 620 n.14 (1974).
42 Id. at 613.
' UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-203(1)(a) (1972 text). (Written agreement required to create a security interest unless the secured party possesses the collateral).
"I Note, Quasi In Rem Jurisdictionand Due ProcessRequirements, 82 YALE L.J.
1023, 1032-36 (1973).
I's Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 94 (1972). This was the type of analysis used
by Judge Lasker in Sugar v. Curtis Cir. Co., 377 F. Supp. 1055 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), when
he held that Mitchell did not foreclose a constitutional attack on a statute that admittedly closely resembled the Louisiana statute procedurally, but allowed attachment of
property on other bases than a security interest in the property. Judge Lasker cited
language from Mitchell for his position that the dual interest test in Mitchell arises
when the creditor has an actual possessory interest in the attached property, such as
is given by a security interest. Id. at 1062-63. See also North Georgia Finishing, Inc.
v. D. Chem, Inc., 95 S. Ct. 719 (1975) (garnishment of bank account invalidated along
with statute without relying on the attachment of property unrelated to a security
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Additional problems of discerning a constitutionally cognizable interest appear in possessory liens. The owner has surrendered possession to a repairman or creditor, normally under
a contractual arrangement. Under a repairman's lien, the creditor has added material and labor to the property, something
the repairman has a right to possess. Furthermore, he has enhanced the property's value. Thus, the owner no longer has a
possessory interest in the Fuentes sense and the "property" in
the item is dual in the Mitchell sense. The holder of the property may retain it without notice and a hearing, but the owner
has a constitutionally cognizable interest in not being permanently deprived of the property. Therefore the property cannot
be sold under the lien without prior notice and a hearing.'
Various liens must be examined to determine where the
constitutionally cognizable interest lies. For example, an artisan or mechanic who improves the owner's property adds
value but the owner continues in possession. May the artisan
file a lien against the property without notice to the owner? The
lien affects the owner's right to sell or mortgage. One court,
nevertheless, has allowed the lien to attach without prior notice, saying that the owner's interest was de minimus because
the value of the property was enhanced by the improvements. 47
Even though a tenant's property may technically be in the
interest feature of the statute); Welch v. Kinchla, 386 F. Supp. 913 (D. Mass. 1975);
In re Law Research Services, Inc., 386 F. Supp. 749 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). But see Balter
v. Bato Co., Inc., 385 F. Supp. 420 (W.D. Pa. 1975).
"I This was precisely the view of the court in Cockerel v. Caldwell, 378 F. Supp.
491 (W.D. Ky. 1974). It was the first case to deal with Mitchell's implications for
possessory liens. There the court decided that the portion of the Kentucky garageman's
lien statute that authorized sale of the automobile to liquidate the claim was unconstitutional. This completely extinguished the owner's rights in the automobile. But the
portion of the statute authorizing the garageman to hold the automobile as security
for his claim was upheld, because of his property interest in the chattel. The court in
Cockerel relied upon and adopted the views expressed in Adams v. Department of
Motor Vehicles, 520 P.2d 961, 113 Cal. Rptr. 145 (1974); see Hernandez v. European
Auto Collision, Inc., 487 F.2d 378, 383-86 (2d Cir. 1973) (Timbers, J., concurring);
Ceaser v. Kiser, 387 F. Supp. 645 (M.D.N.C. 1975); Mason v. Garris, 364 F. Supp. 452,
360 F. Supp. 420 (N.D. Ga. 1973); R. BROWN, THE LAW OF PERSONAL PROPERTY § 119
(2d ed. 1955); Clark & Landers, Sniadach, Fuentes, and Beyond: The CreditorMeets
the Constitution,59 VA. L. RIv. 355, 383-91 (1973); but see Straley v. Gassoway Motor
Co., 359 F. Supp. 902 (S.D.W. Va. 1973) (entire scheme unconstitutional); Quebec v.
Buds Auto Service, 105 Cal. Rptr. 677 (Super. Ct. 1973) (garageman cannot retain
property).
"' Cook v. Carlson, 364 F. Supp. 24, 27 (S.D.S.D. 1973).
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landlord's possession, courts have struck down landlord's liens,
apparently because the landlord's or innkeeper's lien violates
the core values of due process. It allows one private party to use
state power to take another private party's unsecured property
before the controversy is examined by a state official.1 8 When
a bank and a debtor-depositor have a controversy, the bank
may seize the depositor's account under a banker's right to setoff. The bank's possession or "ownership" of a demand account
is technical, while the depositor and his creditors have a palpable interest in liquidity. To allow summary seizure is to appoint
the bank the judge in its own case. "9
While there are numerous other security devices such as
pledges, liens for storage and statutory liens, enough has been
said to indicate the topic's variety and to posit a solution. Two
factors should be considered. First, to assert that the property
is enhanced in value, or that the property interest is mixed or
dual frequently begs the question. That question is the genuineness of the putative creditor's claim. Allowing that claim to
attach without disinterested review may lend the state's credence to an unfounded or disputed claim."' One primary pur"' See, e.g., Hall v. Garson, 468 F.2d 845 (5th Cir. 1972); Klim v. Jones, 315 F.
Supp. 109 (N.D. Cal. 1970); Blye v. Globe-Wernicke Realty Co., 300 N.E.2d 710, 347
N.Y.S.2d 170 (1973).
"I Stillwater, The California Banker's Lien Law: A Reappraisalof a Creditor's
Remedy in a New Economic Context, 27 Bus. LAWYER 777 (1972); Kruger v. Wells
Fargo Bank, 107 Cal. Rptr. 133 (Ct. App. 1973), rev'd, 531 P.2d 441, 113 Cal. Rptr.
449 (1974) (no state action). See generally R. BROWN, supra note 146, at § 117, at 57781; Clark and Landers, supra note 146, at 400-402. But see Burke & Reber, State
Action, CongressionalPower and Creditor'sRights: An Essay on the Fourteenth
Amendment HI, 47 S. CAL. L. Rav. 1, 33-43 (1973); Note, Bank Credit Cards and the
Right of Setoff, 26 S. CAL. L. Rav. 89, 108 (1974), where the author notes that summary
banking setoff is very similar in practicality to constitutionally prohibited practices,
but is not unconstitutional because of lack of state action. The author suggests legislative treatment.
1- For example, in most litigated garageman liens, the existence or amount of the
debt was in question. See Hernandez v. European Auto Collision, Inc., 487 F.2d 378,
381 (2d Cir. 1973); Cockerel v. Caldwell, 378 F. Supp. 491 (W.D. Ky. 1974); Mason v.
Garris, 360 F. Supp. 420, 422 (N.D. Ga. 1973); Straley v. Gassoway Motor Co., 359 F.
Supp. 902 (S.D. W. Va. 1973); Adams v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 520 P.2d 961,
113 Cal. Rptr. 145 (1974). In contrast, most § 9-503 plaintiffs have admitted failure to
make payments. See, e.g., Shirley v. State Nat'l Bank, 493 F.2d 739, 741 (2d Cir. 1974).
This causes "welfare Cadillac" tirades in some circles. See, e.g., R. HNSON, HANDBOOK
ON SEcURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 10-18 (1973). For
almost a century it has been clear that the substantive validity of the claim and the
truth of the alleged facts have no relevance when due process is denied. Pennoyer v.
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pose of due process is to sort spurious from real claims, and the
Mitchell dissenters were unwilling to extend this credence to
the creditor's claim absent notice and a hearing. Yet the
Mitchell majority felt that the security agreement was a sufficient guarantee of genuineness to allow the Court to conclude
that the property interest was dual. This willingness to accept
the secured creditor's word is the principal practical difference
between the majority and the dissent. Unless the dual analysis
is confined to written, consensual security agreements, the
mixed interest analysis may destroy the new due process. Even
in consensual security agreements, Mitchell allows the creditor
to beg the default question. But the practical reasons to allow
this, such as the creditor's desire for future business, are absent
in many nonconsensual liens.
The second factor to be considered grows out of the property issue. Property as an unexamined conclusion may create
serious analytical difficulties.151 In Roth and Mitchell, the
Court stated that fourteenth amendment property is to be defined under state law. 52 But the Court in both Mitchell and
Sniadach distinguished particular kinds of property as deserving additional protection. 5' 3 State definitions of property
should be followed generally but not adhered to slavishly. In
dealing with a similar problem, the question of what passes to
the bankruptcy trustee under Bankruptcy Act § 70(a)(5), a
federal definition of property was developed.'54 Lines v.
Fredrick55 defines vacation pay accrued on the date of bankruptcy to be outside of § 70(a)(5)'s definition of property. Thus
a federal definition of property advances a social welfare purpose. In dealing with questionable or hazy state property interNeff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877); Lopez v. Williams, 372 F. Supp. 1279, 1302 n.17 (S.D. Ohio
1973), prob. juris. noted, 415 U.S. 912 (1974). But it is unrealistic to assume that these
social facts will be ignored in deciding, in the first instance, whether due process is
required.
5 Cohen, supra note 56, at 815-16.
, Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 604 (1974); Board of Regents v. Roth,
408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
Im Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974); Sniadach v. Family Fin. Co.,
395 U.S. 337, 340-42 (1967). See also Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 & n.8 (1970).
But cf. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 88-89 (1972) (disapproving this branch of
Sniadach).
"I4Segal v. Rochelle, 382 U.S. 375 (1966).
155400 U.S. 18 (1970).
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ests, the social welfare purpose is an analytical variable with a
sounder basis in reality than chameleon conclusions like possession.5 8 In many lien questions which raise issues of whether
there is a constitutionally cognizable fourteenth amendment
property interest, courts might well adopt the Lines approach.
Thus, a line-drawing process is taking place. As interests
are posited, courts analyze their magnitude in terms of liberty
and property. 57' If the interest is minimal, courts refuse to interfere: administrative discretion is preserved and expensive
hearings are avoided. 58 If the interest is defined as liberty or
property, the authorities must respect the citizen to the extent
of according due process.
B. Affecting Constitutionally Cognizable Interests Without
Due Process
Constitutionally cognizable citizen interests can be affected in several ways without notice and a hearing. The government may act in a non-adjudicatory fashion, it may act in
an emergency, there may be a finding that the interest was
affected without state action, or the defendant may not be a
"person" within the meaning of the Civil Rights Acts, thus
barring federal jurisdiction.
1. Legislation versus Adjudication
The distinction between adjudicatory and legislative action results from the doctrine of separation of powers.159 The
government, without individual notice or an adjudicatory hearing, may affect citizen interests in a myriad of ways. The legislature can increase taxes, lower transfer payments, declare a
type of business to be a public nuisance or extend subsidies. 6 '
Still, there are limits on legislative action; the statutory and
"I Cf. Graff v. Nicholl, 370 F. Supp. 974 (N.D. Ill. 1974) (impounding "abandoned" automobiles).
I" City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507, 515 (1973).
,' Adams v. Walker, 492 F.2d 1003 (7th Cir. 1974).
25, K. DAvis, supra note 92, at §§ 7.03, 7.05.
,,OSee Traylor v. City of Amarillo, 492 F.2d 1156 (5th Cir. 1974); Trager v. Reabody Redev. Auth., 367 F. Supp. 1000 (D. Mass. 1973); Whitefield v. King, 364 F.
Supp. 1296, 1301-02 (M.D. Ala. 1973); Amen v. City of Dearborn, 363 F. Supp. 1267,
1280 (E.D. Mich. 1973).
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constitutional procedure applicable to the legislature must be
followed. A legislative hearing generally includes advance
warning and a chance to state a position. But the testimony
need not be sworn and there may be no cross-examination and
no transcript. In comparison, when dealing with individual
cases rather than general policy, the government must follow
adjudicative due process. The government cannot, for example, without notice and opportunity for an adjudicative hearing, raise the assessed value of a particular piece of property
or enjoin a particular business.
The courts apply a practical analysis to determine whether
government action is legislative or adjudicative. If a court is
functioning as a legislature, the legislative rules govern the
procedure.16 ' If the legislature is adjudicating, it must follow
adjudicative procedure."' This is a more realistic approach
than classifying a governmental body as either a legislative or
an adjudicative body and reasoning that all the action of a
legislature is legislative and all the action of a court is adjudicative. Moreover, it is the only workable approach in some
areas, such as local government, where separation of powers is
at best an obscure and elusive concept.
6 3 ilBurr v. New Rochelle Municipal Housing Authority"
lustrates the difference between legislation and adjudication as
well as the due process consequences flowing from the
distinction. Burr, which ultimately established the procedure
necessary for a public housing authority to increase rent, originated when the deficit-plagued Authority imposed a "service
charge" of $2 per month on all tenants. Since the service charge
affected the tenant's property interest, they filed suit, charging
a violation of due process and requesting the court to compel a
hearing. The district court found that due process was violated,
and ordered written notice, a public hearing, oral evidence,
assistance of counsel for the tenants, an opportunity to adduce
contrary evidence, a verbatim transcript and a written decision
I In re Oliver, 452 F.2d 111, 113-14 (7th Cir. 1971).
,"2 Groppi v. Leslie, 404 U.S. 496 (1972); Hornsby v. Allen, 326 F.2d 605 (5th Cir.
1964).
1- 479 F.2d 1165 (2d Cir. 1973). Burr was followed in Thompson v. Washington,
497 F.2d 626 (D.C. Cir. 1974), wherein it was held "that the tenants of public housing
constructed under the National Housing Act are entitled under that statute to an
opportunity to be heard before rents are increased." Id. at 639.
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based on the record. On appeal the court of appeals considered
the administrative burden on the Authority, the lack of individual issues of fact, and the need for an expert weighing of
complex economic data. The Authority, the court of appeals
held, could increase charges without a full adversary hearing.
Notice, an opportunity to submit material, and a statement of
reasons were enough to protect the tenant's interests. The district court decision appears to grow out of a conclusion that the
decision to impose the charge was adjudicatory. The court of
appeals rejected that conclusion and held that the decision was
legislative. Safeguards, nevertheless, were required to ensure
that the issues were properly examined and to prevent the
Authority from acting in ignorance.'"
2. State Action and Private Conduct
A second limit on due process stems from the principle
that the fourteenth amendment only limits state action. 65
Likewise, plaintiffs asserting denials of due process under the
Civil Rights Act must allege that action was taken under color
of law,'" a concept similar, if not identical to, the fourteenth
amendment state action concept. ' The issue may be stated
simply: what is sufficient state action or action under color of
law to give rise to due process? Nonetheless, the problem is
complex. As will be seen, this difficulty is at least partially
generated by the fact that both state action and color of law
are expanding concepts.
At the outset, it is clear that adjudicative procedures applied to resolve purely private disputes must follow due pro"' K. DAvis, supranote 92, at §§ 7.02, 7.05. See also Hahn v. Gottlieb, 430 F.2d
1243 (1st Cir. 1970). But see Keller v. Kate Maremount Foundation, 365 F. Supp. 789,
802-04 (N.D. Cal. 1972), aff'd sub nom. Geneva Towers Tenants' Organization v.
Federated Mortgage, Inc., 504 F. 2d 483 (9th Cir. 1974).
"I See generally P. KAUPER, CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERAL, 779-831
(1972); McCormack, 60 VA. L. Rav. 1, 19-28 (1974).
" See, e.g., Hornsby v. Allen, 326 F.2d 605 (5th Cir. 1964).
"v Palmer v. Columbia Gas, 479 F.2d 153, 161 (6th Cir. 1973); Joy v. Daniels, 479
F.2d 1236, 1239 (4th Cir. 1973); Trapper Brown Const. Co. v. Electromech, Inc., 358
F. Supp. 105, 106 (D.N.H. 1973); Commonwealth ex rel. Rafferty v. Philadelphia
Psychiatric Cent., 356 F. Supp. 500, 506 (E.D. Pa. 1973). But cf. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 483 F.2d 754, 757 (3d Cir. 1973), aff'd, 95 S. Ct. 449 (1974) (state action
and color of law may not be congruent).
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cess.' 6' Limits on the state action-color of law concepts, however, cause the other dispute-settling environments to be less
clear-cut. Neither New York University, the Brooklyn Law
School, Chatham College, nor the Miami Woman's Club acts
with "color of law" even though all have tangible connections
6 9 On the other
with the government."
hand, a federal district
court in New York held that a privately owned utility, Consolidated Edison, was engaged in state action and could not terminate a patron's electricity without some kind of "due process."' 70 The Fifth Circuit decided that the Montgomery, Alabama YMCA acted under "color of law" when it refused to
accept applications for membership.' 7 ' Most earlier state action
cases dealt with equal protection, but equal protection is related to due process. The equal protection question refers to
access. May the YMCA exclude these people? The due process
question refers to termination. If the YMCA board decides to
expel the new members, must it give them notice and hold a
hearing? Thus, the equal protection question must be answered
affirmatively before the due process question can arise.
The contours of the "new" due process are not clear but
the direction is apparent. Due process is expanding into places
which have heretofore been considered sacrosanct and escaped
its influence. Today a serious argument for state action and
due process can be mounted against any defendant who has a
continuing relationship to a governmental body and is carrying
on a function with a general public interest or concern. 17 This
"I See, e.g., Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714
(1878).
6I Wahba v. New York Univ., 492 F.2d 96 (2d Cir. 1974); Grafton v. Brooklyn Law
School, 478 F.2d 1137 (2d Cir. 1973); Pendrell v. Chatham College, 370 F. Supp. 494
(W.D. Pa. 1974); Solomon v. Miami Womans' Club, 359 F. Supp. 41 (S.D. Fla. 1973).
But see Rackin v. University of Pennsylvania, 386 F. Supp. 992 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
"I Bronson v. Consolidated Edison, 350 F. Supp. 443 (S.D. N.Y. 1972). See also
Limuel v. Southern Union Gas Co., 378 F. Supp. 964 (W.D. Tex. 1974); Salisbury v.
Southern New Eng. Tel. Co., 365 F. Supp. 1023 (D.Conn. 1973). But see Edwards v.
Philadelphia Elec. Co., 371 F. Supp. 1313 (E.D. Pa. 1974); Jackson v. Metropolitan
Edison, 483 F.2d 754 (3d Cir. 1973), aff'd, 95 S. Ct. 449 (1974); Lucas v. Wisconsin
Elec. Power Co., 466 F.2d 638 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1114 (1973).
"I Smith v. YMCA, 462 F.2d 634 (5th Cir. 1972).
172 Associated Students v. NCAA, 493 F.2d 1251, 1254-55 (9th Cir. 1974); Rackin
v. University of Pennsylvania, 386 F. Supp. 992 (E.D. Pa. 1974); Golden v. Biscayne
Bay Yacht Club, 370 F. Supp. 1038 (S.D. Fla. 1973); Anderson v. Denny, 365 F. Supp.
1254, 1258-59 (W.D. Va. 1973); Keller v. Kate Maremount Foundation, 365 F. Supp.

1975]

THE NEW DUE PROCESS

is especially true when the function is also carried out by the
13
state.
Several decisions in which plaintiffs attacked repossessions under § 9-503 of the Uniform Commercial Code are highly
relevant to the issue of state action. These cases emerge from
a common factual and legal pattern. Initially, a purchaser
enters into an installment contract for a consumer purchase.
The contract allows the seller or the holder of the debt to repossess the purchased item upon a default, usually failure to make
periodic payments. Pursuant to the contract and § 9-503, the
"self-help" section of the commerical code, the consumer loses
the chattel. Next the purchaser sues, charging that due process
was ignored because there was no notice before the item was
taken. In defense, the sellers argue that there was no state
action and no federal jurisdiction under the Civil Rights Act.
The purchasers reply that there is state action because the
statute allows the seller or financier to repossess through selfhelp. They agree that no state official stamps papers, serves
process or tows the car, but contend that statutory permission
to repossess lends the required "color" of law. Notice and a
hearing are thus required."' To date, however, such arguments
have been largely unpersuasive; several courts have accepted
the seller's private action defense 7 and, only a few have found
798, 800-01 (N.D. Cal. 1972), aff'd sub nom. Geneva Towers Tenants' Organization v.
Federated Mortgage, Inc., 504 F.2d 483 (9th Cir. 1974); Stem v. Massachusetts Indem.
& Life Ins. Co., 365 F. Supp. 433, 438 (E.D. Pa. 1973); Suckle v. Madison Gen. Hosp.,
362 F. Supp. 1196, 1199, 1209 (W.D. Wis. 1973).
I" The educational institution cases are admittedly an anomoly. See, e.g., Grafton
v. Brooklyn Law School, 478 F.2d 1137 (2d Cir. 1973); Broderick v. Catholic Univ., 365
F. Supp. 147 (D.D.C. 1973); Furumoto v. Lyman, 362 F. Supp. 1267, 1267-80 (N.D.
Cal. 1973). They may be explained by the tradition of excellence in private education,
deference to academic expertise, fear of a barrage of lawsuits and lack of compelling
facts.
"I See generally Note, Constitutional Torts: Section 1983 Redress for the Deprived Debtor, 14 WM. & MARY L. REv. 627 (1973).
"I Calderon v. United Furniture Co., 505 F.2d 950 (5th Cir. 1974); Gary v. Darnell,
505 F.2d 741 (6th Cir. 1974); Turner v. Impala Motors, 503 F.2d 607 (6th Cir. 1974);
Brantley v. Union Bank & Trust Co., 498 F.2d 365 (5th Cir. 1974); Nichols v. Tower
Grove Bank, 497 F.2d 404 (8th Cir. 1974); Bowman v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 496 F.2d
1322 (5th Cir. 1974); Nowlin v. Professional Auto Sales, Inc., 496 F.2d 16 (8th Cir.
1974); James v. Pinnix, 495 F.2d 206 (5th Cir. 1974); Shirley v. State Nat'l Bank, 493
F.2d 739 (2d Cir. 1974); Adams v. Southern Cal. First Nat'l Bank, 492 F.2d 324 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 95 S. Ct. 325 (1974); McDuffy v. Worthmore Fum., Inc., 380 F.
Supp. 257 (E.D. Va. 1974); Mayhugh v. Bill Allen Chevrolet, 371 F. Supp. 1 (W.D.
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state action.17 1

The arguments against finding state action in self-help
repossession are varied. Courts have found that there was no
state action because no government official participated 177 and
because governmental process was not used. 7 In one recent
suit, the buyer argued that the official act of issuing a "repossessed title" to the buyer of the- vehicle was sufficient state
action. The court held, however, that issuing the title was ministerial and adequately severed from the repossession and sale.
There was, therefore, no state action.17 9 One court stated that

the statute creates "passive" state action but held that there
must be "active" state action before due process is required.' 0
Courts rejecting due process have also cited history and the
common law'8 ' as well as the need for efficient and economical
Mo. 1973); Calderon v. United Furn. Co., 371 F. Supp. 572 (S.D. Tex. 1973); Kinch v.
Chrysler Credit Corp., 367 F. Supp. 437 (E.D. Tenn. 1973); Shelton v. General Electric
Credit Corp., 359 F. Supp. 1079 (M.D. Ga. 1973); Kirksey v. Theilig, 351 F. Supp. 727
(D. Colo.1972); Pease v. Havelock Nat'l Bank, 351 F. Supp. 118 (D. Nev. 1972); Green
v. First Nat'l Exch. Bank, 348 F. Supp. 672 (W.D. Va. 1972); Oler v. Bank of America,
342 F. Supp. 21 (N.D. Cal. 1972) (the leading case); McCormick v. First Nat'l Bank,
322 F. Supp. 604 (S.D. Fla. 1971). See also Phillips v. Money, 503 F.2d 990 (7th Cir.
1974) (mechanic's lien); Fletcher v. Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Nat'l Bank, 496 F.2d
927 (1st Cir. 1972) (bank set off is not state action); Parks v. "Mr. Ford", 386 F. Supp.
1251 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (mechanic's lien); Smith v. Bekins Moving & Storage Co., 384
F. Supp. 1261 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (warehouse lien); Leisure Estates of America v. Carmel
Dev. Co., 371 F. Supp. 556 (S.D. Tex. 1974) (repossession via deed of trust not state
action); Bichel Optical Labs, Inc. v. Marquette Nat'l Bank, 487 F.2d 906 (8th Cir.
1973), aft'g 336 F. Supp. 1368 (D. Minn. 1971) (bank seizure of account and accounts
receivable); Kruger v. Wells Fargo Bank, 521 P.2d 441, 113 Cal. Rptr. 449 (1974) (bank
setoff); Giglio v. Bank of Delaware, 307 A.2d 816 (Del. Ch. 1973) (state decision of no
state action).
"' Watson v. Branch County Bank, 380 F. Supp. 945 (W.D. Mich. 1974); Gibbs
v. Titelman, 369 F. Supp. 38 (E.D. Pa. 1973), rev'd, 502 F.2d 1107 (3d Cir. 1974);
Boland v. Essex County Bank & Trust Co., 361 F. Supp. 917 (D. Mass. 1973); Adams
v. Egley, 338 F. Supp. 614 (S.D. Cal. 1972), rev'd sub horn. Adams v. Southern Cal.
First Nat'l Bank, 492 F.2d 324 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 95 S. Ct. 325 (1974). See also
Northrip v. Federal Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n, 372 F. Supp. 594, 597 (E.D. Mich. 1974)
(mortgage foreclosure); Adams v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 520 P.2d 961, 113
Cal. Rptr. 145 (1974) (mechanic's lien).
,7'
Oller v. Bank of America, 342 F. Supp. 21, 23 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
'7 Pease v. Havelock Nat'l Bank, 351 F. Supp. 118, 121 (D.Neb. 1972).
17 Nichols v. Tower Grove Bank, 362 F. Supp. 374, 377-78 (E.D. Mo. 1973). But
cf. Garner v. Tr-State Development Corp., 382 F. Supp. 377, 379 (E.D. Mich. 1974)
(ministerial enough); Ceaser v. Kiser, 387 F. Supp. 645, 647-48 (M.D.N.C. 1975) (issuing title enough).
1' Greene v. First Nat'l Exch. Bank, 348 F. Supp. 672, 674-75 (W.D. Va. 1972).
'1' Shirley v. State Nat'l Bank, 493 F.2d 739, 742 (2d Cir. 1974); Adams v. South-
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business operations.1 12 Prior cases finding state action in similar circumstances are distinguished as arising from race discrimination, not due process." ' Finally, cases finding state action and lack of due process in statutory liens are distinguished
because the lien was created
by statute alone and not by both
184
the statute and a contract.
The premise that self-help repossession lacks state action
is stoutly defended in scholarly quarters."' The scholarly arguments are neither doctrinal nor constitutional, usually consisting of unsupported and perhaps unsupportable assumptions
about individual and business motivation and the economic
result of a decision striking down the code section." 6 The casual
reader should be able to discern the alliance between these
em Cal. First Nat'l Bank, 492 F.2d 324 (9th Cir., cert. denied, 95 S. Ct. 325 (1974);
Shelton v. General Electric Credit Corp., 359 F. Supp. 1079, 1081 (M.D. Ga. 1973);
Kirksey v. Theilig, 351 F. Supp. 727, 730 (D. Colo. 1972); Kruger v. Wells Fargo Bank,
521 P.2d 441, 113 Cal. Rptr. 449 (1974); Messenger v. Sandy Motors, Inc., 295 A.2d
402 (N.J. Super. 1972).
18 Mayhugh v. Bill Allen Chevrolet, 371 F. Supp. I(W.D. Mo. 1973); Kirksey v.
Theilig, 351 F. Supp. 727, 730-31 (D. Colo. 1972).
10 Shirley v. State Nat'l Bank, 493 F.2d 739, 744 (2d Cir. 1974); Adams v. Southern Cal. First Nat'l Bank, 492 F.2d 324 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 95 S.Ct. 325 (1974);
Mayhugh v. Bill Allen Chevrolet, 371 F. Supp. 1 (W.D. Mo. 1973); Shelton v. General
Electric Credit Corp., 359 F. Supp. 1079, 1081 (M.D. Ga. 1973); Kirksey v. Theilig,
351 F. Supp. 727 (D. Colo. 1972); Pease v. Havelock Nat'l Bank, 351 F. Supp. 118,
121 (D. Nev. 1972); Oiler v. Bank of America, 342 F. Supp. 21, 23 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
See also Kruger v. Wells Fargo Bank, 521 P.2d 441, 113 Cal. Rptr. 449 (1974) (statute
allowing setoff recognized but did not create right).
I" Shelton v. General Electric Credit Corp., 359 F. Supp. 1079, 1081 (M.D. Ga.
1973); Oller v. Bank of America, 342 F. Supp. 21, 23 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
,u R. HENsON, supra, note 150, at § 10-18; Mentschikoff, Peaceful Repossession
Under the Uniform Commercial Code: A Constitutional and Economic Analysis, 14
WM. & MARY L. REV. 767 (1973). See also Burke & Reber, State Action, Congressional
Power and Creditor'sRights: An Essay on the FourteenthAmendment, PartsI & II,
46 S. CAL. L. RE,. 1003 (1973); PartIfI, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1973). These creditor's
briefs are well researched, well written, well reasoned and wrong. Stripped of doctrine,
the authors take the economic royalist-small government position. Their position is
that the government should not intercede in existing economic-social power relationships; that generally, freedom for the trout is death for the minnow, which is good.
I" See R. HENsON, supra note 150, at 265: "The patent absurdity of finding unconstitutional a provision appearing in a statute promulgated by the American Law Institute and The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. . . . In
essentially all instances where self help repossessions are used, there is no question of
the debtor's being in default. . . ... See also id. at 263-64; Mentschikoff, supra note
185: "With notice of impending repossession, the dishonest debtor tends to disappear
so that the collateral in fact relied on in making the loan is gone." Id. at 779.
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academicians and the financing interests and to discount the
argument accordingly."s7 The economic argument, as Professor
White demonstrated, is overstated."' Professor Wallace has
stated the other side of the economic argument'89 with contrary
arguments that are equally compelling. Due process seeks to be
protective and, perforce, is expensive and time consuming."'
Constitutional questions, however, should not be decided solely
for economic reasons. This is especially true when a plausable
argument can be mounted for the other side."' All the values
which will be advanced and retarded should be tested in a
factual crucible.
The district courts in Boland v. Essex County Bank &
3 and Gibbs v. Titelman 4
Trust Co.,"12 Adams v. Egley"1
found

state action. The Adams court first recognized the selfexecuting private contracts and distinguished taking property
solely under the statute."5 Reitman v. Mulkey"' was held to be
I" Cf. Clark, Default, Repossession, Foreclosure,and Deficiency: A Journey to the
Underworld and Proposed Salvation, 51 Ona. L. REv. 302, 306-08 (1972). Beutel, The
Proposed Uniform [?] Commercial Code Should Not Be Adopted, 61 YALE L.J. 334
(1952).
'
White, The Abolition of Self-Help Repossession: The Poor Pay Even More,
1973 Wisc. L. Rav. 503. Professor White, although sound in what he assails, is mischievous in some of what he accepts. See also Johnson, Denialof Self-Help Repossession:
An Economic Analysis, 47 S. CAL. L. REv. 82 (1973); Dauer & Gilhool, The Economics
of ConstitutionalizedRepossession: A Critique for Professor Johnson, and a Partial
Reply, 47 S. CAL. L. Rav. 116 (1973); Johnson, A Response to Dauer and Gilhool:A
Defense of Self-Help Repossession, 47 S. CAL. L. REv. 151 (1973) (the full debate).
18, Wallace, The Logic of Consumer Credit Reform, 82 YALE L. J. 409 (1973). See
also Gibbs v. Titelman, 369 F. Supp. 38, 55-57 (E.D. Pa. 1973), rev'd, 502 F.2d 1107
(3d Cir. 1974).
110Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656-57 (1972); see also Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S.
535, 540-41 (1971).
"'9See Clark & Landers, supra note 146, at 377-83. Professors Clark and Landers
conclude that there is sufficient state involvement to invoke the fourteenth amendment in § 9-503 cases. They say that it could be found to be so under the "state
functions" theory (private individuals doing what state officials would ordinarily do,
with the distinction blurred in the consumer's mind); or the "entwinement" theory
(that the UCC is not a neutral legislation, considered in totality, but is rather creditororiented; and the state's enactment of it inextricably involves the state in a repossession case).
,12361 F. Supp. 917 (D. Mass. 1973).
, 338 F. Supp. 614 (S.D. Cal. 1972), rev'd sub nom. Adams v. Southern Cal. First
Nat'l Bank, 492 F.2d 324 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 95 S. Ct. 325 (1974).
', 369 F. Supp. 38 (E.D. Pa. 1973), rev'd, 502 F.2d 1107 (3d Cir. 1974).
, Adams v. Egley, 338 F. Supp. 614, 617 (S.D. Cal. 1972), rev'd sub nom. Adams
v. Southern Cal. First Nat'l Bank, 492 F.2d 324 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 95 S. Ct. 325
(1974).
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decisive on the issue of state action. In Reitman, the Supreme
Court struck down a state constitutional provision which interdicted the government from regulating the sale or rental of real
property. The constitutional provision, in the particular ambience, placed a governmental imprimatur on "private" discriminatory conduct. If the discrimination were performed by
the government, it would be unconstitutional. The Court found
in this the requisite state action to bring the equal protection
clause into play and to void the provision. The Adams court
applied Reitman to self-help repossession. Since the contract
allowing the secured party to take and the later taking were
authorized by § 9-503, and because "the right is created by
state law," the property was taken under "color of law" and the
court had jurisdiction to hear and determine the due process
issue. 9 '
Other courts have developed state action reasoning further. In Boland v. Essex County Bank & Trust Co. ,' the court
suggested a state action theory in self-help repossessions. There
might be, the court said, "a close working arrangement between repossessors and the police and court officials . ..."I"
This arrangement needed to be explored. In Gibbs v.
Titelman,0 0 the court faced the historical and passiveministerial arguments. Self-help repossession's historical antecedents were located, traced, found slim and rejected as inapplicable to the present day."0 ' The court rejected the argument that the state was only passively involved as begging the
"' 387 U.S. 369 (1967).

,, Adams v.Egley, 338 F. Supp. 614, 618 (S.D. Cal. 1972), rev'd sub nom. Adams
v. Southern Cal. First Nat'l Bank, 492 F.2d 324 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 95 S. Ct. 325
(1974). See also Central Sec. Nat'l Bank v. Royal Homes, Inc., 371 F. Supp. 476 (E.D.
Mich. 1974); Gibbs v. Titelman, 369 F. Supp. 38, 49 (E.D. Pa. 1973), rev'd, 502 F.2d
1107 (3d Cir. 1974); Tunheim v. Bowman, 366 F. Supp. 1395, 1396 (D. Nev. 1973);
Bond v. Dentzer, 362 F. Supp. 1373, 1379-81 (N.D.N.Y. 1973), rev'd, 494 F.2d 302 (2d
Cir. 1974); Boland v. Essex County Bank & Trust Co., 361 F. Supp. 917, 920-21 (D.
Mass. 1973); Klim v. Jones, 315 F. Supp. 109, 114 (N.D. Cal. 1970); Adams v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 520 P.2d 961, 113 Cal. Rptr. 145 (1974).
"s 361 F. Supp. 917 (D. Mass. 1973).
"' Id. at 921.
200369 F. Supp. 38 (E.D. Pa. 1973), rev'd, 502 F.2d 1107 (3d Cir. 1974).
201 Id.
at 45-47. See also McCall, The Pastas Prologue:A History of the Right to
Repossess, 47 S. CAL. L. REv. 58 (1973). The article narrowly and legalistically traces
legal terms without referring to social context. Judge Bechtle views self-help as a stage
in social evolution and as a feudal anachronism.
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question. By looking at the actions of the state at the time of
the repossessions, the real thrust of state action is overlooked.
The thrust is the power to do the acts that deny due process,
and the state action comes when that power is delegated."'
Blye v. Globe-Wernicke Realty Co. 2 1 3 and Bond v.
Dentzer °4 posit a similar state action theory in due process
cases. The litigation in Blye attacked a seizure under an innkeeper's lien law and in Bond a wage assignment agreement.
State conduct was absent in both procedures, yet in each the
court found state action. In Blye the court focused upon the
actions taken, and held that even when a traditionally public
function such as execution or attachment is performed by private persons, the conduct is sufficiently state action to compel
due process.2 15 In Bond, the court found state action under
another theory, reasoning that the wage assignment scheme
merged "state power and private economic interests," and that
the state, by delegating the power, became a "silent business
'2
partner with private interest. 11
In yet another case, Cockerel v. Caldwel,217 the court
found state action even though the statute involved merely
212Gibbs v. Titelman, 369 F. Supp. 38, 47-48 (E.D. Pa. 1973), rev'd, 502 F.2d 1107

(3d Cir. 1974). For an interesting and novel approach to the delegation argument, see
Yudof, Reflections on PrivateRepossession, Public Policy and the Constitution, 122
PENN. L. REv. 954, 962-63 (1974). There Professor Yudof concludes that there is sufficient precedent for a court to find state action if it is so inclined. He concludes that
the power to repossess should not be delegable to private parties, absent the restrictions that would be placed on the state. Thus, under this approach, private parties
could not have power to repossess without the attendant procedural requirements, or
the delegation of the power itself violates due process and is unconstitutional.
- 300 N.E.2d 710, 347 N.Y.S.2d 170 (1973).
" 362 F. Supp. 1373 (N.D.N.Y. 1973), rev'd, 494 F.2d 302 (2d Cir. 1974).
"I Bond v. Dentzer, 362 F. Supp. 1373, 1381 (N.D. N.Y. 1973), rev'd, 494 F.2d 302
(2d Cir. 1974); Blye v. Globe-Wernicke Realty Co., 347 N.Y.S.2d 170, 174-75 (1973).
See also Adams v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 520 P.2d 961, 113 Cal. Rptr. 145
(1974); Note, State Action: Theories for Applying ConstitutionalRestrictions to Private Activity, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 656, 690-98 (1974).
2 Bond v. Dentzer, 362 F. Supp. 1373, 1378-79 (N.D.N.Y. 1973), rev'd, 494 F.2d
302 (2d Cir. 1974); Shirley v. State Nat'l Bank, 493 F.2d 739, 745-47 (2d Cir. 1974)
(Kaufman, C. J., in dissent argues that there is state action because the statute
delegates the state monopoly of dispute settlement); Northrip v. Federal Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n, 372 F. Supp. 594, 597 (E.D. Mich. 1974) (statute allows foreclosure). See
also Boland v. Essex County Bank & Trust Co., 361 F. Supp. 917, 921 (D. Mass. 1973);
Countryman, supra note 70, at 553.
m 378 F. Supp. 491 (W.D. Ky. 1974).
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codified the common law. In Cockerel, the defendant sold the
plaintiff's automobile to satisfy his claim for a repair and storage bill, pursuant to a Kentucky garageman's lien statute. The
court held that the sale of the automobile violated due process
where no procedural requirements were met and the fact that
the statute merely restated decisional law was held to be immaterial. Where a statute confers upon an individual the right
to act in derogation of the fourteenth amendment, then the
necessary element of state action is present.2

8

The court con-

sidered the state action question, and determined that because
the statute gives the garageman the means of extinguishing the
owner's right in the automobile, there is sufficient state action.
But as to the garageman's authority to retain the automobile,
this only preserved the garageman's possessory interest in the
improvements made, and only delays the owner's rights until
2
an adjudication is possible, rather than extinguishing them. 11
Thus when the legal arguments against state action are examined in depth, they are reduced in force.
The weakness of the "no state action" position in § 9-503
repossession is further illustrated by an examination of the
analytical approach taken by its adherents. They view the
basic issue as, ". . . whether all conduct authorized by a statute is state action. 2 10 This states the question so broadly that

it raises the specter of expanded governmental power and increased judicial business. The issue needs to be stated more
precisely and realistically. The question as ordinarily stated
also ignores part of the problem. Unjustified interference with
a possessory right in personal property is conversion, an ancient
and well recognized tort.2 11 Property normally cannot be taken
2" Id. at 494. But it should be pointed out that only the statute authorizing the

garageman to sell the automobile was invalidated. The statute authorizing its detention was upheld. See Motion to Alter and Amend Order, id. at 496-98. See also Ceaser

v. Kiser, 387 F. Supp. 645 (M.D.N.C. 1975).
378 F. Supp. at 498.
" White, supra note 188, at 506; Horowitz and Karst, The CaliforniaSupreme
Court and State Action Under the FourteenthAmendment: The Leader Beclouds the
Issue, 21 U.C.L.A. REv. 1421 (1974).
211 W. PRossER, ToRTs § 15 (1971); Cf. Klim v. Jones, 315 F. Supp. 109, 114 (N.D.
Cal. 1970); see Note, State Action: Theories for Applying ConstitutionalRestrictions

to Private Activity, 74 COLUM L. REv. 656, 666 n.59 (1974), where the author points
out that the draftsmen of the fourteenth amendment intended for it to apply to state
statutes changing the common law.
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without procedural due process. 2'2 Both conversion and due
process are intended to prevent misuse of power and to protect
private property. The tort protects the citizen from private
overreaching, and due process prevents abuse of public power.
If a litigant takes another's property without proper procedure,
due process is denied. If a private person takes another's property, it is converted. Section 9-503 legalizes conduct which is a
tort if privately done and a denial of due process if publicly
21
done. 1
Fuentes v. Shevin sheds additional light on the complex
state action question. In Fuentes it was unnecessary to discuss
the state action issue, since, under the procedure attacked,
officials processed the paper which set the taking in motion."'
The concern in Fuentes, i.e., to prevent private persons from
abusing public power, was expressed by the Court:
The statues, moreover, abdicate effective state control over
state power. Private parties, serving their own private advantage, may unilaterally invoke state power to replevy goods
from another. No state official participates in the decision to
seek the writ; no state official reviews the basis for the claim
to repossession; and no state official evaluates the need for
immediate seizure. There is not even a requirement that the
plaintiff provide any information to the court on these mat215
ters. The State acts largely in the dark.
To prevent potential misuse, the Court required an adversary
hearing as a check to determine whether the applicant's claim
is valid before the possessory interest is disturbed. The process
is designed to identify both debtors' and creditors' false conclusions.
Under Fuentes, then, the amount of concern over possible
overreaching should be inversely proportional to the amount of
official inquiry into the private taking. When property is taken
by private initiative without filling out any forms and without
any state official participating in the process, the potential for
abuse is greater than when pleadings, certification and service
are required. The argument against state action in § 9-503
22 Robinson v. Hanrahan, 409 U.S. 38 (1972).
21

McCormack, 60 VA. L. REv. 1, 27 (1974).

2,4 Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 74-75 (1972).
2,5

Id. at 93.
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repossession asserts that the smaller the governmental inquiry
into a private person's using statutory power, the less reason
to be concerned. But this is palpably contrary to the thrust of
the due process cases." 6 Under due process theory, self-help
repossession is, therefore, more clearly unconstituional than ex
parte replevin. 2 7 Protecting the possessor's interest from the
completely unchecked use of publicly endorsed power is more
compelling than the specious state action issue. The argument
against state action in § 9-503 cases stressed the absence of
state involvement. But focusing on the amount of action taken
by the state poses one grave risk. It allows the protections
stated by the Court in Mitchell to be important (e.g. approval
by a judge, posting of a bond) to be whittled away because the
court is only looking to the issue of whether agents of the state
were involved, not to the more fundamental issue of due process protections. Government power will not expand except to
insure that private disputes are settled fairly and to stunt the
growth of private tyranny. The courts should be willing to find
state action to ensure public control over repossession, to give
the state control over all coercive interference with a possessory
interest." '8 Focusing judgment on § 9-503 as a delegation of
state power to private persons and following the analysis in
Fuentes yields only one conclusion-that § 9-503 self-help repossession denies due process." '
"I1Gibbs v. Titelman, 369 F. Supp. 38, 48 (E.D. Pa. 1973), rev'd, 502 F.2d 1107
(3d Cir. 1974).
21 Countryman, supra note 70, at 551-52. Chief Judge Kaufman's state action
analysis of debtor creditor cases is similar. State action exists, he argues, when a
statute delegates to a creditor the state's dispute resolving or adjudicative function.
Thus, when a creditor asserts default and seizes property pursuant to statute, state
action is present. See Bond v. Dentzer, 494 F.2d 302, 312-14 (2d Cir. 1974) (dissent);
Shirley v. State Nat'l Bank, 493 F.2d 739, 745-47 (2d Cir. 1974) (dissent). This argument would appear to include a taking by bank setoff, as an "adjudicative" function,
but this is contrary to the views of many commentators. See, e.g., Clark & Landers,
supra note 146, at 400-02.
219 Yudof, supra note 202.
2"I The Mitchell v. W.T. Grant majority explicitly refrained from ruling on § 9503. 416 U.S. 600, 618 n.13 (1974). In addition, the majority stressed judicial control
as a factor in affirming ex parte repossession. But there is reason to think that selfhelp repossession will be approved. First, in article 9 repossessions, the property interest may be called "dual" because of the security interest. Second, Justice White has
expressed willingness to defer to legislative judgment. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67,
103 (1972) (dissent). Third, Justice White stressed the cost of procedural protections
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The fact that a contract is involved in no way alters this
conclusion, though it may have a practical effect on the outcome of a particular case. In the repossession cases, the sales
and financing agreement allows the seller to repossess," and §
9-503 creates and endorses the right to so agree. The Court in
Adams v. Egley correctly holds the agreement irrelevant to the
state action question.2

1

The agreement, however, raises a sepa-

rate issue: whether the right to notice and a hearing has been
waived. 222 Waiver is a factual and pragmatic issue which turns

on disclosure, knowledge and equality. 223 In a consumer transaction, significant barriers to waiver are present. The
merchant-consumer relationship connotes unequal sophistication and bargaining power: consideration may be lacking. and,
in any event, standarized forms normally are used. Moreover,
in view of the great number of such transactions, it is safe to
assume that these forms are seldom read or understood, since
few people will knowingly place their property at another's
mercy. 2 If, however, the buyer has an opportunity to comprewhile almost ignoring their value. Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 618 n.13
(1974); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 97 (1972).
229 See, e.g., Nichols v. Tower Grove Bank, 362 F. Supp. 374, 376 (E.D. Mo. 1973);
Giglo v. Bank of Delaware, 307 A.2d 816, 818 (Del. Ch. 1973).
22 Adams v. Egley, 338 F. Supp. 614, 618 (S.D. Cal. 1972), Rev'd sub norm. Adams
v. Southern Cal. First Nat'l Bank 492 F.2d 324 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 95 S. Ct. 325
(1974).
2
Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 93 (1972); Overmyer v. Frick, 405 U.S. 174
(1972); Swarb v. Lennox, 405 U.S. 191 (1972). Professor White states that waiver is an
"essentially dishonest" solution in self-help repossession cases. White, supra note 188,
at 508-09.
22 See, e.g., Garner v. Tri State Development Corp., 382 F. Supp. 377, 381 (E.D.
Mich. 1974); Northrip v. Federal Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n, 372 F. Supp. 594, 599 (E.D.
Mich. 1974); Law v. United States Dep't of Ag., 366 F. Supp. 1233, 1239-40 (N.D. Ga.
1973); Klein v. New Castle County, 370 F. Supp. 85, 89-91 (D. Del. 1974). If the waiver
issue grows out of an "adhesion" contract, the courts are less willing to find waiver
and may decide the issue on "social facts." See Gonzalez v. County of Hidalgo, 489
F.2d 1043, 1049-50 (5th Cir. 1973); Gibbs v. Titelman, 369 F. Supp. 38, 57-58 (E.D.
Pa. 1973), rev'd, 502 F.2d 1107 (3d Cir. 1974) ("A buyer's signature to a contract of
this type does not amount to a knowing and intelligent waiver of his constitutional
rights"). But see W.T. Grant Co. v. Mitchell, 269 So. 2d 186, 191 (1972) (finding
knowledge and relinquishment from signing agreement), afi'd, 416 U.S. 600 (1974)
(waiver not mentioned).
224 Gonzalez v. County of Hidalgo, 489 F.2d 1043, 1049-50 (5th Cir. 1973); Gibbs
v. Titelman, 369 F. Supp. 38, 57-58 (E.D. Pa. 1973), rev'd, 502 F.2d 1107 (3d Cir. 1974);
Bond v. Dentzer, 362 F. Supp. 1373, 1387-88 (N.D.N.Y. 1973), rev'd, 494 F.2d 302 (2d
Cir. 1974).
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hend what is at stake, to consider the alternatives, and to reject
his right to due process, then despite the presence of state
action, notice and a hearing may be waived.2"' There may also
be a cost which must be either absorbed by the enterprises or
passed on to the consumers,2 but these expenses might be
reduced by notice providing for waiver and by attenuated hearings. 12 If in most cases the creditor's grievance is legitimate,
waivers and brief hearings should be the rule rather than the
exception.228 Finally, the need to repossess can be lessened by

increased care in extending credit.2 9
An additional consideration bearing on the § 9-503 state
action issue can be summarized as follows: if the argument that
state action is absent in self-help repossession is upheld, there
will be an effect far beyond § 9-503. As due process has advanced, a variety of ex parte statutory procedures have been
called into question. Many statutes allowed private persons to
take property without any governmental restraint. The cases
include utility terminations, 3 landlord's liens on tenant's

property,2sl landlord's liens on tenant's property plus ejectment
from the leased premises, 2 2 confession of judgment,us trustee
judgmentss 4 and bankers' liens.2

5

1

In striking down these stat-

22 Anderson, A Proposed Solution for the Commercial World to the SniadachFuentes Problem: Contractual Waiver, 78 CoM. L.J. 283, 288 (1973); Law v. United
States Dep't of Ag., 366 F. Supp. 1233, 1239-40 (N.D. Ga. 1973).
2' But cf. Wallace, supra note 189.
2 Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 94 (1972); Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 64
(1972).
2n Bond v. Dentzer, 362 F. Supp. 1373, 1388 (N.D.N.Y. 1973), rev'd, 494 F.2d 302
(2d Cir. 1974).
2n Wallace, supra note 139.
m Palmer v. Columbia Gas, 479 F,2d 153 (6th Cir. 1973); Edwards v. Philadelphia
Elec. Co., 371 F. Supp. 1313 (E.D. Pa. 1974); Bronson v. Consolidated Edison Co., 350
F. Supp. 443 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). But see Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 95 S. Ct.
449 (1974).
z" Hall v. Garson, 468 F.2d 845 (5th Cir. 1972); Gross v. Fox, 349 F. Supp. 1164
(E.D. Pa. 1972); MacQueen v. Lambert, 348 F. Supp. 1334 (M.D. Fla. 1972); Shaffer
v. Holbrook, 346 F. Supp. 762 (S.D.W. Va. 1972); State ex rel. Payne v. Walden, 190
S.E.2d 770 (W. Va. 1972).
2' Barber v. Rader, 350 F. Supp. 183 (S.D. Fla. 1972); Blye v. Globe-Wernicke
Realty Co., 300 N.E.2d 710, 347 N.Y.S.2d 170 (1973).
23 Osmond v. Spence, 359 F. Supp. 124 (D. Del. 1972).
2 Trapper Brown Constr. Co. v. Electromech, Inc., 358 F. Supp. 105 (D.N.H.
1973).
2u Kruger v. Wells Fargo Bank, 107 Cal. Rptr. 133 (Ct. App. 1973), rev'd, 521 P.2d
441, 113 Cal. Rptr. 449 (1974).
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utes, the courts have found state action in the statutory permission to perform an otherwise illegal act.25 Because they
bestow on one person the unbridled power to take another's
property, the statutes are unconstitutional.23 By and large,
these statutes are indistinguishable from § 9-503 in allowing
28
one private citizen to take another private citizen's property.
The sphere of conduct permitted under them was broad. For
example, it was legal to enter a home,2 9 to expel a citizen from
his home, 240 to seize unsecured property, 21 and even to confiscate property from people unrelated to the controversy. 2 2 The
statutory schemes, moreover, were less protective than the
Uniform Commercial Code. Often no remedy other than an
unnamed tort was provided, while under the Code, breaches of
the peace are forbidden and a commercially reasonable resale
is required.2 4 1 In short, the ex parte statutes presented a wide
field for overreaching, and there were thus compelling reasons
2m See, e.g., Hall v. Garson, 468 F.2d 845, 848 (5th Cir. 1972). See also Adams v.
Department of Motor Vehicles, 520 P.2d 961, 113 Cal. Rptr. 145 (1974); Blye v. GlobeWernicke Realty Co., 300 N.E.2d 710, 347 N.Y.S.2d 170 (1973).
231 See, e.g., Hall v. Garson, 468 F.2d 845, 848 (5th Cir. 1972); Barber v. Rader,
350 F. Supp. 183, 185 (S.D. Fla. 1972). Palmer v. Columbia Gas, 479 F.2d 153, 161-65
(6th Cir. 1973); Salisbury v. Southern New Eng. Tel. Co., 365 F. Supp. 1023 (D. Conn.
1973).
m Gibbs v. Titelman, 369 F. Supp. 38, 50 (E.D. Pa. 1973), rev'd, 502 F.2d 1107
(3d Cir. 1974). In two § 9-503 cases Hall v. Garson, 468 F.2d 845 (5th Cir. 1972), which
invalidated landlords lien statutes, was distinguished as a permissible finding of state
action. In Hall, the courts said that the taking was under statute alone, while under §
9-503 the taking was pursuant to both statute and agreement. Shelton v. General
Electric Credit Corp., 359 F. Supp. 1097, 1081 (M.D. Ga. 1973); Oller v. Bank of
America, 342 F. Supp. 21, 23 (N.D. Cal. 1972). But § 9-503 allows the parties to agree.
The agreement may relate to waiver but is irrelevant to state action. Another § 9-503
case distinguished Hall by saying that there was state action because the landlord
could enter the tenant's home and seize property unrelated to the debt. Calderon v.
United Furniture Co., 505 F.2d 950 (5th Cir. 1974). Whether the interest in the seized
property is dual may relate to what due process requires. See Mitchell v. W.T. Grant,
416 U.S. 600 (1974). But it seems irrelevant to the state action issue.
"I Palmer v. Columbia Gas, 479 F.2d 153 (6th Cir. 1973); Blye v. Globe-Wernicke
Realty Co., 300 N.E.2d 710, 347 N.Y.S.2d 170 (1973).
211Barber v. Rader, 350 F. Supp. 183, 185 (S.D. Fla. 1972); Blye v. GlobeWernicke Realty Co., 300 N.E.2d 710, 347 N.Y.S.2d 170 (1973).
241See, e.g., Hall v. Garson, 468 F.2d 845 (5th Cir. 1972); MacQueen v. Lambert,
348 F. Supp. 1334 (M.D. Fla. 1972); Kruger v. Wells Fargo Bank, 107 Cal. Rptr. 133
(Ct. App. 1973), rev'd, 521 P.2d 441, 113 Cal. Rptr. 449 (1974); Blye v. Globe-Wernicke
Realty Co., 300 N.E.2d 710, 347 N.Y.S.2d 170 (1973).
242 Gross v. Fox, 349 F. Supp. 1164, 1165-66 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
243 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-503, § 9-504(3) (1972 text).
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to abolish them. If, however, it is held that there is no state
action under § 9-503, it is questionable whether these statutes
were properly abolished on due process grounds. Thus, the ultimate effect of finding no state action in § 9-503 repossessions
may be to validate procedures far more opprobrious in their
operation than any available under the Uniform Commercial
Code.
There is, finally, an alternative to repossessing. In consumer finance cases, the creditor has a legitimate interest in
either being paid or recovering the collateral. For this reason
the debtor should be prevented from selling the collateral, removing it from the jurisdiction, or hiding it. But Fuentes held
that the creditor cannot disturb the debtor's contractual right
to possession without notice and a hearing, 4 and this makes
it more difficult to recover secured property from defaulted
debtors. A creditor may justifiably fear that a debtor will destroy, hide, remove or sell the property upon receiving notice
of an impeding repossession hearing. If so, a creditor can secure
an ex parte order that does not disturb the debtor's possessory
interest but interdicts destruction, sale or removal. 245 Then the
creditor can give notice and repossess. This remedy has the
obvious drawbacks of possible expense for the extra hearing,
and the loss to the creditor of the leverage of summary taking
of the property. But it backs the creditor's contractual rights
with the threat of contempt. 246 So long as this less onerous
alternative is available, creditors can protect their legitimate
interests without interfering with debtors' property rights.
As the foregoing discussion demonstrates, a great deal has
been written on the state action issue in self-help repossession
and other due process cases. The heart of the matter can be
simply stated. Fuentes and other leading due process cases
struck down statutes because they allowed one private citizen
to affect another private citizen's constitutionally protected
interest without adequate government control. Private power
was subjected to a judicial scrutiny. The argument against
2 Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 87 (1972). IfMitchell dilutes or changes Fuentes
by finding dual interests in secured personal property, this paragraph is less relevant
than it was before Mitchell was decided.
215FED. R. Crv. P. 65(b); VA. CODE ANN. § 8-614 (1950).
2,I Cf. Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Waegele, 105 Cal. Rptr. 914 (Ct. App. 1972).
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state action converts the defect into a virtue by allowing the
absence of any governmental restraint to become a reason to
deny relief completely. This logical flaw reveals the irony of
accepting the argument that statutory permission to repossess
is not state action. The state action line must be drawn somewhere. It should be drawn to embrace conduct which, except
for statutory permission, is a common law tort."7 The opinions
which refuse to find state action should suffer the same fate as
those which read Sniadach v. Family Finance narrowly. They
should be disapproved.24
3.

"Persons" and Other Defendants

The Civil Rights Act limits. defendants to "persons" acting
under color of law who cause plaintiffs to be deprived of constitutional rights.2 41 As might be expected, this limitation, though

based upon sound policies, creates both practical and concep2
tual difficulties. The person concept is related to personal 1
and sovereign immunity.251 The personal immunities were borrowed from the common law where they were designed to protect government officials who erroneously but legitimately
exercised official discretion. 512 The personal immunity concepts
will be treated extensively below, but the primary concern here
is with sovereign immunity to which the discussion will return
after focusing upon some preliminary background matters.
Governmental liability to a Civil Rights Act plaintiff was
debated by Congress in 1871 and omitted from the Civil Rights
Act.215 Thus, in 1961 the Supreme Court held that the City of
Chicago was an improper defendant in a Civil Rights Act dam247 Note,

supra note 211. Since interruption of possession without permission was

a tort of common law, and § 9-503 authorizes the creditor to do so legally, the draftsmen of the fourteenth amendment would have intended to include this change from
the common law by statute within the concept of state action.
248 Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 69 (1972).
21,See generallyMcCormack, 60 VA. L. REv. 1, 28-34 (1974). The plaintiffs are not
so limited. A corporation may be a § 1983 plaintiff. Trapper Brown Construction Co.
v. Electromech, Inc., 358 F. Supp. 105, 106-07 (D.N.H. 1973). See also Undergraduate
Student Ass'n v. Peltason, 359 F. Supp. 320 (N.D. Ill. 1973).
250McCormack, 60 VA. L. Rev. 1, 11-17 (1974).
"1' Id. at 36-52.
215Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
The legislative history is discussed in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 188-92
(1961).
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age action. 4 In Moor v. County of Alameda, 5' the Court considered the impact of § 1988 which, if federal law is incomplete
in a Civil Rights Act suit, allows federal courts to use state law
to fill gaps. The state had abrogated county damage immunity.
Plaintiff argued that when dealing with the § 1983 claim, §
1988 authorizes the district court to pick up the state cause of
action against the county. The Supreme Court, citing the plain
language of the Civil Rights Act and legislative history, rejected plaintiff's argument and affirmed the decision to grant
the county's motion to dismiss. 56
Moor was extended in City of Kenosha v. Bruno.Hr In that
case licensees had sued the city charging that a refusal to renew
their licences denied them due process, asking only declaratory
and injunctive relief. There was some previous thought that
cities could be proper defendants in a Civil Rights Act case
seeking only equitable relief. The Supreme Court, however,
held that a district court lacks Civil Rights Act jurisdiction
over a city even though no damages are asked."'5
Moor and Kenosha should not create many serious problems. The governmental defendants will merely be dis26 0
missed.S Prior cases against governmental defendants will
be treated as aberrational. As has always been true in damage
actions, plaintiffs must sue the responsible color of law defendants. Injunction cases offer a little more difficulty, because
relief is prospective and officers change. But Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 25(d) has been held to bind a successor to
public office to obey an injunction granted against his predeId. at 191-92.
411 U.S. 693 (1973).
2"

Id. at 710.

-7 412 U.S. 507 (1973).
2m Id. at 512-13. Justice Douglas dissented, arguing that the legislative history did
not support a bar to equitable relief against a local government entity. Id. at 516-20.
21 See, e.g., Freitag v. Carter, 489 F.2d 1377, 1384 (7th Cir. 1973); Harper v.
Kloster, 486 F.2d 1134, 1137-38 (4th Cir. 1973); Monos v. City of Green Bay, 372 F.
Supp. 40 (E.D. Wis. 1974); Edwards v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 371 F. Supp. 1313 (E.D.
Pa. 1974); Tilli v. City of Northampton, 370 F. Supp. 459 (E.D. Pa. 1974); Perzanowski
v. Salvio, 369 F. Supp. 223 (D. Conn. 1974); Downs v. Department of Pub. Welfare,
368 F. Supp. 454, 460-61 (E.D. Pa. 1973); Nyberg v. City of Virginia, 361 F. Supp. 932,
937 (D. Minn. 1973).
20 See, e.g., Pioneer Say. & Loan Co. v. City of Cleveland, 479 F.2d 595 (6th Cir.
1973); Dailey v. City of Lawton, 425 F.2d 1037, 1038-39 (10th Cir. 1970).
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cessor.281 Thus, the injunction will continue to be an effective
remedial tool under the Civil Rights Acts. Even so, conceptual
problems appear because citing Rule 25(d) focuses attention on
the fictional nature of the inquiry. Rule 25(d) substitutes a
successor in office only when the predecessor is a party "in his
official capacity." But only "persons" can be defendants. Tension lurks in the personal-official dichotomy.
Ex Parte Young5 2 held that a federal court could enjoin a
state officer from enforcing an unconstitutional state act. The
Young result is ostensibly incongruous with the doctrine of
sovereign immunity expressed in the eleventh amendment.
Reconciling this incongruity in an intellectually satisfactory
fashion is difficult. The Court handled the problem by looking
at the state official's act as simply illegal if pursuant to an
unconstitutional statute. In such instances, the official is deprived of sovereign immunity as a defense. He is "stripped of
his official or representative character and is subjected in his
23
person to the consequences of his individual conduct."
Ex Parte Young solves the sovereign immunity problem
with a legal fiction." 4 Since the fourteenth amendment only
bars state action, most lawsuits of this sort are, in fact, against
a governmental policy rather than an individual or person. Yet,
only persons may be sued. Ex Parte Young's person fiction,
however, allows the federal courts to avoid sovereign immunity's potentially serious injustice, preserve judicial review and
maintain federal supremacy while simultaneously paying symbolic obeisance to the role of states in the federal system. Under
Rule 25(b) a successor to office may be substituted as a defendant when his predecessor was sued officially. Yet, under
Young a state official can only be sued individually. Thus, as
if to further expose the person fiction, Rule 25(d) appears to
26 5
bind the office in addition to the individual.
6,Lucy v. Adams, 224 F. Supp. 79 (N.D. Ala. 1963), aff'd, 328 F.2d 892 (5th Cir.

1964).

262209 U.S. 123 (1908).
21 Id. at 160.
264K. DAvis, supra note 92, at § 27.03. C. WMUGhTr, FEDERAL CouRs § 48 (2d ed.

1970). Craven, Paean to Pragmatism,50 N.C.L. Rav. 977, 984-88 (1972) is an excellent
and incisive discussion of the fictional nature of Ex Parte Young.
25 See 0. Fins, INJUNCTIONS 702 (1972).
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The person concept in the Civil Rights Act anticipates the
Ex Parte Young person fiction. The problem did not become
apparent until the Act became a litigation tool in the 1960's.
Some Civil Rights Act actions are run-of-the-mill tort cases
brought against an official who has behaved aberrationally.256
In most Civil Rights Act suits, however, a governmental policy,
a statute, an administrative regulation or practice is attacked.
The official is a defendant only as a formality. In these cases,
even though the conduct is mandated or general, Moor and
Kenosha compel the plaintiff to name individuals as defendants. 6 '
In a damage case, the Civil Rights Act plaintiff is deprived
of the governmental entity as a solvent defendant. The Act's
language is clear, and has not been amended even though it
may be based on superannuated notions of sovereign immunity."'5 As a policy matter, limiting a plaintiff to individual defendants could be supported by a desire to punish the individual malefactor's fault. Also, depriving the plaintiff of the entity
as a defendant could be supported by a desire to protect the
general public purse."' These factors coupled with the comity
inherent in federalism might be sufficient to outweigh the
plaintiff's need for the entity as a defendant. The final result,
however, is that a plaintiff may be deprived of damages simply
because the responsible defendant is impecunious.7
The person concept and the accompanying fictions have
additional consequences in Civil Rights Act cases. Courts lacking an understanding of the underlying fictions hold that an
action against named individuals is "really" against the government and extend sovereign immunity's injustice. 2 1 Krause
v. Rhodes, 72 which grew out of the May 1970 Kent State shoot211

See, e.g., York v, Story, 324 F.2d 450 (9th Cir. 1963) (police officer allegedly

stripped plaintiff and forced her to pose for indecent photographs).
261 City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507 (1973); Moor v. County of Alameda,
411 U.S. 693 (1973).
2
The legislative history is quoted in Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693,
708 n.24 (1973). See K, DAvis, supra note 92, at §§ 26.01-27.07.
2,, This point is made in Justice Douglas' dissent in City of Kenosha v. Bruno,
412 U.S. 507, 516-20 (1973).
211 Note Vicarious Liability Under Section 1983, 6 IND. L. Rlv. 509, 515 (1973).
"I K. DAvis, supra note 92, at § 27.03.
272 471 F.2d 430 (6th Cir. 1972), rev'd sub nor. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232
(1974).
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ings, reveals this tendency. Rhodes is a wrongful death case
brought against several officials by the victim's parents. The
court of appeals, affirming the district court's dismissal, said
that although individuals were named defendants, the lawsuits
"are in substance and effect actions against the State of Ohio"
and were "prohibited by the Eleventh Amendment."' 3 The
blunder is apparent when it is remembered that the doctrine
of Ex Parte Young and the Civil Rights Acts were designed to
allow lawsuits which are "in substance and effect actions
against the state."
The Supreme Court rejected the notion that the officials
were protected by sovereign immunity. 24 Applying Ex Parte
Young, the Court held that sovereign immunity is "no shield
for a state official confronted by a claim that he had deprived
another of a federal right under the color of state law."-*5 The
Court refused to distinguish between damages and the injunction in Young, observing that "in some situations a damage
remedy can be as effective a redress for the infringement of a
26
constitutional right as injunctive relief might be in another."
Had a sensitive and highly charged controversy like the Kent
State shootings been dismissed at the pleading stage because
of sovereign immunity, the courts would have taken a step in
the direction of abrogating the Civil Rights Acts. Instead, the
Kent State litigation will be decided on the merits. If the courts
apply the requisite personal immunity to the function and facts
involved,2 7 7 legitimate official discretion will be adequately pro-

tected.
Nevertheless, while holding that damages were available
to the shooting victim's parents, the Court reaffirmed sovereign
immunity's continued vitality. This was compelled by
Edelman v. Jordan28 in which the Court held that sovereign
immunity barred a suit for retroactive welfare benefits. Future
difficulties were created by these opinions because, at least on
21

Krause v. Rhodes, 471 F.2d 430, 442 (6th Cir. 1972). See also Williams v. Eaton,

443 F.2d 422, 429 (10th Cir. 1971) for similar conclusions.
2' Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974).
vs Id. at 237.
r' Id. at 238.
2 The Court generally accepted the dissent in the Court of Appeals. See 471 F.2d
at 447-68. The personal immunities are discussed at length in Part II below.
8'415 U.S. 651 (1974).
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a verbal level, the differences between Edelman and Rhodes
are elusive. In Rhodes, the Court said that sovereign immunity
"bars suits not only against the state when it is the named
party but when it is the party in fact." 2 But, while a plaintiff
may not seek damages from the public treasury, the Kent State
plaintiffs were not barred by sovereign immunity because
".. . they are seeking to impose individual and personal liability on the named defendants for what they claim . . . was a

deprivation of federal rights by these defendants under the
color of state law."' 0
Edelman involved "a very substantial amount of money
which should have been paid, but was not."l The Court appeared to hold that retroactive payments were interdicted by
sovereign immunity because the award "must be paid from
public funds in the state treasury" and the action was, therefore, "in essence" against the state. 212 This conclusion appears

to flow from the size of the damages. "These funds will obviously not be paid out of the pocket of petitioner Edelman";
"the funds to satisfy the award in this case must inevitably
come from the [state's] general revenues. ' '213 But to distin-

guish sovereign immunity from potential liability on amount at
issue is to place a premium on doing evil in large portions.
Moreover, the Kent State plaintiffs asked $11,000,000, 211 a sum
that "obviously" will not be paid out of most defendant's pockets.
Also, while the "prospective" relief asked in Ex Parte
Young may be distinguished from the "retroactive" relief asked
in Edelman, these verbal categories do not serve to distinguish
Rhodes and Edelman. The court system cannot extend either
retroactive or prospective relief to dead children's parents,
therefore money damages are substituted. The best that can be
said for this analysis is that where the wrong has stopped, as
in Rhodes, money damages will be extended. But where the
wrong continues, as in Edelman, the defendant will be merely
21 Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974). The Court appeared, therefore, to
reject McCormack's analysis. See McCormack, 60 VA. L. Rzv. 1, 36-52 (1974).
" Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 238 (1974).
-1 415 U.S. 651, 664 (1974).
21 Id. at 663.
21 Id. at 664, 65.
2" Krause v. Rhodes, 471 F.2d 430, 433 (6th Cir. 1972).
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ordered to cease. Now the inquiry is back where it began because this places a premium on continuing to do the wrong.
There are several verbal categories, such as legalequitable, compensatory-remedial, and substitutionaryprospective; and the categories can be manipulated at leisure.
But one thing is palpably clear. None provide an intellectual
fabric which is responsive to underlying social reality. Sovereign immunity is a jumble too impenetrable even to be enter' Realistically, sovereign immunity's effect can be
taining. 85
obviated from the date of the decision into the future. Edelman
holds that the courts may force a state to do what it should do,
but may not force a state to do what it should have done. Thus,
the proper tactical course is to sue early and to request immediate preliminary relief.
4. ExtraordinaryCircumstances and Nonemergencies
Several cases decided before Fuentes allowed the government to affect significant citizen interests without notice and
a hearing.25 These incongruous opinions existed parallel to the
developing new due process theories. In Fuentes, Justice Stewart formulated standards to explain and distinguish the earlier
opinions. He went on to define the conditions for exercising the
government's power on private interests in extraordinary circumstances without notice and a hearing. There are three requirements:
First, in each case, the seizure has been directly necessary to
secure an important governmental or general public interest.
Second, there has been a special need for very prompt action.
Third, the State has kept strict control over its monopoly of
legitimate force: the person initiating the seizure has been a
government official responsible for determining, under the
standards of a narrowly drawn statute, that it was necessary
and justified in the particular instance.27
This is a significant advance over earlier attempts to distinI See the extensive citations and lucid discussion in McCormack, supra 60 VA.
L. Rav. 1, 36-52 (1974).
"I See, e.g., Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594 (1950) (drugs
misbranded); North American Cold Storage Co. v. Chicago, 211 U.S. 306 (1908) (contaminated food).
2" Fuentes v. -Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 91 (1972).
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guish the summary seizure opinions. 2 Following Justice Stewart's reasoning, these cases are satisfactorily reconciled with
developing ideas of due process.29
Almost all court actions are extraordinary situations, resulting from breakdowns in the usual social processes. If the
emergency exception is allowed to expand, notice and a hearing
might be obviated in almost every instance. The lower courts
have, however, been careful to carry out the spirit of the "extraordinary situations" exception. Creditors, because only individual interests are at stake, have advanced the emergency
argument without success. In MacQueen v. Lambert,"' amicus
argued that a landord's lien could be summarily enforced
against a tenant's property "under the recognized emergency
exception." The court rejected the argument. "Emergency,"
the court wrote, "is the cry of intuition rather than reason. It
should accordingly be used as an excuse for summary proce2 defendures only sparingly . . ..,"I" In Gibbs v. Titelman"
dants argued that the "general public interest" allowed them
to repossess without notice and that requiring notice would
raise the cost of credit to all and prevent some consumers from
obtaining credit.293 The court was unconvinced. Because hearings might be waived, it reasoned that only the opportunity to
be heard was at issue. Further, it noted that, if due process is
to be protective, it inevitably will involve some expense.2 94 Several other courts have summarily rejected the "cry" of emergency as an excuse to proceed without notice. 295 The courts, it
2" Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379 (1971); Sniadach v. Family Fin.
Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 339(1969).
2' Quasi in rem seizure to attain jurisdiction over a nonresident continues to be
somewhat incongruous with developing ideas of due process. Compare Lebowitz v.
Forbes Leasing & Fin. Co., 456 F.2d 979 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 843 (1972);
Balter v. Bato Co., 385 F. Supp. 470 (W.D. Pa. 1975); Central Sec. Nat'l Bank v. Royal
Homes, Inc., 371 F. Supp. 476 (E.D. Mich. 1974); Banks v. Superior Court, 102 Cal.
Rptr. 590 (Ct. App. 1972); with Welsh v. Kinchla, 386 F. Supp. 913 (D. Mass. 1975);
In re Law Research Services, Inc., 386 F. Supp. 749 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). See note, Quasi

in Rem Jurisdictionand Due Process Requirements, 82 YALE. L.J. 1023 (1973).
"1 348 F. Supp. 1334 (M.D. Fla. 1972).
'
2

Id. at 1337-38.
369 F. Supp. 38 (E.D. Pa. 1973), rev'd, 502 F.2d 1107 (3d Cir. 1974).

Id. at 56.
' Id. at 55-57. A trenchant note hints that "[cireditors may never qualify...

on

. .

.creditor status alone." Note, supra note 289, at 1027.

2' Gonzalez v. County of Hidalgo, 489 F.2d 1043, 1050-51 (5th Cir. 1973); Graff
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appears, are rejecting generalized emergencies and are requiring both statutorily defined and factually importunate situa5 the court applied the
tions. For example in Newton v. Burgin,"'
extraordinary situations exception scrupulously to a child neglect case and found that the requirements were met. Thus, so
long as the courts analyze the proper factors, Fuentes' emergency exception appears to be safe. 97
One significant anomaly remains. The procedure for granting an ex parte temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction is significantly less restrictive than the "extraordinary
situations" exception in Fuentes. Many state rules governing
ex parte restraining orders are even less restrictive than the
federal rule.29 Under Federal Rule 65(b), the applicant must
present sworn documents to a judge showing an "immediate
and irreparable injury" that would result before the defendant
can be heard. The applicant must also either give reasons for
proceeding without notice or show unsuccessful efforts to reach
the defendant. An important public or govermental interest is
not required. Nor is it necessary for the state, acting within well
defined guidelines, to retain strict control of the proceeding."'5
v. Nicholl, 370 F. Supp. 974, 982 (N.D. Ill. 1974); Morrow Elec. Co. v. Cruse, 370 F.
Supp. 639 (N.D. Ga. 1974); Roscoe v. Butler, 367 F. Supp. 574 (D. Md. 1973); Bay
State Harness Horse Racing & Breeding Ass'n v. PPG Industries, Inc., 365 F. Supp.
1301, 1306 (D. Mass. 1973); Gunter v. Merchants Warren Nat'1 Bank, 360 F. Supp.
720, 723 (D. Conn. 1973); Commonwealth ex rel. Rafferty v. Philadelphia Psychiatric
Center, 356 F. Supp. 500, 511-12 (E.D. Pa. 1973); Geisinger v. Voss, 352 F. Supp. 104,
110 (E.D. Wis. 1972); Bronson v. Consolidated Edison Co., 350 F. Supp. 443, 448
(S.D.N.Y. 1972); Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1091 (E.D. Wis. 1972),
vacated and remanded, 414 U.S. 473 (1974);" C.V.C. v. Superior Court, 106 Cal. Rptr.
123, 127 (Ct. App. 1973); Cf. Braxton v. Municipal Court, 514 P.2d 697, 700, 109 Cal.
Rptr. 897, 907 (1973). But see Astol Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416
U.S. 663 (1974) (government seizure); United States v. One 1967 Porsche, 492 F.2d
893 (9th Cir. 1974) (crime); Aircrane, Inc. v. Butterfield, 369 F. Supp. 598 (E.D. Pa.
1974) (government seizure); Cook v. Carlson, 364 F. Supp. 24, 28-29 (S.D.S.D. 1973)
(incorrect); W.T. Grant Co. v. Mitchell, 269 So. 2d 186, 190-91 (1972), affd on another
point, 416 U.S. 600 (1974). The exception is discussed in Note, supra note 289, at 102632.
296 Newton v. Burgin, 363 F. Supp. 782, 786-88 (W.D.N.C. 1973).
2" But see Aircrane, Inc. v. Butterfield, 369 F. Supp. 598, 604 (E.D. Pa. 1974)
(apparently applying a balancing test).
211 Compare FED. R. Civ. P. 65(b) with VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8-610-26 (1950).
n' The due process problems in ex parte injunctions and temporary restraining
orders were considered in earlier articles by the author. Rendleman, More on Void
Orders, 7 GA. L. REv. 246 (1973); Rendleman, Toward Due Process in Injunction
Procedure, 1973 U: ILL. L.F. 221 (1973). Due Process attaches, I concluded, when the
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Recent opinions have considered the constitutional issues
involved in the granting of such temporary relief. In Chrysler
Credit Corp. v. Waegele,300 a creditor obtained an ex parte
order forbidding a debtor from disposing of automobiles which
were security for a loan. The debtor sold the automobiles, was
held in contempt and appealed. He argued that the ex parte
order violated due process. The court held that the ex partc
order was constitutional and affirmed. It sought a "situation
requiring special protection to a state or creditor interest" and
found that in serving the interest of the plaintiff, the ex parte
order "serves the interest of the state in the power of the courts
to preserve the status quo as a necessary adjunct to their ability
to'render an effective judgment."3' The standard the court
applied was whether the plaintiff would suffer "great or irreparable injury" without the order. These words, the court said,
"have been used often in our law and are capable of accurate
judicial application. Their presence in this statute represents
a significant 'narrowing' of the court's discretion in authorizing
summary relief." 30 2 Finally, to grant an ex parte order, the
court held, is "judicial" as opposed to "ministerial" and the
order was only for a limited time. Thus, the Waegele court
upheld ex parte restraining orders generally against a due process attack.
Waegele may be criticized. First, it can be said that to
affirm the contempt it was unnecessary to hold the statute
valid against a due process attack in all cases. In Fuentes the
replevin interfered with a contractual right to possess, and in
Mitchell both the plaintiff creditor and the defendant debtor
had an interest in the secured property. But the Waegele order
differs in three respects from the creditor's remedy in either of
defendant has a constitutionally cognizable interest in his conduct. This interest is
sufficiently affected when the order or injunction has "practical finality." Several
arguments that due process does not mandate notice and a hearing were stated, examined and rejected. The arguments are that the order is not final, that the plaintiffs'
need for speed and efficiency should prevail, that the standard provides adequate
guidance, and that an improperly enjoined defendant may recover on the injunction
bond. Toward Due Processin Injunction Procedure,supra, at 241-45, n.109-28. Injunc-

tions and restraining orders are discussed here because of decisions which were published too late to add fully to those articles.
',

105 Cal. Rptr. 914 (Ct. App. 1972).
Id. at 918.

311Id.

at 917.
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those cases: it did not lead to a seizure, the defendant's privacy
was not invaded, and he was not ordered to do anything except
to follow the contract. 3 Thus, the Waegele court might have
held that the ex parte order was permissible because it did not
impinge on any constitutionally cognizable interest.3 4
Secondly, Waegele reads the due process cases narrowly
and fails to consider or apply Fuentes' extraordinary situations
test for summary procedure. The Court in Fuentes specifically
rejected a restricted reading of prior due process opinions stating that they were "in the mainstream of past cases.

. .

estab-

lishing that due process requires an opportunity for a hearing
before a deprivation of property takes effect." ' 5 In Geisingerv.
Voss"°' an order that required a husband to vacate his home
which was granted without notice or a hearing was assailed on
due process grounds.3

7

The Geisinger order was designed to

protect the applicant's physical safety rather than, as in
Waegele, the applicant's property. The Geisinger order constricted the defendant's conduct more drastically than the
Waegele order. In Geisinger, the court applied Fuentes' "extraordinary situations" test. The relief sought, the court found,
was private and did not advance "an important governmental
or general public interest." Because of delay between granting
and serving the order, the court did not discover any "special
need for very prompt action." Even if there was such a need,
the court did not understand why the applicant should summarily order the defendant to abandon his home. There was an
alternative. The applicant could leave the home voluntarily.
Finally, because a conclusory, standardized form was used
without a factual inquiry, the court saw no need for ex parte
procedure in the "particular instance."
303 Waegele was not the type of case considered in More on Void Orders,supra note
299, and Toward Due Process in Injunction Procedure, supra note 299. The order in
Waegele related to property, not conduct. There was a bond to protect the defendant.
And, there was no "practical finality;" rather the order protected a legitimate status
quo. See Toward Due Process in Injunction Procedure,supra note 299, at 242 n.112.
30 Cf. Cook v. Carlson, 364 F. Supp. 24, 27 (S.D.S.D. 1973).
m Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 88 (1972).
352 F. Supp. 104 (E.D. Wis. 1972).
31 Id. at 109. The order, granted by a family court commissioner, was analogous
to an injunction. The issue was whether to convene a three judge court and the court
discussed whether success was probable, not the ultimate merits.
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When due process reasoning is applied to ex parte orders,
the other branches of Waegele are underminded. The Waegele
court stressed the presence of a judge and the "great or irreparable injury" standard. Judicial control was emphasized by the
Court in Mitchell as a factor in approving ex parte repossessions of secured property,"8 but that should not be read too
broadly. Many injunctions circumscribe conduct or fourteenth
amendment liberty. The Mitchell court was careful to approve
only those ex parte orders which involve property." 9 In addition, the great or irreparable harm standard appears to be
similar to the "broad fault standard" which in a "liberty" or
conduct case is particularly inappropriate for documentary
proof and which is appropriate for notice and a hearing. This
is because that standard is "inherently subject to factual determination and adversarial input." ' Unsupported allegations
are no substitute for a hearing. The "great or irreparable injury
standard" may be insignificant when the defendant has no
right to be heard. Allegations "test no more than the applicant's belief in his rights" and because "private gain is at stake
. . . the danger is all too great that his confidence in his own
311
cause will be misplaced."
The judicial act allowing ex parte relief is frequently not a
deliberated one. The Geisingercourt condemned the lack of a
factual inquiry and the use of a conclusory, standardized
form.31 2 Forms for a variety of ex parte temporary injunctions
are readily available, 3 3 and the drafting process may be no
more than filling in blanks.3 14 The order may be granted almost
automatically.3 1 5 When the applicant asks to circumscribe lib"

3"'

Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 616 (1974).

Id. at 611.

Id. at 617.
3, Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 83 (1972).
3,2 Geisinger v. Voss, 352 F. Supp. 104, 110 (E.D. Wis. 1972).
3,3 See, e.g., Forms for injunctions to stop a student demonstration, INsTrru'E OF
CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION, LAW AND Discn'UNE ON CAdmus 317-19 (G. Holmes ed.
1971); INsTrruE OF CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION, STUDENT PROTEST AND THE LAW 269326 (G. Holmes ed. 1968); PRACTICING LAW INsTrrUTE, THE CAMPus CRIsis REvIsrrED 4068 (1970).
"I STUDENT PROTEST AND THE LAW, supra note 313, at 152. While the Mitchell
opinion stresses the requirement that specific facts be alleged, 416 U.S. 600, 605 (1974),
the application in that case was on a form. See Arguments Before the Court:
Installment Sales, 42 U.S.L.W. 3345, 3346 (Dec. 11, 1973).
3 Appalachian Volunteers v. Clark, 432 F.2d 530 (6th Cir. 1970) (injunction
2,
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erty under a vague standard, Justice Stewart's dissenting remarks in Mitchell are apt: "Whether the issuing functionary be
a judge or a court clerk, he can in any event do no more than
ascertain the formal sufficiency of the plaintiff's allegations,
after which the issuance of the summary writ becomes a simple
'31 6
ministerial act.
It is not a sufficient justification to note that the order is
"temporary." After all, the Geisinger order required a person
to abandon his home.3 1 7 "That a wrong can be done because it
can be undone" 318 has been rejected. "Due process is afforded
only by the kinds of 'notice' and hearing which are aimed at
establishing the validity or at least the probable validity of the
underlying claim . . .before he can be deprived of his property. '311 Thus, if an injunction or restraining order affects a
cognizable interest in liberty or in many property interests,
Fuentes and Mitchell compel notice and a hearing unless there
is an "emergency."
The result suggested above is possible under existing statutes and rules. 3 22 For example, the Washington Court of Appeals recently construed the Washington statute authorizing
temporary restraining orders to include the Fuentes v. Shevin
"extraordinary situations" exception.3 2' The Washington statgranted by clerk of the circuit court); Geisinger v. Voss, 352 F. Supp. 104, 110 (E.D.
Wis. 1972); Lynch v. Snepp, 350 F. Supp. 1134, 1136 (W.D.N.C. 1972), rev'd, 472 F.2d
769 (4th Cir. 1973); UMW Union Hosp. v. UMW Dist. 50, 275 N.E.2d 231 (Ill.
Ct. App.
1971), rev'd, 288 N.E.2d 455 (Ill.
1972) (complaint filed at 5:33 A.M.-order granted
at 5:33 A.M.); Note, Equity on Campus: The Limits of Injunctive Regulation of
University Protest, 80 YALE L.J. 987, 988-89 nn.1l-14, 1024 n.27 (1971).
, Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 632-33 (1974).
", Geisinger v. Voss, 352 F. Supp. 104, 111 (E.D. Wis. 1972): "There is an old saw
that a man's house is his castle. If modem times will not permit him moats and
battlements, it still remains, I strongly suspect, that the constitution insists that he
be allowed except in exceptional circumstances, a few words before the sheriff escorts
him out the door."
318 Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 647 (1972).
' Justice Harlan concurring in Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 343
(1969), quoted in Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 97 (1972); See also Mitchell v. W.T.
Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974) (property); Pervis v. La Marque Ind. School Dist., 466
F.2d 1054, 1057 (5th Cir. 1972).
I" Cf. More on Void Orders, supra note 299, at 305; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-474.1
(Supp. 1974).
' Coming and Sons, Inc. v. McNamara, 506 P.2d 1328,1330-31 (Wash. 1973). See
11 C. WmoRw &A. MILE, FEDERAL PRACTCE AND PRocEDuRE 505-06 (1973) (Rule 65(b)
valid as written).
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ute is phrased in terms of "emergency," but the same result
should be possible under "irreparable harm" or similar language. This standard plus care in defining liberty-property interests and complete appellate scrutiny should be adequate to
accommodate preliminary injunctions and temporary restraining orders to the new due process.2 2
C.

Conclusions and Generalizations-PartI

The new due process can be summarized. The threshold
question is whether the affected individual has a constitutionally cognizable interest. The importance of this issue has been
purposefully stressed. 23 In Fuentes, the property right which
gave rise to the interest was a contractual right to possess the
property. The Roth and Perry cases expand and clarify the
liberty-property analysis. Mitchell develops the property analysis further when an interest is security for a debt. At the
interest-identifying stage, there is no judicial balancing. Due
process applies when the government acts adjudicatively to
affect a constitutionally cognizable interest. If sufficient state
action or color of law is found in ostensibly private action,
notice and an opportunity to be heard are required. The second
step is to determine precisely how much process is due; it is
here that the courts consider and balance the interests of all
affected persons and the government. But to all the above there
is one exception. If extraordinary or emergency measures are
necessary, the action may proceed without due process.
Some will argue that as due process advances, society's
progress will be clogged by excessive hearings. Due process, in
this view, is an impediment to efficient government. Justice
Stewart answered this in Fuentes by noting that avoiding "ordinary costs imposed by the opportunity for a hearing is not
sufficient to override the constitutional right."3 4 If, moreover,
" More on Void Orders, supranote 299; TowardDue Process in InjunctionProcedure, supra note 299.
'1 The two step analysis as outlined here has also been recognized and commented
upon. 87 HARv. L. Rav. 1190, 1271 (1974). In its essentials, it can be briefly stated.
First, there must be determined whether liberty or property is being affected. Only
after that is decided does the balancing begin, in determining what due process requires. See Goss v. Lopez, 95 S. Ct. 729, 739 (1975).
"I Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 92 n.29 (1972). See also id. at 90 n.22; Mitchell
v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974).
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as the opponents of due process uniformly contend, the issues
are easy, then hearings will be waived or attenuated.3 Finally,
the argument reveals that the proponents are ideologically predisposed to accept the authority's word. They simply overlook
the present arrangement's conspicuous failure to safeguard the
public from serious and inherent defects. In many reported
cases, the seething arrogance of unchecked official power completely refutes the argument. 2 The reader, no doubt, can supply his own examples. There are, of course, many trustworthy
officials; still, Jeremy Bentham's rejoinder will suffice:
In every public trust, the legislator should, for the purpose of
prevention, assume the trustee disposed to break his trust in
every imaginable way in which the breach of it would be to
his personal advantage. This it the principle on which public
institutions ought to be formed; and when it is applied to all
men universally, it is injurious to none. The practical inference is to oppose to such possible breaches of trust every bar
that can be opposed consistently with the power that is requisite to the efficient discharge of the trust. Indeed, these arguments, drawn from the supposed virtues of men to power, are
3
opposed to the first principles on which all laws proceed.2
Considering the evils of irresponsible power, due process should
not involve readjustments too burdensome to be tolerated.
What does the new due process mean? Due process embodies the simple idea that no one may be the judge in his own
case. The due process trend vindicates notice and a right to be
heard as an indispensable cornerstone of our legal and political
3 2 2 Notice and
traditon.
a hearing before adverse governmental
action protect privacy and property. 29 The authorities are pre" Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 92 n.29 (1972): "[W]e deal here only with the
right to an opportunity to be heard." See also Bond v. Dentzer, 362 F. Supp. 1373,
1388 (N.D.N.Y. 1973), rev'd, 494 F.2d 302 (2d Cir. 1974).
316See, e.g., Palmer v. Columbia Gas Co., 479 F.2d 153, 168 (6th Cir. 1973); Holt
v. Sarver, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971) (prison); Landman v. Royster, 354 F. Supp. 1292
(E.D. Va. 1973); Landman v. Royster, 354 F. Supp. 1302 (E.D. Va. 1973) (prison);
Acree v. Drummond, 336 F. Supp. 1275 (S.D.Ga.), modified, 458 F.2d 486 (5th Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1006 (1972).
3' J. BENTHAM, HANDBOOK OF POLrICAL FALLACIES 82 (H. Larabee ed. 1952).
1' See 1 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 97, 104 (1971); RESTATEMENT
OF JUDGMENTS § 6, comment a at 36, 511, comment b at 66, § 11 (1942); F. JAMs, CIVM
PnocEDuRE §§ 11.5-.8 (1965); Rosenberg, Devising Procedures That Are Civilized to
Promote Justice That is Civilized, 69 MICH. L. REv. 797, 802 (1971).
"So viewed, the prohibition against the deprivation of property without due
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cluded from condescending to permit "no more than an oppor0
tunity for oral importunities aimed at a fait accompli."I"
Notice and a hearing also advance two primary goals of
any functioning political system: legitimacy and effectiveness.3 31 If all affected by a decision participate in making it,
there is less chance that it will be wrong. 3 2 This advances the
pragmatic interest in effectiveness or efficiency. 31 Due process
does not abolish authority but reduces it from judge to accuser.
Thus, controversies are more likely to be decided on the merits
instead of according to relative power. 334 This deters unconsi5
dered, erroneous and arbitrary action.11
The legitimacy goal is advanced when the governed feel or
believe that the institutions of government are proper and appropriate. If due process is observed and affected persons have
an opportunity to state their position, the losers, while not
relishing the defeat, will more readily accept the decision. 6 On
the other hand, if affected persons are denied access to decision-making institutions, they may feel that the institutions
are not the appropriate ones to govern the society. 337 This is the
process of law reflects the high value, embedded in our constitutional and political
history, that we place on a person's right to enjoy what is his, free of governmental
interference." Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 81 (1972).
C.V.C. v. Superior Court, 106 Cal. Rptr. 123, 129 (Ct. App. 1973). See also
Wagner v. Little Rock School Dist., 373 F. Supp. 876 (E.D. Ark. 1973), which gives an
excellent exposition of the underlying reason for the new due process requirement of
hearing before official action. There Judge Eisele explains that it is an attempt to place
the individual in as equal a position to assert his rights as is possible; to prevent the
individual from having to bear the burden of overcoming the bureaucratic inertia after
an action is taken. Thus the individual "should not have to bear the burden of persuad" Id. at 882.
ing the decision-maker to reverse a fait accompli ...
"I S. Lipsrr, PoLrcAL MAN 64-67 (1963).
m2Carroll v. President and Comm'r of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 182-84 (1968);
T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 385 (1970); Note, Defiance of
Unlawful Authority, 83 HAv. L. Rxv. 626, 635 (1970).
m United States ex rel. Miller v. Twome, 479 F.2d 701, 715 (7th Cir. 1973); United
States ex rel. Jones v. Rundle, 358 F. Supp. 939, 951 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
"I Bond v. Dentzer, 362 F. Supp. 1373, 1385 (N.D.N.Y. 1973), rev'd, 494 F.2d 302
(2d Cir. 1974); Rinhart v. Brewer, 360 F. Supp. 105, 114 (S.D. Iowa 1973), afl'd, 491
F.2d 705 (8th Cir. 1974).
C.V.C. v. Superior Court, 106 Cal. Rptr. 123, 128 (Ct. App. 1973).
mT. EMERSON, TOWARD AGENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 12-13 (1966);
Thode, The Ethical Standardfor the Advocate, 39 TEx. L. REV. 575, 587-92 (1961);
Wickham, Let the Sun Shine In! Open Meeting LegislationCan Be Our Key to Closed
Doors in State and Local Government, 68 Nw. U.L. REv. 480, 489 (1973).
I" F. FRANKFURTER & N. GRER, THE LABOR INJUNCTION 52-53, 130-133, 188
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theoretical underpinning of the adversary system.
Due process assures that affairs are conducted with more
consideration for the interests of all concerned. Formerly closed
lines of communication may be opened. Conflicting interests
will be reconciled in the open. As authorities become obliged
to give account, irrational, immature or incompetent officials
will be exposed to public view. The corrupt will be revealed or
find it more difficult to operate. Thus may due process function
as a potent educational and corrective force. More importantly,
the new due process will enable citizens to achieve a stronger
voice in decisions governing their daily lives. As such, it represents a long-overdue realization that it is foreign to our political
traditions for the lives and fortunes of many to depend upon
the arbitrary decisions of a few.
As due process advances, ex parte procedure declines. This
accompanies the waning of paternalism, ex cathedra power and
authoritarian relationships. 3 8 Established institutions no
longer evoke absolute, unquestioned obedience. Leaders must
deign to persuade and influence. Power, it is believed, vitiates
honest human relationships and degrades both the powerful
and the powerless. Influence and persuasion, however, allow
rational choices between alternatives. 39 Due process, the working out of better ways to do justice, is part of the struggle to
create a more humane society. The new due process cases mark
the trend and accelerate its development.
On the other hand, even if due process is mandated, it may
simply challenge the ingenuity of the unscrupulous. More
adroitly but no less effectively, they may conduct sham hearings, affect to listen, dissemble actual motives, and substitute
pretenses for reasons. Such a hearing is better than no hearing
at all. A hearing exposes the institutional thought process to
outside scrutiny and allows those interested in the result to
speak their piece. In addition, a hearing may reveal unconstitutional reasons and lay the foundation for judicial relief.341 But,
(1930); S. Lnpsrr, PoLmcAL MAN 64-67 (1963). Cf. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471,
483-84 (1972); Winters v. Miller, 446 F.2d 65, 71 (2d Cir. 1971); United States ex reL
Jones v. Rundle, 358 F. Supp. 939, 951 (E.D. Pa. 1973); Landman v. Royster, 333 F.
Supp. 621, 655 (E.D. Va. 1971).
"' B. SKINNER, THE TECHNOLOGY OF TEACHING 57 (1971).
'1 R. SAMPSON, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF PowER 233 (1966).
310See, e.g., Lusk v. Estes, 361 F. Supp. 653 (N.D. Tex. 1973).

1975]

THE NEw DUE PROCESS

hearings will eliminate only some of the graver abuses. Due
process is only part of the effort to build a better society. Due
process cannot protect as well as common decency, a simple
willingness to hear both sides and to decide on the facts. When
common decency is absent, law may not be much assistance;
when it is present, law may not be necessary.
PART 1-REMEDIES
The remainder of this article will be concerned with remedies for breach of the new due process. One recurring problem,
both practically and doctrinally, is the backward reach of a
decision that a procedure is contrary to due process. This is the
first issue before a court, and it must be resolved before the
court can move to the specific remedial issue. In keeping with
that analysis, the problem of retrospective application will first
be considered, under the voidness concept and the retroactivity
analysis. The new due process cases will be divided into practical categories: property, public employment, mental health
commitments and prison discipline. In each of these categories,
the application of both traditional legal theories and the Civil
Rights Act will be evaluated, and the gamut of injunctive relief, damages, and newer remedial tools will be analyzed. However, the precise requirements of the type of procedure that is
required in each instance will not be treated in detail because
the courts generally do not spell out procedural requirements
specifically. In this regard one must remember that due process
is outspokenly experimental; procedural forms will be tried,
modified and discarded. Thus, in assessing the following analysis the proper attitude to be maintained is an open mind, above
all avoiding dogmatism.
A.

Voidness and Retroactivity

Few propositions are better established in traditional due
process than that if a court lacks jurisdiction, its judgment is
void. 4' Jurisdiction, for present purposes, takes two forms: jurisdiction of the subject matter and jurisdiction of the person.
Subject matter jurisdiction means that the court has constitu324See, e.g., T. Coormy, CONsTrrUToNAL LMTrATIONS 499 (1878).
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tionally and statutorily defined competence to hear a particular class of cases. Personal jurisdiction means that the court
has power over the defendant and that the proper means were
utilized to bring him before the court. A court's decision in the
absence of jurisdiction is a nullity and has no effect.34 The
decision may be repudiated and is subject to collateral attack
in any subsequent proceeding.3 43 At the same time, so long as
a court has jurisdiction, it has the power to decide the case,
even if its decision is erroneous.3" If the judgment is erroneous
but not void, (i.e. within the court's jurisdiction) it binds the
parties.35 Error must be corrected by direct attack. If an erroneous judgment is not directly attacked, it is binding on collateral attack. Thus, a merely erroneous judgment is entitled to
res judicata and full faith and credit.
Many cases involving void judgments turn on a failure to
serve proper notice.3 41 Notice is basic to a right to be heard. A
proceeding purportedly commenced without notice is seriously
defective and a perversion of the adversary system.3 47 Some
cases observe a failure to accord proper procedural protections
and refuse to inquire further.3 1 Under traditional due process,
the substantive validity of the claim is not relevant. If due
process has been ignored by a failure to give effective notice, it
312RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 11, comment f at 68; § 93, comment c at 462; §

115, commentj at 561 (1942).
" See, e.g., Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965); Polansky v. Richardson,
351 F. Supp. 1066 (E.D.N.Y. 1972). But cf. cases applying res judicata to jurisdictional
issues: Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106 (1963) (subject matter); American Surety Co. v.
Baldwin, 287 U.S. 156 (1932) (personal).
"I United States v. Fidanian, 465 F.2d 755, 758-59 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 1044 (1972); Brown v. Jacobs, 12 N.E.2d 10, 11-12 (111. 1935); Z. CHAFEE, SOME
PROBLEMS OF EQUrrY 348 (1950); F. JAMES, CIVIL POCEDURE 534 (1965).
31 T. CoOLEY, supra note 341, at 510-11.
"I Robinson v. Hanrahan, 409 U.S. 38 (1972); Hanson v. Denkla, 357 U.S. 235
(1958); Mullane v. Central Hanover, 339 U.S. 306, 320 (1950); Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276
U.S. 13 (1928); McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90 (1917); Polansky v. Richardson, 351
F. Supp. 1066 (E.D.N.Y. 1972); RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 6, comment a at 36
(1942). Some turn on lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Ex parte Bryant, 485 S.W.2d
719 (Tex. 1956).
31 RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 6, comment a at 36 (1942).
348 See, e.g., A Quantity of Books v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205, 212-13 (1964); Marcus

v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717, 738 (1961); Shafer v. Stephens Adamson Mfg. Co.,

183 N.E.2d 575, 578 (Ill. Ct. App. 1962);
at 39 (1942).

RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS

§ 6, comment f
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is as if nothing had happened.349
The voidness concept has also been applied in new due
process litigation. In a recent school discipline case, for example, the principal suspended students without a hearing. A
school board hearing months later affirmed the principal. The
district court held that failure to hold a pre-suspension hearing
"may be cured by a valid subsequent hearing." The court of
appeals, reversing, held that "punishment cannot be imposed
before a hearing is given" and ordered the school to expunge
the record of the suspensions.3 5 ' Thus, to the extent legally
possible, the court extirpated the effect of the suspensions. Yet,
not even the court's equitable powers could return the missed
school days, a fact which underscores the finite scope of judicial
power in dealing with many of the interests asserted in new due
process cases. This limitation could also raise the question of
money damages to substitute for the students' loss.
As an alternative to the traditional voidness remedy, a
court may resolve the problem under the retroactivity doctrines
developed in criminal procedure cases." ' For example, in
Weaver v. O'Grady,352 the court held that it was unconstitutional to suspend a driver's license without an opportunity for
a hearing. 53 Applying traditional due process reasoning, nothing legally cognizable had happened and all purported prior
suspensions were void. Instead, the court noted that the holding was not totally unexpected in view of past practices and
developing notions of due process. Mailing notice to the plaintiff group would be expensive, but, in view of the imperative
nature of due process and the state's administrative capabilities, mailed notice was not impossible. Hence, the court held
that the decision was retroactive and required the state to send
notice to the affected licensees within 90 days. 54 Under traditional due process, the notice might have stated that the pre3' RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENT

§ 11, comment f at 68; § 93, comment c at 462; §

115, comment j at 561 (1942). See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877). See also
Polansky v. Richardson, 351 F. Supp. 1066 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
"
Pervis v. LaMarque Ind. School Dist., 466 F.2d 1054, 1058 (5th Cir. 1972). See
also Lopez v. Goss, 372 F. Supp. 1279, 1302 (S.D. Ohio 1973), aff'd, 95 S. Ct. 729 (1975).
"I
See, e.g., Wainwright v. Stone, 414 U.S. 21 (1973).
"1 350 F. Supp. 403 (S.D. Ohio 1972).
"

Id. at 408.

m Id. at 410-12.
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vious "suspension" was legally ineffective. Under retroactivity,

however, licensees were notified of their right to request a due
process hearing. 55
In Rios v. Cozens, 356 a similar case, the plaintiff asked the
court to reinstate illegally suspended licenses. The Supreme
Court of California directed the license department to extirpate
the order suspending the named plaintiff's license pending notice and a hearing. 357 The court, though refusing to vacate suspension orders entered against the other members of the
plaintiff class did require the department to hold a hearing if
requested by one whose license had been previously suspended
without due process. 35 8 Nevertheless, the court rejected the

named plaintiff's claim for money damages. 59
The concept of retroactivity will be developed more fully
in succeeding sections. Still, even the scant overview presented
by the foregoing cases yields some important conclusions.
Under the retroactivity analysis, the court has considerable
flexibility to consider various factors to determine whether a
decision is to be retroactive or prospective. Once it is decided
that a decision is retroactive, the court has discretion in shap360
ing a remedy.
Clearly the voidness concept and the retroactivity analysis
are alternative approaches to retrospectivity in due process
cases. If, under the voidness concept, the assailed procedure
denied due process, nothing legally cognizable happened. 31
The truth of the facts asserted is immaterial. 2 But someone
has been deprived of due process and frequently property, liberty or employment as well. May he then use the legal system
to recover money damages? In many of the major new due
process cases, plaintiffs have asked that the practice be declared illegal and that it be enjoined. 33 This equitable and
"' Id.
at 411.
-' 499 P.2d 979, 103 Cal. Rptr. 299 (1972), vacated and remanded, 410 U.S. 415
(1973), reaffirmed on state ground, 509 P.2d 696, 107 Cal. Rptr. 784 (1973).
"1 Id. at 985, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 305.
331Id. at 984, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 304.
13 Id. at 985, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 305.
"I Cf. Callahan v. Wallace, 466 F.2d 59 (5th Cir. 1972) (justice of the peace trials
illegal but $1,200,000 fines not refunded).
"IPennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
11 Landman v. Royster, 354 F. Supp. 1302, 1311 (E.D. Va. 1973).
363 See, e.g., Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 71 (1972); Hall v. Garson, 468 F.2d
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prospective relief ends the practice without facing all the remedial implications. In other new due process cases, affirmative
relief has been asked for denials of due process. Thus it appears
that in redressing due process violations courts are pressed to
scan the entire spectrum of possible remedial alternatives. The
discussion that follows will focus on the widely varying responses to that pressure.
B.

Remedies for "Property" Due Process Violations

The property decisions reveal a pattern which occurs in
each category of cases. First, some courts recognize that due
process exists but refuse to accord remedial effect, while others
extend due process to the granting of a remedy. In analyzing
these cases, serious remedial questions must be faced. Is it
intellectually honest to strike down a statute without giving
any benefit to the winning litigant? If the defendant has followed a procedure which had not been previously questioned,
is it fair to require him to respond in damages? Should the
magnitude of the property or other interest asserted affect the
remedy?
The vehicle primarily used to vindicate due process rights
in property cases is conversion,364 a tort action designed to protect a possessory interest in property.16 5 The conversion occurs
when the defendant exercises dominion or control over the
plaintiff's property; and the converting act can be any conduct
inconsistent with the plaintiff's possessory interest. Examples
of converting acts include a refusal to surrender possession to
one so entitled, and taking property under illegal process. Taking property under a statute unconstitutional because of failure
to accord notice and a hearing also appears to be a conversion. " The conversion theory may be useful in many ex parte
transfers of property including replevin, distraint and attachment. The following cases should better illustrate both the
legal and factual context in which the property cases arise and
are resolved.
845, 847 (5th Cir. 1972).
31

W. PnOSSER, LAw op ToRTS § 15 (4th ed. 1971). See also Boston Educ. Research

Co. v. American Mach. & Foundry Co., 488 F.2d 344, 348 (1st Cir. 1973).
W. PNOSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 15 (4th ed. 1971).
' Quebec v. Bud's Auto Service, 105 Cal. Rptr. 677 (Super. Ct. 1973).
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In Thorp CreditInc. v. Barr,367 personal property had been
purchased on installment payments. The buyer fell behind,
and the seller, following the local statute, replevied without
notice to the buyer. At trial, the seller established his right to
the property. On the defendant's appeal, the court declared the
replevin statute unconstituional, following Fuentes v. Shevin.
But, because the record supported the seller's right to possession, the court affirmed the lower court decision for the seller.366
Two factors must be considered to ameliorate the impact of the
criticism which follows. First, the defendant-buyer was held to
have "waived" prior procedural defects by appearing generally
rather than entering a special appearance to contest jurisdiction.366 Second, Barr had been decided by the trial court and
argued to the appellate court when Fuentes was decided.
If due process reasoning is applied to Barr, several substantial criticisms appear. Because of the lack of effective prior
notice, no jurisdiction was attainedY °0 The unconstitutional
taking was a legal non-event. Thus, no credence should be
accorded to the fact-finding. Indeed, in such situations, the
defendant may be entitled to the property and perhaps, upon
a proper counterclaim, a judgment for conversion. Barr, however, appears to hold that even though the trial court obtained
no jurisdiction over the defendant, the plaintiff wins the lawsuit.
There are additional criticisms. The Barr court, as noted
above, held the statute unconstitutional. If a litigant who successfully asserts that a statute is unconstitutional attains no
benefit, there is no incentive to attempt to void an arguably
unconstitutional statute or practice."' If merchants are allowed
to retain property unconstitutionally taken, it is fair to ask
whether the statement that the statute is unconstitutional is
3 2
holding or dictumY.
This paradox could be avoided by an in-

"'

200 N.W.2d 535 (Iowa 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 919 (1973).
Id. at 537.
RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 9 (1942).

30

State ex rel. Williams v. Berrey, 492 S.W.2d 731, 735-36 (Mo. 1973).

31

M

' See Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit Dist. No. 302, 163 N.E.2d 89 (Ill.

1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 968 (1960) (governmental tort immunity overruled prospectively except for plaintiff who was allowed a cause of action to encourage the
beneficial activity of assailing superannuated law). See also Willis v. Department of
Conserv. & Econ. Dev., 264 A.2d 34, 37-38 (N.J. 1970).
"I In Molitor,the court noted that unless the new rule applied to plaintiff, "such
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junction requiring the defendant to return the property and
proscribing future unconstitutional takings. 7 3 The court in
Barr, however, did not even enjoin the defendant. The dissent
takes the better view: "Surely that which developed in the
instant case after pursuit by plaintiff of unconstitutional seizure cannot effectively eliminate the inceptional taint of inval374
idity."
Quebec v. Bud's Auto Service375 shows a marked contrast
to Barr. Quebec, a conversion case, grew out of a repair controversy. The automobile owner alleged that after the repairman
repaired the automobile, it failed. The repairman took the vehicle to his shop and performed additional repairs. Then, the
repairman invoked a statutory garageman's lien without notice
or a hearing, and refused to relinquish the automobile until the
owner paid additional money.
In holding that the owner's complaint for conversion
stated a cause of action, the court had to resolve the issue of
the constitutionality of the lien statute. This is because possession under a valid lien is a defense to conversion, while holding
under a defective lien is not. The court held that the lien
statute was no defense, giving full effect to the broad sweep
of Fuentes and holding the lien statute unconstitutional:
"[p]rejudgment remedies not providing notice and" hearing
violate due process except in extraordinary situations. . . .No
justification has been advanced why a private citizen should be
allowed unilaterally to invoke the power of the state to retain
the property of another without notice and the opportunity for
a prior hearing. '37 Thus, the owner has a chance to prove con37
version and may in the end be entitled to damages. 1
announcement would amount to mere dictum." 163 N.E.2d at 97.
" See Yates v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 362 F. Supp. 520 ,(M.D. Ala. 1973); Mason
v. Garris, 360 F. Supp. 420, 424, modified, 364 F. Supp. 452 (N.D. Ga. 1973); State ex
rel. Williams v. Berrey, 492 S.W.2d 731, 736 (Mo. 1973).
37 Thorp Credit Inc. v. Barr, 200 N.W.2d 535, 538 (Iowa 1972), cert. denied, 410
U.S. 919 (1973).
'7 105 Cal. Rptr. 677 (Super. Ct. 1973).
'7 Id. at 679-80. In Adams v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 520 P.2d 961, 113
Cal. Rptr. 145 (1974), the Supreme Court of California held that retaining a car under
a garageman's lien did not violate due process but that selling a car without notice
and a hearing was unconstitutional. Thus, Quebec's precise holding is repudiated.
"
Cf. Graff v. Nicholl, 370 F. Supp. 974 (N.D. Ill.
1974) (owner of "abandoned"
car has sufficient property interest to require notice and a hearing before towing);
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Quebec may be criticized for overlooking the possibility
that the defendant had reasonably relied on the continuing
legality of an established practice.318 If the garageman did rely,
an injunction requiring him to return the car may be more
appropriate than damages. 79 Even so, a good argument can be
put forward for allowing damages when property is taken without due process. In the long run, the damage remedy may work
significant changes in relationships. An unscrupulous garageman who deals with an unsophisticated customer might not be
deterred by the thought of an injunction requiring him to return the property. The prospect of also paying damages for
conversion may therefore have a salutary deterring effect. On
the other hand, Quebec may also make it harder to collect
repair bills from unscrupulous automobile owners, by depriving
the garageman of the practical leverage of informally retaining
possession. It is significant to note that California's supreme
court, in a Quebec-type case, evidently found these factors as
well as the mixed possessory and property interests worthy of
consideration; as a result it held that a garageman may retain
an automobile under a garageman's lien without notice and a
hearing, but that due process was required before the car was
sold.8 0
Alternate torts available when a non-possessory property
interest is taken without due process are abuse of process and
wrongful attachment.s These actions have not been fully deMurrell v. Trio Towing Serv., Inc., 294 So.2d 331 (Fla. Ct. App. 1974) (court held that
towing company that declined to relinquish control of automobile without payment for
towing was not entitled to lien on vehicle, and was guilty of conversion for failing to
relinquish control); Fendler v. Texaco Oil Co., 499 P.2d 179 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1972)
(plaintiff's 1970 Chrysler Imperial towed out of "no parking" zone: conversion suit
rejected).
378 Tucker v. Maher, 497 F.2d 1309 (2d Cir. 1974) held that it is inappropriate to
grant damages for acts occurring prior to the declaration of the statute's unconstitutionality, unless they would be proper under the analogous common law tort. There
the analogous tort was malicious prosecution which required a showing of bad faith.
Thus in the absence of a showing of bad faith, damages were not warranted. Id. at 1315.
See Rios v. Cessna Fin. Corp., 488 F.2d 25, 28 (10th Cir. 1973).
31,McCormack, Federalism and Section 1983-Limitations on JudicialEnforcement of ConstitutionalProtectionsI, 60 VA. L. Rav. 1, 26-27 (1974) [hereinafter cited

as McCormack]; Wellington, Notes on Adjudication, 83 YALE L.J. 221, 254-57 (1973).
3 Adams v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 520 P.2d 961, 113 Cal. Rptr. 145
(1974).
311Leesburg v. Builder's Plumbers Supply, 149 N.W.2d 263 (Mich. Ct. App. 1967);
Brown v. Guaranty Estates Corp., 80 S.E.2d 645, 649-51 (N.C. 1954).
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veloped in non-possessory due process litigation, and several
factors appear to be influencing the courts in shaping the prospective and retrospective relief necessary to effectively remedy
the abuses involved. A review of the cases will perhaps best
illustrate these factors.
5 2 the court dealt with MassaInSchneider v. Margossian,
chusetts' trustee process. The action was brought to enjoin the
use of an ex parte procedure whereunder several civil actions
had been initiated by attaching the defendant's property.
While in each instance the defendant received notice soon
after the attachment, it was impossible to contest it before the
property was frozen. The court held that the use of property
was taken and that due process was violated. The court extended prospective relief by enjoining all future ex parte attachments, but retroactive relief presented more difficulty.
The plaintiff sued as a class representative, the class being all
persons whose property had been attached by ex parte trustee
process. The court refused to allow the class and held that,
except for the named plaintiff, the decision would not affect
any lawsuit commenced before the effective date of the instant
decree. 3 To justify this attenuated relief, the court said, "a
retrospective judgment would cast doubt on the validity of all
civil actions now pending . . . that were started by way of
trustee process. ' 3 4 The theory of prospective relief found in
Schneider was approved on appeal, and has attracted a wide
following in lower courts. 85
The observer might speculate that the plaintiff's decision
to seek class relief could bear on the court's decision not to
extend retroactive relief. The plaintiff class causes the court to
318349 F. Supp. 741 (D.Mass. 1972).

ul Id. at 745.
3MId.

m Schneider v. Margossian, 349 F. Supp. 741 (D.Mass. 1972), afj'd sub nom.
Ruotolo v. Gould, 489 F.2d 1324 (lst Cir. 1974). For lower courts following the prospective theory, see, e.g., Gibbs v. Titelman, 369 F. Supp. 38, 58-59 (E.D. Pa. 1973), rev'd,
502 F.2d 1107 (3d Cir. 1974) (relief prospective from date of order); Roscoe v. Butler,
367 F. Supp. 574, 583 (D. Md. 1973); Bay State Harness Horse R. & B. Ass'n v. PPG
Indus., Inc., 365 F. Supp. 1299, 1307 (D. Mass. 1973) (parties, amicus curiae and
pending cases in the district to receive retroactive benefit; order otherwise effective on
filing); Clement v. Four North State Street Corp., 360 F. Supp. 933, 936 (D.N.H. 1973);
Trapper Brown Constr. Co. v. Electromech, Inc., 358 F. Supp. 105, 107-08 (D.N.H.
1973).
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consider the massive disruption of such sweeping relief, and to
thereby overlook injustice to one person. The request for injunctive relief, the observer may speculate, might also affect
the decision's backward reach. For an injunction is prospective
and the court may concentrate on improving future practices
rather than on repairing past injuries. In any event, individual
plaintiffs suing for specific or damage relief have successfully
attained retroactive relief.8 6
An additional factor is that the procedure followed in
Schneider did give notice to the defendant. It seems more likely
that a lawsuit begun with an attachment would be defaulted,
but the defendant did have the opportunity to defend. In contrast, the procedure condemned in Pennoyer v. Neff 7 allowed
no opportunity to defend; the property was attached only after
judgment was entered. While both deny due process, there is
more reason to extend broad retroactive relief when rights are
affected without any opportunity to participate in the process.
Furthermore, a retroactive decision may affect more than
pending cases. If a judgment is void for lack of due process, it
may be collaterally attacked at any time. 8 Thus, an unqualified holding of retroactive unconstitutionality might upset
many prior trustee process judgments. This would create, at
the very least, administrative burdens on the courts.3 89 To give
due process some credence, however, defendants who have defaulted in attachment cases prior to the decision should be
allowed to reopen those cases and to contest the merits.8 '
That the attaching party may have relied on the apparent
legality of existing practice appears to be an important factor
in denying retroactivity. In Osmond v. Spence,3"9' the court
dealt with a combined confession-of-judgment/wage"I Straley v.

Grossway Motor Co., 359 F. Supp. 902 (S.D.W. Va. 1973) (reserving

damages); MacQueen v. Lambert, 348 F. Supp. 1334 (M.D. Fla. 1972); Scoggin v.
Schrunk, 344 F. Supp. 463 (D. Ore. 1971). See also Donaldson v. O'Connor, 493 F.2d
507 (5th Cir. 1974), vacated and remanded, 43 U.S.L.W. 4929 (U.S. June 26, 1975).
95 U.S. 714 (1877).
Misco Leasing v. Vaughn, 450 F.2d 257 (10th Cir. 1971); Bass v. Hoagland, 172
F.2d 205 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 816 (1949); Polansky v. Richardson, 351 F.
Supp. 1066 (E.D.N.Y. 1972); J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRACricE 60.25[4] (1974).
"I Osmond v. Spence, 359 F. Supp. 124, 127 (D. Del. 1972).
390Id.
391Id.
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garnishment scheme. The procedure was found to deny due
process because there was no showing of waiver before execution issued. While the court refused to void all prior confessed
judgments, the decision was afforded some retroactive effect.
Money held under confessed judgments combined with wage
garnishment was returned to the debtors, the court observing
that this procedure was "a form of the prejudgment garnishment [previously] declared unconstitutional in Sniadach
"392

But even if reliance is an important factor, it is difficult
to determine what reliance is reasonable. One court held that
attachments before the decision date in Fuentes were not vulnerable to a Fuentes attack. 3 ' The reasons were fourfold: (1)
Fuentes "was not clearly foreshadowed"; (2) retroactivity
"would frustrate the legitimate expectations of many Massachusetts State litigants; (3) it would invite confusion and uncertainty in the conduct of continuing litigation; and (4) it
might, in the case of property sold pursuant to real estate attachments, create serious title problems." ' To others, however, the answer has not been so clearcut. Justice Stewart in
Fuentes felt that the result was clearly anticipated by prior
cases, 95 and lower courts have applied Fuentes to facts which
occurred before it was decided."9 Nonetheless, the Second Circuit held in Tucker v. Maher, that there can be no damages
awarded for a taking that occured prior to the statute being
declared unconstitutional. 97 The court appeared uncertain as
to whether this was a result of immunities granted by the Civil
Rights Act itself, or because of the "closely analogous wrong"
of malicious prosecution, which was declared to be the essence
of the claim, which itself requires a showing of bad faith. 98
While the passage of time reduces the importance of the
specific retroactivity issue, the basic problem of enforcing due
"I Id. at 128.
33 Higley Hill, Inc. v. Knight, 360 F. Supp. 203 (D. Mass. 1973).

Id. at 205-06.
Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 71 (1972).
31 Bay State Harness R. & B. Ass'n v. PPG Indus., Inc., 365 F. Supp. 1299, 1307
n.7 (D. Mass. 1973) (Higley Hill disapproved); Gunter v. Merchants Warren Nat's
Bank, 360 F. Supp. 1085, 1091-92 n.17 (D. Me. 1973) (same).
30 Tucker v. Maher, 497 F.2d 1309 (2d Cir. 1974).
31

"I

"' Id. at 1315.
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process remains. Within this there are two major points of
concern. First, when will a person be relieved from an unconstitutional taking? Second, when may the victim of an unconstitutional taking be awarded damages? If the taker's knowledge
is to bear on the second issue, then the next question is, how
specific must knowledge be? Is it sufficient that a similar procedure has been invalidated by the Supreme Court? Or, must
the identical procedure be invalidated? Must the decision be a
specific holding on the precise statute? Must there be something more to bring knowledge home than constructive knowledge from a judicial opinion? For a damage remedy, must the
taker have been a defendant in the case striking the statute
down?
Answers to these questions can vary depending on the remedy asked. Courts find it easier to upset attachments than to
award damages. But, merely dissolving existing attachments
may not deter future attachments; if the practices are to be
stopped, a deterrent, such as a damage remedy, is needed.
Damage remedies may influence conduct, especially institutional conduct, by penalizing the wrongdoer. And if the damage remedy is to be a meaningful deterrent, the courts must
define the knowledge requirement in such a way as to prevent
any premium that might be derived from remaining ignorant.
C. Loss of Employment

The government employment cases are superficially similar
to the ordinary property cases.399 A person is deprived of a
significant interest without an opportunity to participate in the
process. In both, there is a significant threshold barrier. In the
usual property cases, the courts have struggled with state action and color of law. While state action is clear in government
employment cases, the employee faces the threshold problem
of showing an interference with a protectable interest in liberty
or property. When government employment is terminated
without due process, the remedial response appears to be af"I If there is a protected interest found, it can possibly be a "property" interest.
But employment cases are treated independently because of their sometimes unique
remedial problems, and because the interest protected might be either property or
liberty.
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fected by additional complicating factors: the absence of a single legal theory, the high order of the asserted citizen interest
and the desire to preserve administrative discretion.
There are several legal theories, including both tort and
contract actions, available to one deprived of government employment. While there is no single tort which is universally
applicable, several tort theories are useful in certain cases."'
The basic tort remedy is money damage for the harm caused.
Damages, of course, may also be a contract remedy.4"' The
contract theory allows recovery for the money benefit of the
breached obligation. Notwithstanding the importance of these
traditional common law bases of action, discussion here will
concentrate on more recently developed constitutional theories. It has become well established that a government employee cannot be discharged because of an exercise of the first
amendment freedoms."' Also, government employment cannot
4 3
be terminated in a way that violates either equal protection
or due process. 4
'" See Foltz v. Moore McCormack Lines, Inc., 189 F.2d 537 (2d Cir. 1951) (malicious deprivation of a gainful position); Hardy v. Vial, 311 P.2d 494 (Cal. 1957) (malicious prosecution); Ranous v. Hughes, 141 N.W.2d 251 (Wisc. 1966) (defamation); W.
PRossER, LAW OF TonRs § 129 (4th ed. 1971) (interference with contractual relations).
"I1Collins v. Parsons College, 203 N.W.2d 594 (Iowa 1973); Development,
Academic Freedom, 81 HAav. L. REv. 1099-1100 (1968). There are significant complicating doctrines in suing on a contract of employment with the government. See
Starsky v. Board of Trustees, 109 Cal. Rptr. 822 (Ct. App. 1973); Megee v. Barnes,
160 N.W.2d 815 (Iowa 1968).
" Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968); Smith v. Losee, 485 F.2d 334
(10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 908 (1974); Rainey v. Jackson Stite College,
481 F.2d 347 (5th Cir. 1973); Dause v. Bates, 369 F. Supp. 139, 147-48 (W.D. Ky. 1973);
Commonwealth ex rel. Rafferty v. Philadelphia Psychiatric Center, 356 F. Supp. 500
(E.D. Pa. 1973); Nebraska Dep't of Roads Employees' Ass'n v. Department of Roads,
364 F. Supp. 251 (D. Neb. 1973); Fisher v. Snyder, 346 F. Supp. 396 (D. Neb. 1972),
aff'd, 476 F.2d 375 (8th Cir. 1973); Local 594, Teamsters Pub. Emp. Union v. City of
West Point, 338 F. Supp. 927 (D. Neb. 1972). David Roth, who was held to have had
neither a liberty nor a property interest in continued employment in Board of Regents
v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1973), charged at trial that he was discharged for exercising his
first amendment freedoms. The jury awarded Roth $5,246 compensatory damages and
$1,500 punitive. See Chron. Higher Educ., Nov. 26, 1973, at 3.
10 Sparks v. Griffin, 460 F.2d 433 (5th Cir. 1972); Lee v. Macon County Bd. of
Educ., 453 F.2d 1104 (5th Cir. 1971).
404 Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972); Buggs v. City of Minneapolis, 358
F. Supp. 1340 (D. Minn. 1973).
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1. Basic Remedial Alternatives and
Underlying Considerations
The remedial issues can be examined by analyzing three
recent cases. Each concerns the remedy for a teacher who was
fired without due process, yet the remedy differs significantly
from case to case. In Skehan v. Board of Trustees of Bloomsburg State College,"5 the court found that the plaintiff was
denied due process because he should have been given a hearing before being dismissed. He received judgment for one dollar." 6 In Karstetter v. Evans"' there had been two purported
hearings. The plaintiff's salary ceased after the first hearing.
The first hearing, the court held, did not comport with due
process but the second hearing did. The facts were the same at
both hearings but "not having been accorded a hearing which
met procedural due process, plaintiff was entitled to remain in
her status.

. .

until action was taken by the Board at a hearing

meeting procedural due process."4 Because the second termination was effective, plaintiff could not be reinstated but she
was "entitled to receive back wages equal to the amount she
would have received

. . .

less her earnings, if any, in the in-

4 ' In Starsky v. Williams,410 the plaintiff had been fired,
terim.""
but a review of the record revealed a lack of substantial evidence of a constitutionally permissible basis for the decision.
The decision to terminate, therefore, violated due process and
was ineffective. "The defendants," the court held, "have a
duty to reinstate plaintiff to his position with all of its emoluments and perquisites as if terminationhad never occurred. 4 ,
These three cases run the gamut. In Skehan, the court does
not give any remedial effect to the denial of due process except
to vindicate plaintiff symbolically. In Karstetter,the court af358 F. Supp. 430 (M.D. Pa. 1973), vacated and remanded, 501 F.2d 31 (2d Cir.

"15

1974).

Id. at 436 (plaintiff also received costs).
350 F. Supp. 209 (W.D. Tex. 1971). See also Commonwealth ex rel. Rafferty v.
Philadelphia Psychiatric Center, 356 F. Supp. 500 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
"' Karstetter v. Evans, 350 F. Supp. 209, 212 (W.D. Tex. 1971).

,oId. The same situation resulted in the same remedy in Davis v. Barr, 373 F.
Supp. 740 (E.D. Tenn. 1973).
,,o
353 F. Supp. 900 (D. Ariz. 1972), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, remanded, 512
F.2d 109 (9th Cir. 1975).
4,,Id. at 928 (emphasis supplied).
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forded some effect but did not order full pay for the period in
which plaintiff had not been fired. In Starsky, the court held
that because due process was not followed, nothing had happened. Each remedial alternative will be discussed in terms of
doctrinal consistency and practical considerations.
In Skehan, the court justified the one dollar award by
pointing to plaintiff's delay in suing and "the Court's finding
that the Plaintiff was not discharged for exercising his constitu' Both reasons can be criticized. Delay in suit
tional rights."412
should affect due process cases as it does all cases. There is an
applicable statute of limitations.41 If the statute has run, suit
should be barred. But delay short of the statutory bar should
not be interposed to attenuate the remedy. If this reasoning
were attempted in a tort or contract case, it would be repudiated immediately. If it appears that plaintiff, aware that he
was illegally fired, delayed suit to increase the damages, then
the mitigation principle may be applied." 4
Skehan was awarded nominal damages because he "was
not discharged for exercising his constitutional rights." ' This
assumes dismissal, which appears to be a constitutionally impermissible conclusion. If plaintiff's interest was constitutionally cognizable, he was entitled to due process before being
discharged. Employment is not legally terminated until a legal
hearing is conducted.4"6 The right to a hearing prior to a deprivation, in the words of Justice Stewart,
has long been recognized by this court under the Fourteenth
and Fifth Amendments. Although the court held that due
42 Skehan v. Board of Trustees, 358 F. Supp. 430, 435 (M.D. Pa. 1973), vacated

and remanded, 501 F.2d 31 (2d Cir. 1974).
"I Boshell v. Alabama Mental Health Bd., 473 F.2d 1369 (5th Cir. 1973) (one
year); Taliaferro v. State Council of Higher Educ., 372 F. Supp. 1378, 1383-84 (E.D.
Va. 1974).
"I If the employer proves that the wrongfully discharged employee could, by reasonable effort, have obtained a suitable job, the employee is charged with the income
he could have obtained. See, e.g., McAleer v. McNally Mfg. Co., 329 F.2d 273 (3d Cir.

1964).
"I5Skehan v. Board of Trustees, 358 F. Supp. 430, 435 (E.D. Pa. 1973), vacated
and remanded, 501 F.2d 31 (2d Cir. 1974).
1,9This was essentially the court of appeal's view on vacating the district judge's
opinion. Skehan v. Board of Trustees, 501 F.2d 31 (2d Cir. 1974). Klein v. New Castle
County, 370 F. Supp. 85, 91 (D. Del. 1974); Karstetter v. Evans, 350 F. Supp. 209, 212
(N.D. Tex. 1971).
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process tolerates variance in the form of a hearing "appropriate to the nature of the case" . . . and "depending upon the
importance of the interests involved and the nature of the
subsequent proceedings [if any] . . . the Court has traditionally insisted that, whatever its form, opportunity for that
hearing must be provided before the deprivation at issue
takes effect.417

To make the constitutional right to a prior hearing meaningful,
legally ineffective procedures should not be granted remedial
effect. Allowing the unconstitutional hearing to reduce the
remedy is a back door method of allowing a deprivation to take
effect without a constitutionally permissible procedure.," That
the evidence presented at an illegal hearing may have supported discharge at a legal hearing is, therefore, irrelevant to
the remedy. It is accordingly submitted that Skehan and
similar cases419 are inconsistent with the remedial aims of due
process. A wrongfully discharged employee is entitled to more
than a symbolic vindication.
In Karstetter,the court conferred credence upon due process by ordering payment of wages for the period between the
illegal termination of salary and the due process hearing. Interim earnings were allowed as evidence to reduce or mitigate
damages, which is consistent with the mitigation principle as
generally applied in public employee cases.42 Some courts go
farther than subtracting actual earnings from the back pay
"I Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 82 (1972) (citations omitted). But cf. Arnett v.
Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974) (apparently allowing the federal government, operating
under statute and administrative regulation, to give notice of discharge and an opportunity to submit written material before separation from service but to delay the
adversary hearing until after the employee is terminated).
"I The court in Skehan gave additional reasons for the one dollar award: 1) Plaintiff had failed to request a "hearing by the college on the reasons for his dismissal,"
and 2) he did not "participate in the post dismissal ...

hearing.

..

."

Skehan v.

Board of Trustees, 358 F. Supp. 430, 435 (M.D. Pa. 1973). Both also assume the
dismissal conclusion. See the court of appeals opinion remanding, Skehan v. Board of
Trustees, 501 F.2d 31, 40-41 (2d Cir. 1974).
" Johnson v. Netterville, 355 F. Supp. 921 (M.D. La. 1973); Abbott v. Thetford,
354 F. Supp. 1280 (M.D. Ala. 1973).
' See, e.g., Williams v. Albemarle City Bd. of Educ., 485 F.2d 232 (4th Cir. 1973);
United States v. Chesterfield County School Dist., 484 F.2d 70, 76 (4th Cir. 1973);
Adamian v. University of Nevada, 359 F. Supp. 325, 831 (D. Nev.1973); Buggs v. City
of Minneapolis, 358 F. Supp. 1340, 1344 (D. Minn. 1973); Monte v. Flaherty, 351 F.
Supp. 1136 (W.D. Pa. 1972).

1975]

THE NEw DUE PROCESS

award and reduce back pay by "earnings from any actual or
reasonably available employment. 4 2 Few will quarrel with
reducing back pay by actual earnings; the spectacle of a windfall is not pleasant to contemplate. Reducing the back pay
award by imputed interim earnings, however, is arguably inconsistent with the magnitude of the affected interests. The
mitigation principle was designed for breaches of private
contracts and is supported by a policy of preventing economic
waste. The public employee cases grow out of a different environment: because the government is the defendant and is
charged with breaking the law, plaintiff, it may be said, is
acting as a private attorney general42 2 insisting that the government must obey the law, a social policy of a high order.
Further, the policy of preventing waste is diminished when
there were no actual earnings. Much of the plaintiff's time will
be consumed in preparing his case. But under the Federal Back
Pay Act,4H it has been held that the mitigation principle is
applicable, even though not expressly provided for.2 4 This allows an employer to reduce the back pay by the amount the
employee could have earned if reasonable efforts to locate other
employment had been made.4 2 Finally, under traditional due
process the courts are accustomed to holding that a procedurally defective proceeding involving private litigants is void and
has no effect. These ideas can be adapted to employee cases.
If accepted, a former government employee who feels he has
been wrongfully discharged may take his own chances. He will
be allowed to pursue his remedy diligently without fear that
back pay will be cut back for "might-have-been" employment.
The courts are reluctant to extend a complete remedy to
a government employee who has been wrongfully discharged.
Several additional factors must be considered to understand
142United States v. Chesterfield County School Dist., 484 F.2d 70, 76 (4th Cir.
1973). The limits on required mitigation are stated in Jackson v. Wheatley School
Dist., 464 F.2d 411 (8th Cir. 1972). The court held that it was unreasonable for a
married couple to live apart to reduce damages "caused by the unlawful actions of the
school board." Id. at 413. See also Williams v. Albemarle Bd. of Educ., 508 F.2d 1242
(4th Cir. 1974).
'2 Cf. Newman v. Piggy Park Ent., 390 U.S. 400 (1968).
4235 U.S.C. § 5596 (1967).
424 Urbina v. United States, 428 F.2d 1280, 1287 (Ct. Cl. 1970).
4" White v. Bloomberg, 501 F.2d 1379, 1382 (4th Cir. 1974).
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this reluctance. The cases just discussed were decided by federal courts, under federal constitutional law. But many cases
arise from state employment, and state regulatory and statutory schemes."' This is especially true when a plaintiff asserts
a property interest under state law.4 2 Federal judges understandably hesitate before interposing their judgment in these
delicate areas of state policy. Due process litigation may also
originate in a complex collective bargaining environment.
When employee-employer relations are structured by collective
bargaining, the courts are more likely to require the parties to
solve their problems without judicial interference.412
There are also several federal statutory schemes which
deal with the remedy available to improperly discharged employees 4. 29 In shaping remedies under these statutes, the federal

courts have attempted to avoid inflexible doctrine, instead rendering remedial decisions that are equitable and flexible.43
Several other factors appear to enhance remedial flexibility. Many lawsuits are brought against local governmental bodies. Since these bodies perform socially useful functions on limited budgets, the courts hesitate to impose excessive financial
burdens on local school districts.4 31 There is also the traditional
421 See, e.g., Sheelhause v. Woodburry Cent. Com. School Dist., 488 F.2d 237 (8th
Cir. 1973); Nebraska Dep't of Roads Employees Ass'n v. Department of Roads, 364 F.

Supp. 251 (D. Neb. 1973); Buggs v. City of Minneapolis, 358 F. Supp. 1340 (D. Minn.
1973); Johnson v. Netterville, 355 F. Supp. 921 (M.D. La. 1973); Monte v. Flaherty,
351 F. Supp. 1136 (W.D. Pa. 1972). Poschmen v. Dumke, 107 Cal. Rptr. 596 (Ct. App.
1973) was decided on state law in state court but § 1983 supplied one of the theories
of liability. Id. at 603.
IN'Schultz v. School Dist., 367 F. Supp. 467 (D. Neb. 1973); Buhr v. Buffalo
School Dist., 364 F. Supp. 1225 (D.N.D. 1973).
411Lipp v. Board of Educ., 470 F.2d 802 (7th Cir. 1972).
11 Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-2000h(6)(1970); Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1970); Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure
Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (1970).
I See, e.g., Kober v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 480 F.2d 240 (3d Cir. 1973);
Moody v. Albemarle Paper Co., 474 F.2d 134, 141-42 (4th Cir. 1973), vacated and
remanded, 43 U.S.L.W. 4880 (U.S. June 25, 1975) (underTitle VII absence of bad faith
not a sufficient reason to deny back pay); Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d
711, 721 (7th Cir. 1969); Tea v. Cone Mills Corp., 301 F. Supp. 97, 102 (M.D.N.C.
1969), affd, 438 F.2d 86 (4th Cir. 1971). See also Harper v. City of Baltimore, 359 F.
Supp. 1187, 1216-17 (D. Md. 1973); Johnson v. University of Pittsburgh, 359 F. Supp.
1002 (W.D. Pa. 1973).
421Cf. Judge Coleman concurring specially in decision to dissolve en banc panel,
McLaurin v. Columbia Mun. Separate School Dist., 486 F.2d 1049, 1050 (5th Cir.
1973). But cf. Bradley v. School Board, 416 U.S. 696 (1974).
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judicial policy against ordering adverse litigants to work together, based on the idea that it is both undesirable and ineffective to force personal working relations. 2 The court can
vindicate the employee by reinstating him, but the judicial
process inevitably is time consuming and he may have gone on
to something else.43 3 Reinstatement cannot alter either the
authority structure or the personal feelings of co-workers or
superiors. Thus, if an employee and his supervisors are at loggerheads, the court will be reluctant to reinstate even though
the discharge was unconstitutional. The employee must be
content with money damages.3 4 If, however,the working relationship is not so close that harmony and loyalty are required,
reinstatement may be ordered. 35 Even so, the employee may
be uncomfortable, so the court may allow another hearing. The
defendants may seek new grounds to discharge, and having
profited from reading the court's opinion, the officials are much
more likely to discharge correctly the second time.4 3 Thus, a
wrongfully discharged employee should not consider the prospect of reinstatement to be a reason to cease looking for another
job.
2.

Relationship Between Remedy and Interest Affected

Of particular significance in employment cases is the relationship between the interest violated by the defendant and the
remedy extended to the plaintiff. If a property interest in continued employment has been breached, the courts will respond
remedially only enough to cover the period of expectancy. If the
expectancy is indefinite, reinstatement is in order. Most employees, however, work under less than a lifetime appointment.
In that circumstance, a court will order reinstatement and back
SArnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 168 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring); Peacock
v. Board of Regents, 380 F. Supp. 1081, 1087 (D. Ariz. 1974); Abbott v. Thetford, 354
F. Supp. 1280, 1292 (M.D. Ala. 1973); D. DOBBs, REmsIES 925, 929-30 (1972).
" The victorious litigant in Starsky v. Williams, 353 F. Supp. 900 (D. Ariz. 1972),
aff'd in part,rev'd in part,remanded,512 F.2d 109 (9th Cir. 1975), apparently appears
again in Starsky v. Board of Trustees, 109 Cal. Rptr. 822 (Ct. App. 1973).
4m Zimmerer v. Spencer, 485 F.2d 176, 179 (5th Cir. 1973).
"' Nebraska Dept. of Roads Employees Ass'n v. Department of Roads, 364 F.
Supp. 251, 254-55 (D. Neb. 1973).
4 Karstetter v. Evans, 350 F. Supp. 209, 210-11 (N.D. Tex. 1971).
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pay only for the period of the expectancy. 43 7 The effectiveness
of reinstatement is limited by the inherent delay in the legal
process. This is exemplified by a case in which a court in September of 1973 ordered the plaintiff reinstated for the academic
year 1971-72.111 In these cases, a prompt hearing and perhaps
a preliminary injunction are in order. 439 This ensures that reinstatement will not be a hollow remedy and that the employer
will not be required to pay back wages without receiving services in return.
When there is no property interest in employment, a court
will not order reinstatement and back pay for an illegal discharge. If the discharge does not impinge upon any constitutionally cognizable interest, the former employee is not entitled
to any remedy. If, however, the employee has no property interest in the employment, but the reasons given or the procedures
used impinge upon the former employee's future employment
prospects or present reputation, the court must fashion a remedy commensurate with the impaired interest. Often, an administrative hearing on the discharge is the remedy. The hearing is intended only "to provide the person an opportunity to
clear his name. Once a person has cleared his name at a hearing, his employer, of course, may remain free to deny him future employment for other reasons." 4 In passing on public
employee cases after Roth, the lower, courts have distinguished
liberty and property cases. In property cases, the remedy is
reinstatement and back pay. In liberty cases, the remedy is a
hearing to refute the charges.441
411Zimmerer v. Spencer, 485 F.2d 176, 179 (5th Cir. 1973) (one year constructive
tenure and one year's back pay).
Starsky v. Board of Trustees, 109 Cal. Rptr. 822 (Ct. App. 1973).
'9 Klein v. New Castle County, 370 F. Supp. 85 (D. Del. 1974) (commendable
celerity); Fisher v. Snyder, 346 F. Supp. 396 (D. Neb. 1972); Local 594 Public Employees Union v. City of West Point, 338 F. Supp. 929 (D. Neb. 1972). See also Adams v.
Walker, 488 F.2d 1064 (7th Cir. 1973) (defendant's request for a stay on appeal denied,
final opinion affirming discharge, 492 F.2d 1003 (1974).
11 Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 573 n.12 (1972).
"I Garcia v. Daniel, 490 F.2d 290 (7th Cir. 1974); Wellner v. Minnesota State
Junior College Bd., 487 F.2d 153, 156-57 (8th Cir. 1973); Moore v. Knowles, 482 F.2d
1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1973); Ferris v. Special School Dist. No. 1, 367 F. Supp. 459, 465
(D. Minn. 1973); Zumwalt v. Trustees of Cal. State Colleges, 109 Cal. Rptr. 344, 354
(Ct. App. 1973) Cf. Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 156 (1974) (opinion of Justice
Rhenquist, Chief Justice Burger and Justice Stewart).
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The question of what process is due, then, is compelling in
public employee-liberty cases. Since the process may be the
only remedy, remedial implications weight the pragmatic procedural question.4 42 Generally the problem has been solved as
follows. If the reasons for dismissal impinge upon the employee's liberty interest, he is given a choice: He may accept
the reasons and consider the matter closed, or he may demand
a hearing. If the employee's choice is a hearing, certain procedural safeguards are required in order to give him a fair chance
to vindicate himself. Fairly detailed notice of the charges is
required before the hearing takes place; the decision must be
made on the record by apparently impartial persons; and the
employee has a right to retain counsel, to present oral evidence
443
and to cross-examine adverse witnesses.
Though the purpose of this hearing is to allow the employee to clear his name, the employer need not abide the
result.444 The hearing does, however, provide the basis for later
judicial review of the administrative record for proper procedure. The ambit of judicial inquiry into the weight of the evidence is narrow, but the court will insist upon some evidence
of a nonarbitrary reason to terminate. 445 If a reason is unrelated
to employment or working relationships, trivial or unsupported
in the record, it is arbitrary. 446 Because the administrative deci42 Due process is a flexible concept. In determining what procedure due process
requires in a particular setting, the institutional and factual context is weighed. See,
e.g., Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972). Thus, requirements in one setting
may not carry over into another.
"3 McNeill v. Butz, 480 F.2d 314, 322 (4th Cir. 1973); Poddar v. Youngstown State
Univ., 480 F.2d 192 (6th Cir. 1973); Hostrop v. Board of Junior College, 471 F.2d 488,
495 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 967 (1973); Vanderzanden v. Lowell School
Dist. No. 71, 369 F. Supp. 67, 73-74 (D. Ore. 1973); Lindsay v. Kissinger, 367 F. Supp.
949, 953 (D.D.C. 1973); Blunt v. Marion County School Bd., 366 F. Supp. 727 (M.D.
Fla. 1973); Lowrance v. Barker, 347 F. Supp. 588, 591-93 (E.D. Tex. 1972), aff'd, 480
F.2d 923 (5th Cir. 1973); Williams v. Board of Directors, 519 P.2d 15 (Wash. Ct. App.
1974). See also Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974) (timing of hearing); Ferguson
v. Thomas, 430 F.2d 852 (5th Cir. 1970).
"3 Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 573 n.12 (1972); Perry v. Sindermann,
408 U.S. 593 (1972).
"45 Dause v. Bates, 369 F. Supp. 139, 146-47 (W.D. Ky. 1973); Bottcher v. Florida
Dept. of Ag. & Cons. Serv., 361 F. Supp. 1123, 1130 (N.D. Fla. 1973) (no substantial
evidence); Webb v. Lake Mills Community School Dist., 344 F. Supp. 791, 804-05
(N.D. Iowa 1972) (no rule broken).
4I Wiehart v. McDonald, 367 F. Supp. 530, 533 (D. Mass. 1973), aff'd, 500 F.2d
1110 (1st Cir. 1974).
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sion is not reviewed factually, it is important to examine the
composition of the administrative hearing panel. To preserve
the integrity of the process, the decision-makers should have
no prior connection with the controversy.44 In addition to review for arbitrariness, the court will search the record for a constitutionally impermissible reason. If the employee was discharged because of race. or an exercise of first amendment
rights, the case involves exercise of constitutional rights rather
than liberty and the employee is entitled to be reinstated with
back pay. 4 One further reason for the hearing is the employee's entitlement to pay. Though the employer can terminate employment, procedurally improper efforts to terminate
are legally ineffective. Thus, the employee is entitled to remain
on the payroll until proper action is taken.449
The problem of relating the remedy to the interest affected
has led to expungement orders. If no adverse action has been
taken and there is merely an entry in a file, it is not clear
whether the interest affected is liberty or property.450 Since
the information remains in the file unless someone removes it,
it may be disseminated in the future and may injure either
employment opportunities or reputations. Thus, when file
"I Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489 (1972); Duke v. North Texas State
Univ., 469 F.2d 829, 841-48 (5th Cir. 1972) (Godbold, C.J., dissenting), cert. denied,
412 U.S. 932 (1973); Lake Mich. Col. Fed. of Teachers v. Lake Mich. Com. Col., 390
F. Supp. 103, 132-34 (W.D. Mich. 1974); King v. Caeser Rodney School Dist., 380 F.
Supp. 1112 (D. Del. 1974); Wagner v. Little Rock School Dist., 373 F. Supp. 876 (E.
D. Ark. 1973). Contrast Suckle v. Madison Gen. Hosp., 362 F. Supp. 1996, 1209-10,
(W.D. Wisc. 1973) (hospital staff privileges).
"I Smith v. Losee, 485 F.2d 334,.339 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 908
(1974); Dause v. Bates, 369 F. Supp. 139, 147-48 (W.D. Ky. 1973); Ferris v. Special
School Dist. No. 1, 367 F. Supp. 459 (D. Minn. 1973); Lusk v. Estes, 361 F. Supp. 653,
664 (N.D. Tex. 1973); Fisher v. Snyder, 348 F. Supp. 396 (D. Neb. 1972), aff'd, 476
F.2d 375 (8th Cir. 1973); Webb v. Lake Mills Community School Dist., 344 F. Supp.
791, 805 (N.D. Iowa 1972); Teamsters Local 594 v. City of West Point, 338 F. Supp.
927 (D. Neb. 1972); See also Ferguson v. Thomas, 430 F.2d 852 (5th Cir. 1972).
"I Weliner v. Minnesota State Junior College Bd., 487 F.2d 153, 157 (8th Cir.
1973); Klein v. New Castle County, 370 F. Supp. 85, 91 (D. Del. 1974). But see Arnett
v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974); Skehan v. Board of Trustees, 358 F. Supp. 430 (M.D.
Pa. 1973), vacated and remanded, 501 F.2d 31 (2d Cir. 1974).
45 Ortwein v. Mackey, 511 F.2d 696 (5th Cir. 1975) (not liberty); Wellner v.
Minnesota State Junior College Bd., 487 F.2d 153 (8th Cir. 1973) (liberty); Shrick v.
Thomas, 486 F.2d 691 (7th Cir. 1973) (neither); Suarez v. Weaver, 484 F.2d 678 (7th
Cir. 1973) (not clear); Bottcher v. Florida Dep't of Ag. & Cons. Serv., 361 F. Supp.
1123, 1129 (N.D. Fla. 1973) (property and liberty).
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entries are false, courts have ordered the entries expunged.4 5'
To make this meaningful, one court ordered the file opened so
45 2
that false information could be discovered and corrected.
3.

Federal Civil Rights Actions: Remedial Ramifications of
the "Person" Requirement

In 1973, the Supreme Court clarified decisions under the
Civil Rights Act. In City of Kenosha v. Bruno453 and Moor v.
County of Alameda,45 4 the Court held that federal district
courts had no jurisdiction to hear Civil Rights Act cases
brought against local government defendants. The defendant
must be a "person." In public employee cases, the person concept may create remedial difficulties which are more than
merely symbolic. It will be necessary to discuss the remedial
aspects of the person concept in public employee cases.
In Monroe v. Pape,455 the Supreme Court decided that a
city is not a "person" within the ambit of the Civil Rights Act,
at least in a suit for damages. But many suits have been
brought in equity under the Civil Rights Act to desegregate
schools. Many of these suits were originally brought against the
school districts as entities. In some, individuals were added as
defendants. 5 ' The Fifth Circuit considered and resolved several procedural issues in Harkless v. Sweeny Independent
4 57 Ten black
School District.
former teachers sued, charging
that their discharges were racially motivated. The suit was
brought against the board and the superintendent under the
"I Wellner v. Minnesota State Junior College Bd., 487 F.2d 153, 156 (8th Cir.
1973); Bottcher v. Florida Dep't of Ag. & Cons. Serv., 361 F. Supp. 1123, 1132 (N.D.
Fla. 1973).
45 Norlander v. Schleck, 345 F. Supp. 595 (D. Minn. 1973).
412 U.S. 507 (1973).
a, 411 U.S. 693 (1973).
365 U.S. 167, 188-92 (1961).
See, e.g., Lee v. Macon County Bd. of Educ., 267 F. Supp. 458 (M.D. Ala.),
aff'd sub noma. Wallace v. United States, 389 U.S. 215 (1967).
4- 427 F.2d 319 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 991 (1970)(The most recent
decision in Harkless, rendered in light of Kenosha, is reported at 388 F. Supp. 738 (S.D.
Tex. 1975). See also McLaurin v. Columbia Mun. Separate School Dist., 478 F.2d 348,
353-54 (5th Cir.), en banc panel dissolved, 486 F.2d 1049 (1973); McFerrien v. County
Bd. of Educ., 455 F.2d 199 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 934 (1972); Smith v.
Hampton Training School, 360 F.2d 577, 581 n.8 (4th Cir. 1966); Paxman v. Wilkerson,
390 F. Supp. 442, 447 (E.D. Va. 1975).
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Civil Rights Act. The district judge granted defendants' motion
for a jury trial on the back pay issue. When jurors expressed
unwillingness to hold the officials individually, plaintiffs dismissed the defendants as individuals. The trial proceeded
against the school district as an entity as well as the trustees
and superintendent in "representative capacities." After a jury
finding that the discharges were in good faith and not racially
motivated, the district court granted defendants' motion to
dismiss.
On plaintiffs' appeal, the court of appeals resolved
Monroe's impact on the jury trial question. First, the court read
Monroe as limited to damage cases and held that the school
district was "included within the meaning of 'person' in § 1983
' Second, the court held that
for the equitable relief sought."458
the trustees and the superintendent were proper Civil Rights
Act "persons" in both representative and individual capacities
' Finally,
"for the purposes of the equitable relief sought here."459
the court held that the defendants had no right to a jury trial
on back pay and other factual issues because "the prayer for
back pay is not a claim for damages, but is an integral part of
4 ' Several
the equitable remedy of injunctive reinstatement.""
I-" Harkless v. Sweeny Ind. School Dist., 427 F.2d 319, 323 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 991 (1970). Accord, Courtney v. School Dist. No. 1, 371 F. Supp. 401 (D.Wyo.
1974). But see Pelisek v. Trevor State Granded School Dist. No. 7, 371 F. Supp. 1064
(E.D. Wis. 1974); Webb v. Lake Mills Community School Dist., 344 F. Supp. 791, 80607 (N.D. Iowa 1972) (school district not a person).
" Harkless v. Sweeny Ind. School Dist., 427 F.2d 319, 323 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 991 (1970).
11*Harkless v. Sweeny Ind. School Dist., 427 F.2d 319, 324 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 991 (1970). See also Wright v. Southeast Alabama Gas Dist., 376 F. Supp.
780 (M.D. Ala. 1974) where the jury was allowed to determine the issues as to the
lawfulness of the termination, entitlement to reinstatement, and special damages. The
question of back pay was decided by the judge independently. The jury trial issue has
been treated recently in three excellent notes and an article which come to differing
conclusions. See McCormack, 60 VA. L. REv. 1, 66-70 (1974) (historical analogy:
Harkless approved); Note, Monetary Claims Under Section 1983: The Right to Trial
by Jury, 8 HARv. Crv. RIGxs-Civ. Lm. L. REv. 613 (1973) (favoring a result similar to
Harkless); Note, The Seventh Amendment and Civil Rights Statutes: History Adrift
in a Maelstrom, 68 Nw. U.L. REv., 503 (1973) (favoring a jury trial in all "damage"
cases); Note, CongressionalProvisionsfor Nonjury Trial Under the Seventh Amendment, 83 YALE L.J. 401 (1973) (no right to jury trial in some statutory civil rights action
cases). In Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189 (1974), the Court held that either party to a
fair housing act suit could demand a jury trial but specifically declined to pass on
the problem discussed here. Id. Some government employee termination cases are
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speculative conclusions may be inferred from Harkless. If,
under Harkless, the defendants in a wrongful discharge case
are sued in their representative or official capacities along with
the entity, it appears that the school district is responsible for
the back pay rather than the individuals." 1 Also, under
Harkless, the back pay award is equitable and appears to follow a finding of wrongful discharge. The immunities which can
be interposed to insulate individual defendants from damages
are irrelevant to back pay. Immunity, then, only protects defendants when either general or special damages are asked in
addition to back pay.
Moor and Bruno taken together destroy Harkless' foundation, the idea that a school district is a Civil Rights Act "person." Moor held that a county is an improper Civil Rights Act
defendant in a suit for damages.462 Bruno held that a city is an
improper Civil Rights Act defendant in a suit asking an injunction.463 Both are grounded upon the word "person" in the act
and the relevant legislative history. Thus, a federal district
court appears to lack Civil Rights Act jurisdiction over a school
district defendant.464
Bruno's full remedial impact on school desegregation cases
remains to be considered.6 5 Are the federal courts abandoning
tried to juries. See, e.g., Jones v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 359 F. Supp. 1081
(E.D. Tenn. 1972) (ruling on defendant's post trial motions). See generally F. JAMES,
CIVL PROCEDURE §§ 8.1-.11 (1965).
"IGates v. Collier, 489 F.2d 298, 302-03 (5th Cir. 1973) (instructive but not conclusive on this point). But see Courtney v. School Dist. No. 1, 371 F. Supp. 401 (D.
Wyo. 1974) where the court stated that "the board may be vicariously liable for the
actions of its agents." Id. at 404.
4,2411 U.S. 693, 698-710 (1973).
21412 U.S. 507, 509-11 (1973).
4"Adkins v. Duval County School Bd., 511 F.2d 690 (5th Cir. 1975); Harkless v.
Sweeny Ind. School Dist., 388 F. Supp. 738 (S.D. Tex. 1975); Lopez v. Williams, 372
F. Supp. 1279, 1294-95 (S.D. Ohio 1973), aff'd, 95 S. Ct. 729 (1974); Vanderzanden v.
Lowell School Dist. No. 71, 369 F. Supp. 67, 71 (D. Ore. 1973); Contra, Johnson v.
Anderson, 370 F. Supp. 1373 (D. Del. 1974) (correctional institution immune from
suit). See also Huntley v. North Carolina State Bd. of Educ., 493 F.2d 1016, 1017 n.2
(4th Cir. 1974) (state board of education is not a person); Taliaferro v. State Council
of Higher Educ., 372 F. Supp. 1378, 1381 (E.D. Va. 1974) (state council is not a person).
In Davis, An Approach to Legal Control of the Police, 52 TEx. L. Rsv. 703 at 720-21
(1974) he suggests that § 1983 be amended to allow suits against a local government
for damages arising from deliberate torts by local officers. Professor Davis asserts that
the present system is "almost completely ineffective as a deterrent . . . because the
chances that an officer will have to pay a judgement. . .are too remote." Id. at 721.
41 For an analysis of the impact of Bruno on Harkless see Cason v. City of Jack-
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their historic effort to desegregate schools? Recently, the Fifth
Circuit remanded a teacher's appeal in a case against a school
district and other defendants in their official capacities: the
district court was instructed to consider the jurisdictional ques46 In another
tion "in the light of City of Kenosha v. Bruno.""
appeal, the Fifth Circuit held that the plaintiffs did not state
a claim against a municipality and remanded for the district
court to consider whether injunctive relief requiring affirmative
action by municipal officials was proper "in light of
4 7 The Fourth Circuit has also expressed, by a per
Kenosha.""
curiam opinion, that it does not consider a school board to be
a "person;" in so doing it followed Bruno and remanded an
award granted against a school board." 8
Despite the seeming import of these decisions it must be
remembered that fifteen days after Bruno the Supreme Court
decided Keynes v. School District No. 1.469 This was another
Civil Rights Act case involving a governmental defendant, in
which the Court discussed equitable relief at length without
mentioning the jurisdictional bar in Bruno.47 Moreover, unless
Ex Parte Young4 71 is overruled, a federal court's jurisdiction to
enjoin a state official from interfering with a federal right continues unimpaired. This will prevent teachers from being remitted to less sympathetic state forums and will allow the
courts to order reinstatement.
sonville, 497 F.2d 949 (5th Cir. 1974) (injunction against city to enjoin the city from
allowing admittedly white racist organization from renting civic auditorium for meeting vacated because city is not a "person"); Thompson v. Madison County Bd. of
Educ., 496 F.2d 682 (5th Cir. 1974) (remanded for argument and briefs regarding
availability of back pay award from board of education); Howell v. Winn Parish School
Bd., 379 F. Supp. 816 (W.D. La. 1974) (school board is not a "person" as contemplated
by Civil Rights Act); Thomas v. Ward, 374 F. Supp. 206 (M.D.N.C. 1974) (Bruno
denies award of damages against school board).
4"I Campbell v. Masur, 486 F.2d 554, 556 (5th Cir. 1973). The issue was resolved
in Adkins v. Duval County School Bd., 511 F.2d 690 (5th Cir. 1975).
I" Jenkins v. Patterson, 488 F.2d 436, 441 (5th Cir. 1974).
lu Singleton v. Vance County Bd. of Educ., 501 F.2d 429 (4th Cir. 1974).
4" 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
110This argument was considered and rejected in Adkins v. Duval County School
Bd., 511 F.2d 690, 694-95 (5th Cir. 1975). See also Bradley v. School Bd., 416 U.S. 696
(1974); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. La Fleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974); Moore v. Knowles,
482 F.2d 1069, 1075-76 (5th Cir. 1973) (post-Kenosha case seemingly holding that the
school board as a corporate body was an indispensable party).
471

209 U.S. 123 (1908).
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If, however, the "person" requirement does prevent
actions against the employing governmental bodies, and if, as
Harkless held, the equitable remedy of reinstatement includes
back pay, the court can still extend full relief in three ways.
First, the court can manipulate the fiction of suing individual
defendants in their official capacities. This serves the symbolism of Young and Kenosha, yet allows the defendants to be
named in their official or representative capacities. Then, following the inference from Harkless, the immunity is avoided
and the entity may be liable for back pay awards." If, however,
Kenosha repudiates Harkless, this fiction may be too much to
bear. Thus, the back pay award may be remedially
severed
13
from reinstatement in Civil Rights Act cases.1
The second alternative for the wrongfully discharged public employee is to sue under the 1972 amendments to Title VII
of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.474 If the local governmental employer is guilty of "an unlawful employment practice" after
March 24, 1972, the court may order the employee reinstated
with back pay.475 Unlawful employment practices are defined
as hiring or discharge decisions based on race, color, religion,
sex or national origin.47 Unfortunately, a discharge which denies due process is neither an unfair employment practice nor
a basis for reinstatement and back pay. The statute is explicit:
"no order . . . shall require . . . reinstatement . . . or back
pay, if such individual was. . . discharged for any reason other
than discrimination on account of race, color, religion, sex, or
'" Lyman v. Swartley, 385 F. Supp. 661, 665 (D. Idaho 1974). But cf. Williams v.
Eaton, 443 F.2d 422, 429 (10th Cir. 1971) (money damages interdicted because defendants sued in individual capacity and action "in essence" to recover from the state
which is immune); Harkless v. Sweeny Ind. School Dist., 388 F. Supp. 738, 747 (S.D.
Tex. 1975); Klein v. New Castle County, 370 F. Supp. 85, 91 (D. Del. 1974)(same);
O'Brien v. Galloway, 362 F. Supp. 901, 905 (D. Del. 1973)(same).
" Cf. "We do not read Ex Parte Young. . . to indicate that any form of relief
may be awarded against a state officer, no matter how closely it may in practice
resemble a money judgment payable out of the state treasury, so long as the relief may
be labeled 'equitable' in nature." Edelman v. Jordon, 415 U.S. 651 (1974); Nunn v.
City of Paducah, 367 F. Supp. 957 (W.D. Ky. 1973).
,"1 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1974).
'15 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1974). See also United States v. Chesterfield County
School Dist., 484 F.2d 70 (4th Cir. 1973); Moody v. Albemarle Paper Co., 474 F.2d 134
(4th Cir. 1973); Arkansas Educ. Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 446 F.2d 763 (8th Cir. 1971).
"1 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1974).
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national origin ....
1117 Thus a public employee who is discharged without due process has no remedy against the entity
unless the substantive reasons are interdicted by Title VII
standards.4 78 While it might have been hoped that a teacher's
right to due process would not be less prominent under Title
VII than under the Civil Rights Act,4 71 the contrary appears to
be true.
The third answer to the absence of Civil Rights Act jurisdiction over the entity is to ask for damages from the individual
official.480 In the damage part of the case, plaintiff merely sues
the person who caused the discharge in his individual capacity.
Plaintiff can additionally ask for an injunction to bind those
currently in positions of authority."'
Suing the defendant individually for damages has advantages. If officials are individually responsible, wrongful discharges may occur less frequently. The individuals would likely
be less willing to act unless they were positive their course was
correct, and irresponsible behavior would be deterred. Suing
individuals directly, however, entails difficulties. On one hand,
an individual defendant may be charged damages for simply
carrying out a governmental policy. 12 On the other, a wrongfully discharged employee may be deprived of recovery because
an official is insolvent or deceased.48 3 In addition, if the individuals are sued for damages, a major remedial difficulty arises
from personal immunity.4 There are two personal immunities,
4- 42 U.S.C. § 2000-5(g) (1974).
"I But cf. Ward v. Kentucky State Univ. Bd. of Regents, 360 F. Supp. 1179 (E.D.
Ky. 1973). Plaintiff combined § 1983 and Title VII, charging that his discharge violated
due process and free speech as well as being racially motivated. Defendants moved to
dismiss, asserting absence of color of law and lack of a constitutionally cognizable
interest, and asking the court to abstain. The motion was denied.
" Cf. United States v. Chesterfield County School Dist., 484 F.2d 70, 73 (4th Cir.
1973).
Paxman v. Wilkerson, 390 F. Supp. 442, 449 (E.D. Va. 1975); Puckett v. Mobile
City Comm'rs, 380 F. Supp. 593 (S.D. Ala. 1974)(Kenosha prevents suit against entity;
Kenosha allows damage suit against individuals; damages granted against commissioners in individual capacities).
18,Less personal involvement is required to enjoin than to impose damages. See
Schnell v. Chicago, 407 F.2d 1084, 1086 (7th Cir. 1969).
0I2K. DAvis, A MiNisTRATlW LAw TExT § 26.03 (1972).
Landman v. Royster, 354 F. Supp. 1302, 1315 (E.D. Va. 1973).
Some courts use the capacity fiction to confuse sovereign and personal immunities as follows: If an official is sued in his "official" capacity, it is, in reality, a lawsuit
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absolute and qualified. The type of activity performed by the
defendant determines whether an immunity applies and, if so,
whether it is absolute or qualified. Judges, it is clear, are entitled to an absolute immunity while "lesser" officials must be
contented with a qualified immunity.4 85 Immunities are available only in damage actions; even a judge can be enjoined. 8
In Civil Rights Act cases, the immunities have a procedural
effect. If the defendant is entitled to an absolute or judicial
immunity, the trial judge will grant defendant's pre-trial motion either to dismiss or for summary judgment. 87 This results
in the lawsuit being short-circuited before trial. In contrast, if
the immunity is qualified, the plaintiff can allege enough to
avoid a motion to dismiss488 and show a triable issue of fact to
avoid summary judgment.488 In government employment cases,
the courts uniformly protect legislative and administrative defendants with a qualified immunity because these officials exercise judgment and discretion.8 ' Thus, a former employee who
is asking damages can avoid pretrial dismissal and take his
against the state and therefore barred by sovereign immunity. Williams v. Eaton, 443
F.2d 422, 429 (10th Cir. 1971); Klein v. New Castle County, 370 F. Supp. 85, 91 (D.
Del. 1974); O'Brien v. Galloway, 362 F. Supp. 901, 905 (D. Del. 1973). This approach
reveals a profound conservatism about awarding damages, a touching faith in the
reality of fictional concepts and an inveterate belief in the propriety of established
authority. It is well illustrated in Judge Barnette's separate opinion in Smith v. Losee,
485 F.2d 334, 345-51 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 908 (1974) (concurring and
dissenting). The Supreme Court recently reaffirmed sovereign immunity. Edelman v.
Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974). But this approach was categorically rejected in Scheuer
v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974). The problem is discussed in Part I.
I" Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553-58 (1967). In Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232

(1974) the qualified immunities were described as follows: "in varying scope, a qualified immunity is available to officers of the executive branch of government, the
variation dependent upon the scope of discretion and responsibilities of the office and
all the circumstances as they reasonably appeared at the time of the action on which
liability is sought to be based. It is the existence of reasonable grounds for the belief
formed at the time and in light of all the circumstances, coupled with good faith belief
that affords basis for qualified immunity of executive officers for acts performed in the
course of official conduct." See also Wood v. Strickland, 95 S. Ct. 992, 1001 (1975).
I" See, e.g., Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (1971).
19 See, e.g., Williams v. Sepe, 487 F.2d 913 (5th Cir. 1973).
,U See, e.g., Gaffney v. Silk, 488 F.2d 1248 (1st Cir. 1973).
"'

See, e.g., Adamian v. University of Nevada, 359 F. Supp. 825, 831-34 (D. Nev.

1973).

I" See, e.g., Gaffney v. Silk, 488 F.2d 1248 (1st Cir. 1973); Johnson v. Anderson,
370 F. Supp. 1373 (D. Del. 1974).
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claim to the fact-finder. 491

It is more difficult to generalize about the effect of immunities upon the doctrinal standard or the burden of proof or
persuasion. The officials, it may safely be said, are not liable
for damages if they act in good faith but are liable if they act
in bad faith. 492 At this point, diversity arises. In the First Circuit, plaintiff must show that defendants subjectively intended
to deprive him of a constitutional right,493 yet the neighboring
Second Circuit has hinted that it is enough for the defendant
to participate in depriving plaintiff of a constituional right.494
The Seventh Circuit apparently equates liability with lack of
immunity: if the defendants prove that plaintiff was properly
discharged, they are immune, but if the discharge was unjustifiable, defendants are not immune.495 The Tenth Circuit seemingly requires something less than malice, recently holding that
while board members who participate without wrongful intent
are immune, a finding that administrators were malicious is
ample to overcome whatever immunity existed.499 On the other
hand, a district court in Oregon said that breach of constitutional rights overcomes a board member's immunity but that
the administrator could not be liable because he had no statutory power to hire and fire.497 The Eighth Circuit specifically
rejected specific intent-malice as compensatory damage
thresholds for school officials' qualified immunity and held the
good faith test to be objective. 48
49I See, e.g., Jones v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 359 F. Supp. 1081 (E.D.
Tenn. 1972).
"I Wood v. Strickland, 95 S. Ct. 992, 1001 (1975); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S.

232 (1974); Jones v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 359 F. Supp. 1081 (E.D. Tenn.
1972).
4,1Gaffney v. Silk, 488 F.2d 1248, 1251 (1st Cir. 1973). See also Nelson v. Knox,
256 F.2d 312, 315 (6th Cir. 1958); Klein v. New Castle County, 370 F. Supp. 85, 92
(D. Del. 1974).
" Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178, 205 (2d Cir. 1971) (prison case).
" McLaughlin v. Tilendis, 398 F.2d 287, 291 (7th Cir. 1968). See also Vanderzanden v. Lowell School Dist. No. 71, 369 F. Supp. 67, 72 (D. Ore. 1973) ("if plaintiff's
right to freedom of speech was violated it would justify a monetary award."). But cf.
"Implicit in the idea that officials have some immunity. . . is a recognition that they
may err." Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974).
"I Smith v. Losee, 485 F.2d 334, 343-44 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S.
908 (1974). See also Dewell v. Lawson, 489 F.2d 877, 882 (10th Cir. 1974).
" Vanderzanden v. Lowell School Dist. No. 71, 369 F. Supp. 67, 72, 75 (D. Ore.
1973). But see McCormack, 60 VA. L. Rv. 1, 16-17 (1974).
" Strickland v. Inlow, 485 F.2d 186, 191 (8th Cir. 1973), vacated and remanded
sub. nom. Wood v. Strickland, 95 S. Ct. 992 (1975).
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4 99 the Supreme Court clarified a
In Wood v. Strickland,
school board member's immunity. While the opinion dealt with
expelling students rather than discharging teachers, it probably states the general ambit of the board member's immunity.
Steering carefully between strict liability and subjective intent, the Court held:

that a school board member is not immune from liability for
damages under § 1983 if he knew or reasonably should have
known that the (official) action. . . would violate the constitutional right of the student affected, or if he took the action
with the malicious intention to cause a deprivation of constitutional rights or other injury to the student."'
This retains the good faith standard and contains elements of
both objective and subjective."'
It is nearly impossible to reconcile the citizen's interest in
his constitutional freedom with the court's desire to avoid curtailing legitimate exercises of governmental power. But the
courts seek a word formula to focus judgment upon the critical
issues, and the immunity concept is the best analytical tool the
courts have. The malice-intent-good faith spectrum is, nonetheless, ambiguous and pliable.12 One very unfortunate, yet
inevitable, result of courts' development of doctrine is that it
tends to petrify the law and prevent the courts from coming to
grips with the facts of the individual case and the social environment.5 3 In the public employee discharge cases, qualified
immunity established a different standard for equitable relief
(reinstatement) than for legal relief (back pay). Thus, if an
official discharges an employee unconstitutionally but in good
faith, the employee can be reinstated but denied back pay.,0 4
" 95 S. Ct. 992 (1975).

Id. at 1001.
5°'
Id.
i2

L.

GREEN, LrrIGATION PROCESS IN

TORT

LAW

63 (1965).

Id. at 128-40.
' HarkIess v. Sweeny Ind. School Dist., 388 F. Supp. 738, 747-48 (S.D. Tex.
1975); Klein v. New Castle County, 370 F. Supp. 85, 92 (D. Del. 1974); Nebraska Dep't
of Roads Employees Ass'n v. Department of Roads, 364 F. Supp. 251, 258 (D. Nev.
1973) (procedure ostensibly legal); See also Westberry v. Fisher, 309 F. Supp. 12 (S.D.
Me. 1970). But see Sterzing v. Fort Bend Ind. School Dist., 490 F.2d 92 (5th Cir.), revg
376 F. Supp. 657 (S.D. Tex. 1974). There the district court granted back pay but
refused reinstatement. The court of appeals reversed, saying that refusal to reinstate
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Because the employee is deprived of the governmental entity
as a defendant, and because the officials are insulated by qualified immunity, a wrongfully discharged employee receives less
than a full remedy. If constitutional rights are to be protected
from illegal incursions, adequate remedies must be available.
Reinstatement without back pay is inadequate to deter the
callous and recalcitrant. In Smith v. Losee, Judge Doyle advocated an objective standard to determine whether the officials
acted reasonably." 5 Because the citizen interests are both crucial and fragile, Judge Doyle's standard is commendable. His
test seems also to protect official discretion for it allows the fact
finder fully to evaluate official conduct from the viewpoint of
an outside observer.
In addition to legal barriers to remedy, a discharged employee faces imposing proof barriers. When the case comes to
trial, the authorities have spoken; and it is customary and
convenient to believe them. The employee has, in all probability, been a dissenter; and troublemakers inevitably collect enemies. The fact finder must unravel a complex factual environment and deal with relationships and motives over an extended
period of time."' Moreover, the authorities are often canny,
secretive, and skilled in bureaucratic maneuver. This often results in facts being concealed or de-emphasized, and motives
being dissembled. There is often an ambience of arbitrariness,
nondisclosure, secret meetings, ostensible reasons, catch-all
euphemisms, blanket conclusions and lies.0 If this veil is to be
because it would only revive antagonisms is improper. Apparently, the court ruled that
if one's rights have been violated, he is entitled to a full remedy: back pay and reinstatment. Lyman v. Swartley, 385 F.2d 661 (D. Idaho 1974) (back pay and reinstatement
because discharge wrongful; money damages from individuals denied because discharge in good faith); Soni v. Board of Trustees, 376 F. Supp. 289 (E.D. Tenn. 1974)
(back pay from date of termination granted).
10 Smith v. Losee, 485 F.2d 334, 352 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 908
(1974). See also Strickland v. Inlow, 485 F.2d 186, 191 (8th Cir. 1973), vacated and
remanded sub nom. Wood v. Strickland, 95 S. Ct. 992 (1975).
I" Smith v. Losee, 485 F.2d 334 (10th Cir. 1973) cert. denied, 417 U.S. 908 (1974);
Klein v. New Castle County, 370 F. Supp. 85 (D. Del. 1974); Adamian v. University
of Nevada, 359 F. Supp. 825 (D. Nev. 1973); Commonwealth ex rel. Rafferty v. Philadelphia Psychiatric Center, 356 F. Supp. 500 (E.D. Pa. 1973); Starsky v. Williams, 353
F. Supp. 900 (D. Ariz. 1972), aff'd in part,rev'd in part,remanded, 512 F.2d 109 (9th
Cir. 1975).
1 Smith v. Losee, 485 F.2d 334 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 908 (1974);
Johnson v. University of Pittsburgh, 359 F. Supp. 1002 (W.D. Pa. 1973).
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pierced, a sensitive fact finder is vital.
Due process decisions are remedial in the short run and
preventative in the long run. The affected bodies must have
some incentive to begin procedures which will open the decision-making process. Advance notice, hearing both sides, an
opportunity to confront accusers and informers, and a decision
on the record are central to a democratic decision-making process. These simple procedures advance the official body's
legitimacy and efficiency. In Board of Regents v. Roth, Justice
Marshall noted that "a requirement of procedural regularity at
least renders arbitrary action more difficult" and that "proper
procedures will surely eliminate some of the arbitrariness that
results not from malice, but from innocent error."5 ' Moreover,
when embarrassing and institutional issues are discussed
openly, the public interest is advanced. The obvious conclusion
is that due process is in the best interest of both the public and
the employer. But arbitrary power will not be surrendered
without a struggle. To insure future compliance, remedial decisions in a particular case must consider both the specific defendant and other potential defendants. A damage verdict may
encourage the authorities to comply.
The employee's interest presents additional reasons to
consider a remedial decision's admonitory effect. Careers have
been ruined by illegal, malicious or dishonest official misconduct. In addition, an illegal firing may cause the employee to
suffer extreme emotional and financial hardship. 59 The employee must also bear the uncertainty and delay inherent in the
litigation process. Obviously a hearing, reinstatement and a
damage award cannot unring the bell;510 the real goal should be
to prevent similar misconduct. There is a growing body of case
law which affirms the principles of due process by affording
true remedial effect to denials of due process. As noted above
when faced with unconstitutional discharges, many courts
m Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972) (dissenting opinion). See also
Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 160 (1974) (Justice Marshall dissenting).
"See Harris, A Scrap of Black Cloth, NEW YoaKsa, June 17, 1974, at 37; June
24, 1974, at 37, discussing the case apparently reported as James v. Board of Educ.,
385 F. Supp. 209 (W.D.N.Y. 1974); Long, A Reporter at Large: Love of Country, NEW
YoRKR,July 30, 1973, at 35.
51,
Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 81 (1972).
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have ordered
the authorities to. reinstate the employee with
511
back pay.
The remedial arsenal in due process cases also includes
recovery for emotional and mental distress 52 as well as out-ofpocket loss 513 and punitive damages.

4

If incurred, damages for

expenses such as job searches and moving expenses should be
allowed. Plaintiffs, however, often fail to sue on available pendent causes of action for defamation 1' 5 or do not prove impalpable damages satisfactorily.-" 6 Because attorney's fees are an
imposing burden for an individual who is only awarded the
income he should have received, the courts should award attorney's fees more frequently than they do. 51 1 When there are ac5,,
Jannetta v. Cole, 493 F.2d 1334 (4th Cir. 1974); Wellner v. Minnesota State
Junior College Bd., 487 F.2d 153, 157 (8th Cir. 1973); Stewart v. Pearce, 484 F.2d 1031
(9th Cir. 1973); McNeill v. Butz, 480 F.2d 314, 326 (4th Cir. 1973); Vega v. Civil Service
Comm'n, 385 F. Supp. 1376 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Gonzalez v. Gonzalez, 385 F. Supp. 1226
(D.P.R. 1974); Young v. Hutchins, 383 F. Supp. 1167 (M.D. Fla. 1974); Sigmon v. Poe,
381 F. Supp. 387 (W.D.N.C. 1974); Dahleuger v. Town Bd., 381 F. Supp. 474 (E.D.
Wis. 1974); Parker v. Letson, 380 F. Supp. 280 (N.D. Ga. 1974); King v. Conservatorio
de Muscia, 378 F. Supp. 746 (D.P.R. 1974); Wagner v. Little Rock School Dist., 373
F. Supp. 876 (E.D. Ark. 1973); Dause v. Bates, 369 F. Supp. 139, 150 (W.D. Ky. 1973);
Lusk v. Estes, 361 F. Supp. 653, 664 (N.D. Tex. 1973); Black v. Rizzo, 360 F. Supp.
648, 653 (E.D. Pa. 1973); Johnson v. University of Pittsburgh, 359 F. Supp. 1002 (W.D.
Pa. 1973); Adamian v. University of Nevada, 359 F. Supp. 825, 831 (D. Nev. 1973);
Commonwealth ex rel. Rafferty v. Philadelphia Psychiatric Center, 356 F. Supp. 500,
511 (E.D. Pa. 1973); Snead v. Dep't of Social Servs., 355 F. Supp. 764, 773 (S.D.N.Y.
1973), vacated, 416 U.S. 977 (1974), reaffirmed, 389 F. Supp. 935 (S.D.N.Y. 1975);
Starsky v. Williams, 353 F. Supp. 900, 928 (D. Ariz. 1972), afl'd in part, rev'd in part,
remanded, 512 F.2d 109 (9th Cir. 1975); Webb v. Lake Mills Community School Dist.,
344 F. Supp. 791, 805 (N.D. Iowa 1972); Poschman v. Dumke, 107 Cal. Rptr. 596, 604
(Ct. App. 1973).
512 See Donovan v. Reinhold, 433 F.2d 738 (9th Cir. 1970).
, See Dause v. Bates, 369 F. Supp. 139, 150 (W.D. Ky. 1973).
s, See Smith v. Losee, 485 F.2d 334, 345 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S.
908 (1974); Wall v. Stanly County Bd. of Educ., 378 F.2d 275 (4th Cir. 1967). Cf. Lee
v. Southern Home Sites Corp., 429 F.2d 290, 294 (5th Cir. 1970). For a collection of
cases, see Annot., Punitive Damages for Violations of Federal Civil Rights Acts, 14
A.L.R. Fed. 608 (1973).
5,5
See, e.g., Smith v. Losee, 485 F.2d 334 (10th Cir. 1973). cert. denied, 417 U.S.
908 (1974) (no suit for defamation).
5,6
See, e.g., Jackson v. Wheatley School Dist. No. 28, 489 F.2d 608, 612-13 (8th
Cir. 1974); Wright v. Southeast Alabama Gas Dist., 376 F. Supp. 780 (M.D. Ala. 1974)
(reinstatement ordered but not entitled to back pay; failure to discharge burden of
proof of lost income); Webb v. Lake Mills Community School Dist., 344 F. Supp. 791,
806 (N.D. Iowa 1972) (loss of reputation, mental pain and anguish not proved).
511
See, e.g., Wellner v. Minnesota State Junior College Bd., 487 F.2d 153, 157 (8th
Cir. 1973); Gonzalez v. Gonsalez, 385 F. Supp. 1226, 1241-44 (D.P.R. 1974); James v.
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tual losses, the court must do more than admonish the authorities to "go forth and sin no more."
D. Deprivationof Liberty
Under liberty two types of cases will be considered. First,
ex parte mental health commitments will be analyzed under
new and traditional due process. The cases fall into the same
groups as the property and employment cases, some failing to
recognize due process, others finding denials of due process but
refusing to provide remedy and, finally, cases grappling with
the remedial implications of a denial of due process. After the
mental health cases, the discussion will turn to procedurally
defective prison discipline and will discuss only remedial problems. In both mental health and prison cases, liberty is restricted by the official action denying due process. Also, the
legal and remedial theories are similar. Moreover, in both mental health and prison cases there are two major hurdles in the
path of remedy. They are the plaintiff's custodial status and
the courts' apparent desire to protect official discretion through
immunity doctrines.
1. Involuntary Commitment of the Mentally Ill
Due process in mental health commitments has an almost
circular history. 58 Earlier in American history there were relatively few commitments. When institutions became fashionable, strict procedural safeguards were written into the statutes;
and several state courts applied a rigorous due process analysis."1 ' Notice and a right to be heard, it was held, were imperative before a person could be deprived of his liberty. The operative fact of insanity had to be established before liberty was
breached. Contrary arguments, the courts held, assumed the
"insanity" conclusion which the judicial inquiry was designed
Board of Educ., 385 F. Supp. 211, 217 (W.D.N.Y. 1974); Klein v. New Castle County,
370 F. Supp. 85, 92 (D. Del. 1974); Lusk v. Estes, 361 F. Supp. 653, 664 (N.D. Tex.
1973); Webb v. Lake Mills Community School Dist., 344 F. Supp. 791, 807 (N.D. Iowa
1972).
511For an exhaustive work on involuntary commitment, see Developments, Civil
Commitment of the Mentally Ill,
87 HARv. L. Rxv. 1190 (1974).
5" See, e.g., In re Lambert, 66 P. 851 (Cal. 1901); Allgor v. New Jersey State
Hosp., 84 A. 711 (N.J. Eq. 1912); Ex ParteAllen, 73 A. 1078 (Vt. 1909).
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to develop.520
Due process protections then receded. Three possible reasons for this development can be discerned. First, courts and
legislatures began to defer to medical discretion. Second, in the
early 20th century, the parens partriae doctrine enchanced
state power to "help" the unfortunate. Finally, Supreme Court
rulings eroded the earlier cases' due process foundation.521
While a few states retained strict standards, 2 the trend was
decidedly away from the earlier posture, 5 3 as noted by the Supreme Court in 1972, when it expressed surprise at the small
amount of litigation in this area. 5 4 But, by that year, the tide
was reversed. Medical expertise is no longer greeted with uniform approbation, and parens patriae,as a touchstone of state
power to "help" the individual, is on the decline.2 5 The Supreme Court began to construe due process in a variety of situations. Mental hospitals now face lawsuits based on numerous
theories.2
Under the present state of mental health due process, people who present a danger to themselves or others may be committed immediately. Due process, it has often been said, only
mandates a hearing before indeterminate commitment. This
hearing may be held some time after the initial commitment.2
Phillips v. Giles,52 a recent Alabama case, is typical. The peti"2

In re Lambert, 66 P. 851, 854 (Cal. 1901).

2I See, e.g., Chaloner v. Sherman, 242 U.S. 455 (1917); Simon v. Craft, 182 U.S.

427 (1901).
52 See, e.g., Denton v. Commonwealth, 383 S.W.2d 681 (Ky. 1964).
52 See, e.g., In re Barnard, 455 F.2d 1370 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Whittington v. Johnson, 201 F.2d 810 (5th Cir. 1953).
524Jackson v. Indiana, 405 U.S. 715, 736-39 (1972).
52 See, e.g. Donaldson v. O'Connor, 493 F.2d 507 (5th Cir. 1974), vacated and
remanded,43 U.S.L.W. 4929 (U,.S. June 26,1975); Inre Ballay, 482 F.2d 648, 650 (D.C.
Cir. 1973); Winters v. Miller, 446 F.2d 65, 71 (2d Cir. 1971); Dixon v. Attorney Gen.,
325 F. Supp. 966, 972 (M.D. Pa. 1971).
526 See, e.g., Donaldson v. O'Connor, 493 F.2d 507 (5th Cir. 1974) (right to treatment: false imprisonment); In re Ballay, 482 F.2d 648, 654 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (state must
prove insanity beyond a reasonable doubt); Welsh v. Likins, 373 F. Supp. 487 (D.
Minn. 1974) (due process requires that realistic opportunity to be cured or improve
mental condition accompany involuntary commitment); Wyatt v. Adubolt, 503 F.2d
1305 (1974) (right to adequate treatment). Editor's note. In O'Conner v. Donaldson,
43 U.S.L.W. 4929 (U.S. June 26, 1975), the Supreme Court held that the state could
not confine without treatment a person who is neither dangerous to himself nor others.
52 See, e.g., Anderson v. Solomon, 315 F. Supp. 1192 (D. Md. 1970).
5U 252 So. 2d 624 (Ala. 1971). Alabama's commitment statute was construed to
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tioner, who had been in jail in Montgomery, was comitted to
the Veterans Administration Hospital in Tuskeegee. The commitment order recited that three witnesses had been examined
under oath by Judge Hooper. In fact, however, there was neither notice to the petitioner nor any formal commitment hearing. The order was signed by the chief clerk of the County
Probate Court. The commitment was based on affidavits of the
witnesses. The petitioner knew nothing about the commitment
until he arrived at the hospital where he was placed in maximum security. The action was initiated by his petition for a
writ of habeas corpus; the circuit court denied the petition and
he appealed. The appeal presented a single due process issue:
was the commitment order "void because it was made without
prior notice to him and without giving him a hearing prior to
commitment and an opportunity to defend at a prior hearing. 5I The court held that the commitment did not deny due
process. The confined individual, the court said, "has the immediate right to test the legality of his detention in a habeas
corpus proceeding. '5 0 In that proceeding, the petitioner is entitled to a jury trial in which the burden of proof on the issue of
sanity is placed upon the authorities. 3 '
The propriety of "confinement first, hearing later" is now
seriously in question. Emergency commitments without notice
and a hearing appear to be infirm under the new due process
cases. First of all, the requisite citizen interest in his liberty
cannot be seriously contested. 2 One who is confined in a mental hospital is, perforce, restrained bodily. He may be subject
to drugging, electroshock, isolation and demeaning treatment.
conform to Lessard in Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 578 (D. Ala. 1974). See also Logan
v. Arfeh, 346 F. Supp. 1265, 1267-68 (D. Conn. 1972) (emergency commitment without
notice and hearing did not violate due process because judicial review available before
order becomes final).
Phillips v. Giles, 252 So. 2d 624, 628 (Ala. 1971) (petitioner's sanity was alleged
but, according to the majority, not tried).
s Id. at 629.
"' Id. at 629-30. Four justices concurred specially finding that the sanity issue had
been tried and found adversely to petitioner.
"I Donaldson v. O'Connor, 493 F.2d 507, 520 (5th Cir. 1974), vacated and
remanded, 43 U.S.L.W. 4929 (U.S. June 26, 1975). Editor's note. While affirming the
liberty interest in mental health commitments, the Supreme Court said, "We need not
decide. . . by what procedures. . . a mentally ill person may be confined ..
43
U.S.L.W. at 4933.
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A mental health "record" is also a stigma and may include a
loss of civil rights. 33 If a constitutionally cognizable interest is
present and there is not an "emergency," the interest cannot
be impaired without due process, that is, before notice and a
5 34
hearing.
Emergency mental health commitments cannot be justified by asserting that because review is available soon after the
commitment, the subject is merely deprived of liberty temporarily. First, "temporary" commitments may not be very temporary, some lasting as long as six months. 5 5 Second, there is

no "temporary" exception to due process when one is deprived
of other protected interests. If a property interest is taken, the
hearing must precede the taking: "The Fourteenth Amendment draws no bright lines around three-day, 10 day or 50 day
deprivations of property. Any significant taking of property is
within the purview of the Due Process Clause.""' To illustrate
the Supreme Court's emphasis, in Division IV of Fuentes, the
Court uses the word "before" four times; it is italicized three
of those times. 7 The Court finally held "if the right to notice
and a hearing is to serve its full purpose, then it is clear that it
must be granted at a time when the deprivation can still be
prevented."53 In Stanley v. Illinois, the Court said, "[Tihis
Court has not . . . embraced the general proposition that a
5 39
wrong may be done if it can be undone. 1
Nor may ex parte commitments be defended by arguing

that notice and hearing are unnecessary because commitment
is therapeutic and for the subject's own good. In a democracy,

the choice between freedom and confinement is the individaul's, not the state's. 40 Thus, courts have disavowed parens

I"

Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1088-89 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated and
remanded, 414 U.S. 473 (1974). See also Freitag v. Carter, 489 F.2d 1377 (7th Cir.
1973).
'm Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 96 (1972).
531Roth, Daley & Lerner, Into the Abyss: PsychiatricReliability and Emergency
Commitment Statutes, 13 SANTA CLARA LAWYER 400, 414-15 (1973).
5m Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 86 (1972). But cf. Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co.,
416 U.S. 600 (1974) (where property secured and interests dual, taking may precede
notice); Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974) (semble).
Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80-83 (1972).
Id. at 81, 96-97; Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 343 (1969) (Harlan, J., concurring).
51 Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 647 (1972).
510Cf. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 90 (1972). "[U]nder our free enterprise
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patriae as a state interest, 41 the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals stating recently that parens patriae as an interest
5 4 Asserting a thera"largely dissolves upon closer inspection.""
peutic purpose assumes two conclusions: that there is a need
for therapy and that the state can decide without assistance.
Finally, even assuming a benign purpose, the need for notice
and a hearing is not obviated. Due process, the Court said in
Stanley v. Illinois, was "designed to protect the fragile values
of a vulnerable citizenry from overbearing concern for efficiency and efficacy which may characterize praiseworthy government officials no less, and perhaps more, than mediocre
ones."

543

If ex parte mental health commitments are to be upheld
at all, they must be upheld under the "extraordinary situations" or emergency exception. In Lessard v. Schmidt, the
court allowed the authorities to detain a person without notice
and hearing for two days if the "subject" threatens violence to
himself or others.54 4 In cases decided after Fuentes the emergency exception is being clarified by requiring two things: a
statute which defines emergency realistically and narrowly,
and an emergency on the particular facts. 45 Many statutes are
defective on the first point, simply not defining an
emergency." Even if the statute is adequate, difficulty lurks
in defining a factual emergency and maintaining state control
over ex parte process. For, so" long as an emergency can be
found from one sided charges, there is a risk that private parties may employ state power to settle private grievances. The
emergency is the matter at issue. Unless there is an adversary
proceeding, that issue is determined without hearing the one
to be confined. The most rigorous standard may degenerate
system, an individual's choices in the market-place are respected however unwise they
may seem to someone else. It is not the business of a court adjudicating due process
rights to make its own critical evaluation of those choices. . . ... Id.
'
See cases cited supra note 525.
,a In re Ballay, 482 F.2d 648, 650 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
'3 Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656 (1972).
'"
Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1091 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated and
remanded, 414 U.S. 473 (1974). See also Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378, 388 (M.D.
Ala. 1974) (7 days); Bell v. Wayne County Gen. Hosp., 384 F. Supp. 1085, 1098 (E.D.
Mich. 1974) (5 days).
311See, e.g., Newton v. Burgin, 363 F. Supp. 782 (W.D.N.C. 1973).
54, Roth, Daley & Lerner, supra note 535, at 412-16.
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into a meaningless conclusion. "The state,"
in the words of
'547
Justice Stewart, "acts largely in the dark.

Further doubts based on recent cases must be expressed.
Is an important public or private interest advanced when the
loser of a domestic squabble is hospitalized?5 4 If the subject is
confined in jail, is there any need for swift action?548 When a
commitment grows out of form affidavits and is approved by a
clerk, does the state retain strict control over the procedure? 50
Thus, the emergency exception may justify some ex parte
statutes and certain of the commitments, but many other ex
parte commitments even under the proper statutes may still be
unconstitutional.
Mental health commitments present a compelling case for
due process. Both the legitimacy and the effectiveness functions of due process operate. If therapy is to take place at all,
the individual should feel that the committing process is legitimate and rational. Chief Justice Cooley stated this cogently
almost a century ago:
An insane person does not necessarily lose his sense of justice,
or of his right to the protection of the law; and when he is
seized without warning, and without the hearing of those
whom he might believe would testify in his behalf and delivered helpless into the hands of strangers, to be dealt with as
they may decide within the limits of a large discretion, it is
impossible that he should not feel keenly the seeming injustice and lawlessness of the proceeding."'
If involuntary commitments are untherapeutic,5

2

commit-

ments both involuntary and ex parte are bereft of benefit to the
person committed. If personal improvement is anticipated, it
is difficult to conceive a process more self-defeating than government by ukase.
'7 Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 93 (1972); Roth, Daley & Lerner, supra note
535, at 424.
"I See, e.g., Maben v. Rankin, 358 P.2d 681, 10 Cal. Rptr. 353 (Cal. 1961); Stowers
v. Wologzko, 191 N.W.2d 355 (Mich. 1971).
Phillips v. Giles, 252 So.2d 624 (Ala. 1971).
5

Id.

Van Deusen v. Newcomer, 40 Mich. 90, 130 (1879).
S. HALLECK, THa PorcsoF THReAPY 205 (1971); Developments, Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 87 HARv. L. Rzv 1190, 1220 n.100 (1974) cites several authorities for the proposition that involuntary patients are less likely to benefit from treatment.
55
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The other value advanced by due process is accuracy or
efficiency. When the standards are vague and conclusory, the
decision-maker should consider all available information. If
the process is one-sided, the decision-maker may frequently
be led into error by the malicious, over zealous or simply mistaken applicants seeking a certain result. "Experience teaches
• . . that the affording of procedural safeguards, which by

their nature serve to illuminate the underlying facts, in itself
often operates to prevent erroneous decisions on the merits
from occurring.

'5 3 Observers

have noted that the commitment

process is inveterately inaccurate, with a pronounced tendency
to over-predict and to commit excessively.554 Adversary procedure will not end unnecessary commitments, but it might reduce the frequency.
In Lessard v. Schmidt55 a three judge federal court contributed significantly to due process in mental health commitments. Several important points in Lessard can be summarized. The court held that involuntary confinement in a mental
hospital is a "significant deprivation of liberty," and that notice must be given with some kind of hearing conducted within
48 hours. A full hearing must be held within 14 days.556 Detailed
notice is required; the subject must be informed of the legal
standard, the reason for the hearing, the right to a jury trial
and the names of all witnesses together with a summary of their
anticipated testimony. At the hearing counsel is required, hearsay is forbidden, the privilege against self-incrimination may
be claimed, proof must be beyond a reasonable doubt and less
restrictive alternatives to commitment must be considered. 57
Lessard breaks new procedural ground with the potential
of affecting thousands of commitments. Though time must
pass before the full impact can be determined, it is possible
that the nation's mental hospitals could be held to be full of
illegally detained people. Two matters must be noted. First, in
m'Silver v. NYSE,

373 U.S. 341, 366 (1963).
ml Roth, Daley & Lerner, supra note 535, at 428-33, 440.
5u 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1103 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated and remanded,414 U.S. 473
(1974). See also Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378 (M.D. Ala. 1974); Bell v. Wayne
County Gen. Hosp., 314 F. Supp. 1085 (E.D. Mich. 1974).
"' Id. at 1103.
See also In re Ballay, 482 F.2d 648 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
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the abstract, to delay a hearing for two days after confinement
appears to be inconsistent with Fuentes which requires a hearing before interfering with a constitutionally cognizable interest. In specific commitments under a properly drawn statute,
the extraordinary situations exception may obviate notice.
This apparent incongruity needs to be clarified. Second, on the
defendants' appeal, the Supreme Court vacated the order in
Lessard."' After the district court opinion, judgment was ordered "in accordance with the opinion heretofore entered."
Thus, except for the opinion, no injunctive order existed. On
plaintiff's motion to dismiss the appeal, the Supreme Court
observed that the opinion merely told the defendants "not to
enforce 'the present Wisconsin Scheme'" and held that the
order must be vacated and the cause remanded because Rule
65(d) which requires specific terms in an injunction was not
satisfied: "in the absence of specific injunctive relief, informed
and intelligent appellate relief is greatly complicated, if not
5 5 The district court later
made impossible.""
issued another
0
order.
Lessard and the foregoing analysis provide a sufficient
basis to discuss remedy. The focus will be on release and damages. The Lessard court did hold that the plaintiff's commitment was constitutionally invalid. No notice was served on the
plaintiff before she was confined."' Absent either notice and a
hearing or a valid emergency, a mental health commitment is,
it may be concluded, constitutionally defective. Under traditional due process, if no notice precedes adjudication, no jurisdiction over the person is secured. The proceeding is void even
though the claim may be legitimate. In Pennoyer v. Neff, the
Supreme Court said "the validity of every judgment depends
upon the jurisdiction of the Court before it is rendered, not
upon what may occur subsequently." ' 2 Thus, when a person is
confined without notice, traditional due process appears to
"I Schmidt v. Lessard,

414 U.S. 473 (1974).
Id. at 476-77.
560 379 F. Supp. 1376 (E.D. Wis. 1974).
566 Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1081 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated and
remanded, 414 U.S. 473 (1974).
562 Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 728 (1877). See Justice Bloodworth concurring
specially in Phillips v. Giles, 252 So. 2d 624, 630-31 (Ala. 1971); The case of the
Marshalsea, 10 Co. Rep. 686, 77 E.R. 1027 (1613) (subject matter jurisdiction).
'g
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compel immediate release.5 63 But Miss Lessard had been released earlier and the district court did not decide whether she
was illegally confined. The court merely declared Miss Lessard's order "invalid" or "defective."
Plaintiff Lessard also represented a class: "all persons 18
years of age or older who are being held involuntarily pursuant
to any emergency, temporary or permanent commitment provision of the Wisconsin involuntary mental commitment statute."5 " ' The court struck down the statute but did not require
the authorities to release members of the plaintiff class; rather,
ninety days were granted to the authorities to review procedures and individual cases. To justify continued involuntary
confinement, the authorities were compelled to hold "new
hearings. . . in conformity with this opinion." ' The state was
allowed the time because "a number of the patients are undoubtedly properly institutionalized, despite defective procedures."56
The idea that a proceeding which is not preceded by notice
is void and ineffective has been disregarded in recent mental
health commitment cases. The decisions do not annul the early
commitments and command immediate release. Instead the
courts allow the authorities to retain the person in custody and
to commit under proper proceedings. This deprives due process
of its full remedial thrust. It is difficult to distinguish cases
voiding ex parte money judgements from ex parte mental
health commitments. In both, the truth-seeking process is frustrated. Certainly liberty should be as fully protected as property. Yet, in contrast to the traditional due process cases, the
mental health cases afford some effect to a decision reached
10 Allgor v. New Jersey State Hosp., 84 A. 711 (N.J. Eq. 1912) (immediate release
ordered). See also Davy v. Sullivan, 354 F. Supp. 1320 (M.D. Ala. 1973) (sexual
psychopath statute unconstitutional; incarcerated members of plaintiff class ordered
released).
"I Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1103 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated and
remanded, 414 U.S. 473 (1974).
-' Id. at 1104. See also, Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378 (M.D. Ala. 1974); Bell
v. Wayne County Gen. Hosp., 384 F. Supp. 1085 (W.D. Mich. 1974); Dixon v. Attorney
Gen., 325 F. Supp. 966, 973 (M.D. Pa. 1971) (60 days to discharge or recommit); Barry
v. Hall, 98 F.2d 222, 230 (D.C. Cir. 1938) (five days to release or commence proper
proceedings).
"4 Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1104 (E.D. Wis. 1973), vacated and
remanded, 414 U.S. 473 (1974).
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without notice. If there has been no valid adjudication of mental illness, it is difficult to understand why the person is not
entitled to his liberty.
Why are the courts unwilling to extend a full remedial
effect when due process is denied in a mental health commitment? First, tradition probably accounts for much of the reluctance. Legal analogy is powerful. In prisoner habeas corpus
cases, where a convict is illegally confined under an invalid
conviction, courts do not order unconditional release. Instead,
if the conviction is illegal, a conditional release is ordered. The
authorities are given a period of time to release or retry. 67 The
prisoner cases, however, deal with procedural defects in the
course of the proceedings, not with failure to give notice at all.
In addition, prisoners, even unjustly convicted prisoners, seem
to be both more dangerous and more likely to flee than people
unconstituionally confined in mental institutions.
Another reason may be mentioned. The courts in mental
health cases afford the earlier illegal decision a credence which
is not extended to an illegal money judgment because of the
differences in the labeling process. A medical-legal label such
as "mentally ill" or "insane" carries considerable stigma and
causes the individual to be shunned as irrational and deviant.568 Such a label is easy to affix but hard to erase. Even
former mental patients suffer serious social disabilities. For
example, note Senator Eagleton's short-lived 1972 vicepresidental campaign. In failing to order unconditional release,
courts may reflect the social stigma which society attaches to
the mentally ill. But the social stigma might well impel the
courts in precisely the opposite direction. The label's seriousness should force the courts to scrutinize the process used to
attach it. If the committing proceeding was ex parte and onesided, the victim could be granted his liberty and the record of
the illegal proceeding extirpated. If due process is to be meaningful and liberty is to be protected, an adequate equitable
remedy for unconstitutional mental health commitments is
'9 See, e.g., Stump v. Bennett, 398 F.2d 111, 123 (8th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393
U.S. 1001 (1968) (one year to retry). See also State ex rel. Matalik v. Schubert, 204
N.W.2d 13 (Wis. 1973) (incompetency to stand trial found unconstitutionally: 60 days
to commit or release).
5 S. HALLECK, supra note 552, at 111-20.
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immediate release and expungement.
Equitable remedies, however, fail to recompense for the
time spent in illegal confinement. Thus, it is necessary to turn
to false imprisonment and money damages. The interest in
freedom from restraint upon movement is protected by the tort
of false imprisonment."' Confinements without legal authority
are false imprisonments. Neither ill will nor spite is required;
intent to confine is all that is necessary.57 ° One can conclude
that an improper mental health commitment is a false imprisonment.57 ' The tort can be shown by proving a confinement
without proper procedure.5 2 False imprisonment is both a common law tort and a "constitutional tort": if the defendants
acted under color of law to deprive plaintiff of a constitutional
right, a false imprisonment is actionable under the Civil Rights
Acts.173 Detention in a mental hospital is a loss of liberty in the
most fundamental sense. 7 4 Confinement without proper procedure raises due process issues. If the decision-making process
of the state is used, commitments are under "color of law."
Thus, an improper mental health commitment may be a Civil
Rights Act false imprisonment. 7 5
The false imprisonment tort, suprisingly, has not been a
practical limit on questionable mental health commitments.
The citizen interest is significant, and it appears that there are
many unnecessary commitments. 71 In the false imprisonment
W. PRossER, LAW oF ToRis

§ 11 (4th ed.

1971).

Johnson v. Greer, 477 F.2d 101, 104 (5th Cir. 1973).
' Maben v. Rankin, 358 P.2d 681, 10 Cal. Rptr. 353 (1961); Stowers v. Wolodzko,
191 N.W.2d 355, 363-64 (Mich. 1971); see cases collected in Annot., 30 A.L.R.3d 523
(1970). But see Maniaci v. Marquette Univ., 184 N.W.2d 168 (Wis. 1971) (not false
imprisonment but may be abuse of process). See also Winters v. Miller, 446 F.2d 65
(2d Cir. 1971) (battery); Stephen v. Drew, 359 F. Supp. 746 (E.D. Va. 1973) (malpractice); Annot., 30 A.L.R.3d 455 (1970). These and other relevant torts such as malicious
prosecution are beyond the scope of this article.
"I Maben v. Rankin, 358 P.2d 681, 10 Cal. Rptr. 353 (1961).
'3 Anderson v. Nosser, 438 F.2d 183, 194 (5th Cir. 1971), modified en banc, 456
F.2d 835 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 848 (1972).
"I In Stowers v. Wolodzko, 191 N.W.2d 355 (Mich. 1971), plaintiff was taken from
her home by force without being allowed to use the telephone, placed for 6 days in a
room bare except for a bed, forcibly injected with medication and told that if she tried
to contact certain relatives, "you will never see your children again." See generally
Chambers, Alternatives to Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill: PracticalGuides and
ConstitutionalImperatives, 70 MicH. L. Rzv. 1107, 1151-68 (1972).
571 Johnson v. Greer, 477 F.2d 101 (5th Cir. 1973).
' Morris & Luby, Civil Commitment in a Suburban County: An Investigation
'T
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cases, plaintiffs have encountered the usual gamut of tort difficulties, 77 from proximate cause578 to legal protection of medical
discretion.5 79 Civil Rights Act cases have encountered two
major difficulties. If state officials are defendants, judicial or
prosecutorial immunity is a defense. If private citizens are defendants, there is no color of law."' Thus, there are only a few
successful plaintiffs cases.-8'
Charging a private person with common law false imprisonment in a court of general jurisdiction presents only doctrinal problems. Consequently, the ensuing analysis will pass
lightly over problems presented by ordinary tort law, concentrating instead on the problems encountered in suing official
and private defendants in federal court under a constitutional
tort-Civil Rights Act theory.8 2 With regard to the former, suffice it to say that a person whose liberty is circumscribed by
an unconstitutional proceeding has been falsely imprisoned. If
an adequate defendant and a proper forum can be found, the
victim may be entitled to damages.
The local governmental body itself is the most obvious and
solvent defendant in a mental commitment civil rights action,
but in many states, recovery from a governmental defendant
is barred by sovereign immunity. 8 3 Moreover, under Moor v.
by Law Students, 13 SANTA CLARA

LAWYER

518 (1973).

51 Rawls v. Daughters of Charity, 491 F.2d 141 (5th Cir. 1974).
I'l Johnson v. Greer, 477 F.2d 101 (5th Cir. 1973).
511Maben v. Rankin, 358 P.2d 681, 10 Cal. Rptr. 353 (1961); Belger v. Arnot, 183
N.E.2d 866 (Mass. 1962).
In See Annot. 16 A.L.R. Fed. 440 (1973). But cf. Delatte v. Genovese, 273 F. Supp.
654 (E.D. La. 1967) (coroner not immune).
"I' Donaldson v. O'Connor, 493 F.2d 507 (5th Cir. 1974) (ground-breaking case
affirming a plaintiff's verdict for $38,500), vacated and remanded, 43 U.S.L.W. 4929
(U.S. June 26, 1975); Stowers v. Wolodzko, 191 N.W.2d 355 (Mich. 1971) (plaintiff's
verdict for $40,000 affirmed).
u' The constitutional tort, the reader should bear in mind, is viewed within the
framework of traditonal tort liability. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187 (1961). Thus,
while tort problems are ignored herein, they may be significant in a Civil Rights Act
case. See, e.g., Johnson v. Greer, 477 F.2d 101 (5th Cir. 1973) (no proximate cause).
See generally, Note, Constitutional Torts: Section 1983 Redress for the Deprived
Debtor, 14 WM. & MARY L. Rav. 627 (1973).
' Johnson v. Anderson, 370 F. Supp. 1373 (D. Del. 1974); Fish v. Regents of Univ.
of Cal., 54 Cal. Rptr. 656 (Ct. App. 1966); W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 975-87 (4th ed.
1971). State sovereign immunity is changing rapidly. The particular jurisdiction's
statutory and decision law should be reviewed carefully. See Dennison v. New York,
267 N.Y.S.2d 920 (Ct. Cl. 1966) ($115,000 damages for erroneous commitment).
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County of Alameda,"4 a local governmental body cannot be a
Civil Rights Act defendant in a suit for damages because it is
not a "person." Nor can § 1988 be used to add a state claim
under a tort claim act.ss Thus, a person who is wrongfully
confined in a mental hospital cannot use the Civil Rights Act
to sue a state or local government for damages, 511 but must
choose persons as defendants.
The person sued under the Civil Rights Act, however, must
have acted under "color of law." The conduct of a private
person is not actionable. 87 Thus, Civil Rights Act cases against
private physicians,588 private hospitals8 9 and attorneys,8 ' have
been dismissed for lack of color of law.' Still, there are several
ways to escape this difficulty. First, private persons can be
sued for the common law tort in a court of general jurisdiction. 5 2 Second, plaintiff may sue under § 1985(3) charging that
private persons conspired with public officials to deprive him
of a constitutional right.8 ' The conspiracy is difficult: specific
facts as well as at least one overt act must be pleaded and
411 U.S. 693 (1973).
55

Id.
Veres v. County of Monroe, 364 F. Supp. 1327 (E.D. Mich. 1973).

",

Cook v. Advertiser Co., 458 F.2d 1119 (5th Cir. 1973); C.

ANTiEAU, FEDERAL

CivL RIGHTs AcTS: CIVr PRACTICE § 36 (1971).
5u Bryne v. Kysar, 347 F.2d 734 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 913 (1965),

rehearingdenied, 384 U.S. 914 (1965), motion to file for rehearingdenied, 384 U.S. 994
(1965); Joyce v. Ferrazzi, 323 F.2d 931 (1st Cir. 1963); Spampenato v. M. Burger &
Co., 270 F.2d 46 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 944, rehearingdenied, 361 U.S. 973
(1960); Whittington v. Johnson, 201 F.2d 810 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 867
(1953) (persuasive dissent which anticipates Lessard v. Schmidt).
"' Tennessee ex rel. Davis v. Hartman, 303 F. Supp. 411 (E.D. Tenn. 1969).
s, Cooper v. Wilson, 309 F.2d 153 (6th Cir. 1962); Kenney v. Hatfield, 132 F.
Supp. 814 (W.D. Mich. 1955), aff'd, 232 F.2d 288 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 855
(1956).
5I McCormack observes that the color of law cases may be better explained as
turning on personal immunity. McCormack, 60 VA. L. REv. 1, 18 (1974).
5,2 If a Civil Rights action is brought against public officials, pendent jurisdiction
cannot be used to join the private defendants despite the "common nucleus of operative fact," C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL CouRTs 65 (1970). If, however, all defendants are state
officials, related state claims or theories may be joined to the Civil Rights Act claims.
Anderson v. Nosser, 438 F.2d 183, 188-89 (5th Cir. 1971), modified on rehearing en
banc, 456 F.2d 835, cert. denied sub. nom Nosser v. Bradley, 409 U.S. 898 (1972); Whirl
v. Kern, 407 F.2d 781, 793 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 901 (1969).
"I Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971); Azar v. Conley, 456 F.2d 1382 (6th
Cir. 1972); Birnbaum v. Trussell, 371 F.2d 672 (2d Cir. 1966); Curtis v. Peerless Ins.
Co., 299 F. Supp. 429 (D. Minn. 1969).
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proved.-" 4 Third, color of law does not always require a state
officer. If a private citizen "willfully" acts in "joint activity"
with a state agent, color or law may be upheld. 95 Finally, courts
have found that private defendants who took advantage of a
statutory procedure engaged in state action.596 The color of law
concept is similar to, if not broader than, state action.59 , If color
of law were found when private individuals unconstitutionally
confine a plaintiff, one of the principle purposes of due process
is advanced. A remedy is provided for a person who, without
notice and a hearing, is the victim of private abuse of state
power. 98
The next group of potential defendants includes police,
hospital officials and administrators. All these groups are protected by personal immunity, either qualified or absolute. The
cases which deal with the immunities available to court personnel, hospital officials and police are in utter disarray.59 All,
stated generally, may be protected by a qualified immunity.
Unless the plaintiff shows lack of good faith, members of these
groups may be exonerated from responding in damages. Thus,
a custodian acting under apparently legal regulations may be
forgiven from false imprisonment liability even though the reg"I See, e.g., Lucas v. Kale, 364 F. Supp. 1345, 1347 (W.D. Va. 1973); C. ANTmAu,
supra note 587, at §§ 105-06.
"I Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 152 (1970); Undergraduate Student
Ass'n v. Peltason, 359 F. Supp. 320, 322 (D. Ill. 1973) (private person in concert with
state officials).
"I See Hall v. Garson, 468 F.2d 845 (5th Cir. 1972); McQueen v. Druker, 438 F.2d
781 (1st Cir. 1971); Gibbs v. Titelman, 369 F. Supp. 38 (E.D. Pa. 1973); rev'd, 502 F.2d
1107 (3d Cir. 1974); Gross v. Fox, 349 F. Supp. 1164 (E.D. Pa. 1972); MacQueen v.
Lambert, 348 F. Supp. 1334 (M.D. Fla. 1972); Klim v. Jones, 315 F. Supp. 109 (N.D.
Cal. 1970); Blye v. Globe-Wernicke Realty Co., 300 N.E.2d 710, 347 N.Y.S.2d 170
(1973). But see cases holding "no state action" in § 9-503 self help repossessions:
Greene v. First Nat'l Bank, 348 F. Supp. 672 (W.D. Va. 1972); Oller v. Bank of
America, 342 F. Supp. 21 (M.D. Cal. 1972); McCormick v. First Nat'l Bank of America, 322 F. Supp. 604 (S.D. Fla. 1971); Messenger v. Sandy Motors, Inc., 295 A.2d 402
(N.J. Super. 1972).
"I See Part I(b)(2) supra for a comparison of these concepts.
Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 92-95 (1972).
5, See Johnson v. Greer, 477 F.2d 101 (5th Cir. 1973); Robinson v. McCorkle, 462
F.2d 111 (3rd Cir. 1972); Haldane v. Chagnon, 345 F.2d 601 (9th Cir. 1965); Joyce v.
Ferrazzi, 323 F.2d 931 (1st Cir. 1963); Stephen v. Drew, 359 F. Supp. 746 (E.D. Va.
1973); Wade v. Bethesada Hosp., 356 F. Supp. 380 (S.D. Ohio 1973); Delatte v. Genovese, 273 F. Supp. 654 (E.D. La. 1967). See generally Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S.
232 (1974).
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ulations are later declared unconstitutional. 0° So also, constitutional prescience is not exacted from a police officer."'
There is, however, contrary authority. In Johnson v.
Greer,"' the Fifth Circuit dealt with false imprisonment
brought as a constitutional tort by a person who had been
confined in a mental hospital. The defendant was the clinic
administrator. The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff, and
the administrator appealed. The plainitff, the court held,
"need not show malice or ill will": if he was actually deprived
of a constitutional right by state action, "good intentions which
do not give rise to a reasonable belief that detention is lawfully
required cannot justify false imprisonment." ' Johnson may be
read several ways. First, it may merely reject parenspatriaeas
a reason to confine. This is consistent with other recent authority.!0 4 Second, it may stand for a qualified privilege. If the
defendant had a reasonable belief that the plaintiff is detained
lawfully, the defendant need not respond in damages. Third,
it may stand for absolute liability. If the plaintiff was illegally
confined, false imprisonment is shown. There is Fifth Circuit
authority for the proposition that absence of wrongful intent is
05
not a defense to false imprisonment as a constitutional tort."
The plaintiff, it can be argued, should be able to recover
from a custodian if, at the time of confinement, the defendant
could have known that the plaintiff was detained contrary to
existing law.0 ' This places the burden of knowing the applicable law on institutional custodians.60 ' Under this rule, it is impossible to feign ignorance of present law but unnecessary to
See Clarke v. Cade, 358 F. Supp. 1156 (W.D. Wis. 1973).
Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 557 (1967).
", 477 F.2d 101 (5th Cir. 1973).
'4 Id. at 105.
', See cases cited supra note 525.
,4'Donaldson v. O'Connor, 493 F.2d 507, 527 (5th Cir. 1974), vacated and
remanded, 43 U.S.L.W. 4929 (U.S. June 26, 1975) (vacated and remanded to be reconsidered in light of qualified immunity); Whirl v. Kern, 407 F.2d 781, 788 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 901 (1969). Plaintiff was held in jail without legal authority.
"Neither good faith nor non-negligence can exculpate" defendant. Id. at 790. A jury
verdict for defendant was reversed and a directed verdict for plaintiff was ordered. Id.
at 793.
"4 Cf. Preston v. Cowan, 369 F. Supp. 14 (W.D. Ky. 1973).
10 In Wood v. Strickland, 95 S. Ct. 992 (1975), the Court said "a school board
member. . . must be held to a standard of conduct based. . . on knowledge of the
basic, unquestioned constitutional rights of his charges." Id. at 1000-01.
"0

',
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anticipate future changes in the law."' Directors of custodial
institutions may be under a statutory obligation to be sure that
commitments are in order."' Tort liability for damages merely
extends a remedy to one who suffers when this duty is
breached. Good faith is an appropriate defense for a policeman
who must make split-second decisions. But "a jailer, unlike a
policeman, acts at his leisure." 1 ' Even so, to prevent remedy
from being converted into revenge, if the confinement is illegal
only in retrospect, the defendant is immune. Thus, the standard does not impose strict liability.
This standard considers the illegal restraint imposed upon
the plaintiff. "Good faith may clear the conscience, but it does
not redeem or purge the act." '' In viewing the defendant's
state of mind, the law should not ignore the plaintii's loss of
liberty and need for recompense. As Judge Goldberg wrote eloquently in Whirl v. Kern:
Unfortunately non-malicious restraint is no sweeter than restraint evilly motivated, and we cannot sanction chains without legal justification even if they be forged by the hands of
an angel. Neither the sheriff's tears of regret nor explanations
keyed the lock to unmanacle Whirl. Though we apply all the

benign adjectives in our lexicon to Kern's watchmanship-these
do not make Whirl a November to July free
2
61

man.

The suggested standard, which allows recovery from custodians
if confinement was currently illegal, is preferable because it
protects the interest in freedom from illegal restraint.
Another possible defendant is the committing judge who,
if the plaintiff is confined without due process, could possibly
be sued in a Civil Rights Act case. Here the most imposing
barrier to success is judicial immunity. Following Pierson v.
Ray, a state or local judge acting within his jurisdiction is
's Again in Wood, the Court said "ignorance ... of settled indisputable law, on
the part of one entrusted with supervision . . . [cannot justify] an act violating a
student's constitutional rights." Id. at 1000.
60, See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 37.1-68 (Cum. Supp. 1973).
6,0 Whirl v. Kern, 407 F.2d 781, 792 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 901
(1969).
6,, Id. at 794.
6,2

Id. at 794-95.
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completely immune from damage claims. 13 But, applying some
of the reasoning previously developed, an effective argument
for damages can be mounted.
The immunity granted a judicial officer in exercise of his
judicial function is intended to allow the judge to exercise that
function without fear of lawsuits being brought by disappointed litigants. To effectuate this freedom from lawsuits alleging malice or corruption, the judge's privilege in a suit seeking damages is absolute. Ordinarily this allows a judge to end
the litigation before it goes to trial;"1 4 and allegations of corruption and malicious motive are not sufficient to defeat that
immunity. But this pervasive immunity can lead to injustice.
A judge can use the perquisites of his office to carry out a
personal vendetta"' or can use the criminal arm of his court to
advance his private debt collection business." ' Oppressive and
abusive conduct is an evil, but it is felt to be a lesser evil, with
unredressed actual injustice being the price paid for judicial
independence.1 7
Because immunity prevents recovery for an otherwise viable cause of action, courts confer it reluctantly and apply it
sparingly. 8 Likewise, judicial immunity is limited to its proper
purpose. A judge is not immune for his nonjudicial activities:
"I Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967). But see Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547,
558-67 (1967) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (judge not immune for knowingly and willfully
depriving plaintiff of constitutional right); Huendling v. Jensen, 168 N.W.2d 745, 75253 (Iowa 1969) (Rawlings, J., dissenting) (judge not immune for malicious or corrupt
act). A judge who interferes with civil rights may, however, be enjoined. See, e.g.,
Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (1972); Littleton v. Berbing, 468 F.2d 389 (7th Cir.
1972), rev'd on othergrounds sub. nom. O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974); Doe
v. Ceci, 384 F. Supp. 7, 9 (E.D. Wis. 1974); Larsen v. Gallogly, 361 F. Supp. 305, 31011 (D.R.I. 1973), vacated and remanded, 95 S. Ct. 819 (1975) (remanded with instructions to be dismissed as moot). Sutton v. County Ct., 353 F. Supp. 716 (E.D. Wis.
1973); Rosen v. North Carolina, 345 F. Supp. 1364 (W.D.N.C. 1972). See McCormack,
60 VA. L. Rav. 1, 11-14 (1974).
9' See, e.g., Williams v. Sepe, 487 F.2d 913 (5th Cir. 1973). "The privilege would
be of little value if [legislators] could be subjected to the cost and inconvenience and
distractions of a trial upon a conclusion of a pleader. . . ." Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S.
564, 575 (1959) (plurality opinion), citing Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 377
(1951).
", See the allegations in Boydstun v. Perry, 359 F. Supp. 48 (N.D. Miss. 1973).
Huendling v. Jensen, 168 N.W.2d 745 (Iowa 1969).
" Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 576 (1969) (plurality opinion).
" See, e.g., Anderson v. Nosser, 438 F.2d 183, 201-02 (5th Cir. 1971), modified
en banc, 456 F.2d 835 (1972); Lynch v. Johnson, 420 F.2d 818 (6th Cir. 1970).
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"A judge does not cease to be a judge when he undertakes to
chair a PTA meeting, but, of course, he does not bring judicial
19
immunity to that forum either."
In addition, judicial immunity arises only when the judge
acts within his jurisdiction. Jurisdiction is a chameleon word
which has various meanings in different contexts. In judicial
immunity, jurisdiction appears to mean conventional jurisdiction to adjudicate, that is, jurisdiction over the subject matter
of the action and the person of the defendant. Most of the
reported opinions turn on jurisdiction over the subject matter:
if the judge is deciding one of the general classes of cases within
the constitutional and statutory capacity of his court, he will
be absolutely immune from damage claims."' 0 If, on the other
hand, an act is not authorized by statute or constitution, the
judge is not shielded by immunity. 2 ' Thus, if a person is committed to a mental hospital by an official who lacks authority
to commit, the immunity barrier is avoided.
Jurisdiction over the person is more appropriate for the
present inquiry. It has been argued that, following traditional
due process, unless a person receives notice before he is confined in a mental hospital, there is no jurisdiction over his
person. This procedural defect, it was asserted, voids the proceeding and compels immediate release. Does it also vitiate
judicial immunity and render the committing judge amenable
to damages? Many judicial immunity cases state that if the
court had no jurisdiction over the person, a judge is not immune, 22 but jurisdiction over the person has rarely been a con, Lynch v. Johnson, 420 F.2d 818, 820 (6th Cir. 1970) (dicta).
' Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967); Williams v. Sepe, 487 F.2d 913 (5th
Cir. 1973); Boyer v. Wisconsin, 345 F. Supp. 564 (E.D. Wis. 1972); Broom v. Douglas,
57 So. 860 (Ala. 1912).
2I See, e.g., Gregory v. Thompson, 500 F.2d 59 (9th Cir. 1974); Lucarell v.
McNair, 453 F.2d 836 (6th Cir. 1972); Manning v. Ketcham, 58 F.2d 948 (6th Cir.
1932); Wade v. Bethesda Hosp., 337 F. Supp. 671 (S.D. Ohio 1971), reconsideration
denied, 356 F. Supp. 380 (S.D. Ohio 1973); Joyce v. Hickey, 147 N.E.2d 187 (Mass.
1958); Hoppke v. Klapperick, 28 N.W.2d 780 (Minn. 1947), Annot., 173 A.L.R. 802,
819. But see Robinson v. McCorkle, 462 F.2d 111, 113 (3d Cir. 1972) (statute repealed:
judge nevertheless immune).
m,Ryan v. Scoggin, 245 F.2d 54, 58 (10th Cir. 1957); Thompson v. Herther, 235
F.2d 176, 177 (6th Cir. 1956); Link v. Greyhound Corp., 288 F. Supp. 898, 899 (E.D.
Mich. 1968); Fraley v. Ramey, 239 F. Supp. 993 (S.D.W. Va. 1965); Williamson v.
Waugh, 160 F. Supp. 72 (S.D.W. Va. 1958); Pierce v. Caldwell, 360 P.2d 992, 994
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tested issue in recent judicial immunity cases. 2 ' There is, however, some precedent. In Duncan v. Brothers,"4 the judge tried
plaintiff without notice, convicted him and ordered him imprisoned. The Kentucky Court of Appeals held that no personal
jurisdiction was obtained and judicial immunity was not available to shield the judge against plaintiff's suit for false imprisonment.
Should this reasoning apply to an ex parte mental health
commitment? Such a commitment is likely to be both inaccurate and untherapeutic. The person committed loses his liberty
and is likely to be subjected to humiliating and degrading
treatment. Personal possessions may be confiscated; he may be
stripped, examined and reclothed in institutional garb; he may
be denied normal amenities such as tobacco, water and telephones; and his mind may be muddled by drugs administered
against his will.8 Merely ordering the release of illegally committed persons may not deter future illegal confinements. Furthermore, since the hospital authorities are immune from liability if acting pursuant to ostensibly legal commitment, it is
clear the deterrent posed by the possible imposition of damages
is totally absent if the judge is protected by immunity. Judges
control the committing process, and if the judge relies on currently knowable law, he would be protected by a qualified
immunity. But an ex parte commitment is seriously defective
procedurally and has extreme consequences for the victim. The
law should provide a meaningful remedy. Traditional due process applied to judicial immunity is a doctrinal model to accomodate these interests reasonably.
2. PrisonDue Process
A workable frame of reference for prison discipline is the
Landman litigation, which involves four reported cases resulting from Landman's controversies with Virginia prison offi(Idaho 1961). But see Williams v. Sepe, 487 F.2d 913 (5th Cir. 1973). "The test for the
abrogation of judicial immunity is a clear absence of all jurisdiction over the subject
matter." Id. at 914.
", Huendling v. Jensen, 168 N.W.2d 745, 749 (Iowa 1969).
*u 344 S.W.2d 398 (Ky. 1961). See also Sukeforth v. Thegen, 256 A.2d 162 (Me.
1969) (committing physician did not obtain jurisdiction over the person). But see
Quindlen v. Hirschi, 284 P.2d 723 (Okla. 1955).
"I E. GoF mAN, AsYLUms 18-23 (1961).
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cials. 6 In the last two opinions, Virginia officials were cited for
contempt and required to pay damages, but while these orders
were on appeal the litigation was settled. The state agreed to
pay $43,525.70 to Landman's attorney and to continue to extend due process. In return, the injunction, the contempt citation and the damage judgment were dissolved. 2 The Landman
litigation allows the reader to examine the ambit of qualified
immunities and to consider contempt as a remedy.
The application of due process concepts to prisoners while
incarcerated is a recent development. Only ten years ago state
prisoner litigation about prison conditions was almost laughed
out of federal court.6 21 This situation was dramatically reversed
when, upon granting plenary hearings, the shocking and appalling conditions in many prisons became apparent. 29 Prisoner litigation today is extensive and volatile. Judge Lawrence
of the Southern District of Georgia observed that "actions by
state prisoners under § 1983 are the most prolific single source
63
of civil litigation in this District.""
The due process scheme can be outlined briefly. Because
of past unlawful conduct, a prison inmate's liberty is somewhat
circumscribed. But this does not mean that he no longer has
any constitutional rights. In determining the threshold question, whether due process is required, many courts ask whether
the prisoner suffered a grievous loss. 3 ' This standard follows
Morrissey v. Brewer,6312 a parole revocation case, rather than the
"constitutionally cognizable interest in liberty or property"
analysis set out in Roth, Perry, Mitchell, and Fuentes. Though
the tests are thus stated differently, they do not appear to
produce differing results in prison cases. Grievous loss appears
828 Landman v. Peyton, 370 F.2d 135 (4th Cir. 1966); Landman v. Royster, 354 F.
Supp. 1302 (E.D. Va. 1973); Landman v. Royster, 354 F. Supp. 1292 (E.D. Va. 1973);
Landman v. Royster, 333 F. Supp. 621 (ED. Va. 1971).
In Washington Post, Nov. 24, 1973, at B1, col. 3.
121Cooper v. Pate, 324 F.2d 165 (7th Cir. 1963), rev'd per curiam, 378 U.S. 546
(1964).
I2 The seminal case is Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571 (8th Cir. 1968). See also
Rhem v. Malcolm, 371 F. Supp. 594 (S.D.N.Y.), afld, 507 F.2d 333 (2d Cir. 1974).
"* Heard v. Caldwell, 364 F. Supp. 419 (S.D. Ga. 1973).
0' See, e.g., Knell v. Bensenger, 489 F.2d 1014, 1018 (7th Cir. 1973); Rhem v.
Malcolm, 371 F. Supp. 594 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 507 F.2d 333 (2d Cir. 1974); Diamond v.
Thompson, 364 F. Supp. 659, 664 (M.D. Ala. 1973) (Johnson, C.J.).
83 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
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to mean changes in the "liberty" to come and go, with the
result that generally due process attaches if confinement becomes more burdensome or privileges are withdrawn. For example, due process often is required to transfer,"' to segregate
or isolate and to rpvoke good time credits." 4 Likewise, when a
prisoner is called before a prison discipline committee on
charges of misconduct, it is a violation of his due process rights
if he is not given notice of the charges before being called before
the committee, or if he is not given a written statement by fact
finders.835 The lower courts differed on the question of what
636
process is due, some spelling out requirements specifically,
others satisfied with more general formulas. 3 In 1974, the Supreme Court resolved the problem. 38
'm See, e.g., Preston v. Cowan, 369 F. Supp. 14, 24 (W.D. Ky. 1973); Ault v.
Holmes, 369 F. Supp. 288, 291-95 (W.D. Ky. 1973); Diamond v. Thompson, 364 F.
Supp. 659, 664-65 (M.D. Ala. 1973); White v. Gellman, 360 F. Supp. 64, 66 (S.D. Iowa
1973). See generally Note, Procedural Due Process in the Involuntary Institutional
Transfer of Prisoners, 60 VA. L. REv. 333 (1974).
muSee, e.g., Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974); Braxton v. Carlson, 483 F.2d
933, 937-38 (3d Cir. 1973); United States ex rel. Miller v. Twomey, 479 F.2d 701, 71415, 717 (7th Cir. 1973). But cf. Ault v. Holmes, 369 F. Supp. 288, 294 (W.D. Ky. 1973)
(isolation less than 10 days does not require due process).
I Fife v. Crist, 380 F. Supp. 901 (D. Mont. 1974). Damages were denied based
upon the officials' good faith and reliance on established prison practice. Id. at 911.
' United States'ex rel. Miller v. Twomey, 479 F.2d 701, 716 (7th Cir. 1973);
(written advance notice, a hearing and opportunity to explain, right to call witnesses,
factual decision by an impartial decision-maker); Landman v. Royster, 333 F. Supp.
621, 653-54 (E.D. Va. 1971) (opportunity to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses and, in some instances, a lay advisor to assist the prisoner at the hearing). See
also Rhem v. Malcolm, 371 F. Supp. 594 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 507 F.2d 333 (2d Cir. 1974);
Diamond v. Thompson, 364 F. Supp. 659, 665 (M.D. Ala. 1973) (similar to Landman).
Inmate 24393 v. Schoen, 363 F. Supp. 683 (D. Minn. 1973) (settlement: Prisoners
abandoning retroactivity and damage claims in exchange for elaborate procedural
protections); Rinehart v. Brewer, 360 F. Supp. 105, 115 (S.D. Iowa 1973), afl'd, 491
F.2d 705 (8th Cir. 1974); White v. Gellman, 360 F. Supp. 64, 66-67 (S.D. Iowa 1973);
Sands v. Wainwright, 357 F. Supp. 1062, 1083-92 (M.D. Fla. 1973).
"I Braxton v. Carlson, 483 F.2d 933, 940 (3d Cir. 1973) (facts rationally determined); United States ex rel. Tyrell v. Speaker, 471 F.2d 1197, 1203 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 411 U.S. 921 (1973); Gray v. Creamer, 465 F.2d 165, 185 (3d Cir. 1972) (on
remand, the district court found for defendants on the merits, finding no denial of due
process. Gray v. Creamer, 376 F. Supp. 675 (W.D. Pa. 1974)); Sostre v. McGinnis, 442
F.2d 178, 198 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1079 (1972). In Wolff v. McDonnell,
418 U.S. 539 (1974), the Court considers the type of procedures necessary at length,
and to that extent resolves the debate over what procedures are necessary.
I3 Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974). The Court required written notice of
charges, a written statement of evidence and reasons, impartial fact finders and suggested an opportunity to present witnesses. But the Court rejected counsel for the
prisoner and the right to cross-examine.
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When due process is violated, courts typically attempt to
fashion legal or equitable remedies that are most appropriate
for the violation in question. Where the violation is of one particular prisoner's rights, such as when an inmate has been removed to solitary without due process, the simplest type of
equitable order, affecting only that prisoner, can require his
release into the general prison population. The order is often
accompanied by an allowance to the authorities of a reasonable
time to retry the charged infraction. 39 Improving the institution as a whole is a more difficult task. Realizing the limits of
injunctive power and deferring to the expertise of the prison
administrators, a court may disdain to rule on some matters.6 4
If the court decides to act, it may issue a limited order and rely
on the official's propriety to ensure compliance,64 ' or it could
make detailed findings and issue a complex and sweeping
order. 4 Underlying a grant of such prospective injunctive relief
is a purpose to improve prison procedure,643 and in order to
administer such a prospective injunction, a court may retain
jurisdiction and require periodic reports, " or enter an order to
close a facility unless a plan for elimination of unconstitutional
conditions is submitted within a given time. 45
Equitable relief may be retrospective. For example, if
there is an illegal and damaging entry on a prisoner's record,
the court may order the authorities to expunge it.646 These
paper changes do not disrupt prison routine in any meaningful
sense. Similarly, good time credits shorten the time a prisoner
is incarcerated. When good time credits have been taken with-,

Landman v. Royster, 333 F. Supp. 621, 627 (E.D. Va. 1971).
United States ex rel. Miller v. Twomey, 479 F.2d 701, 713 (7th Cir. 1973);
Landman v. Rosyter, 333 F. Supp. 621, 654 (E.D. Va. 1971).
' White v. Gillman, 360 F. Supp. 64, 67 (S.D. Iowa 1973).
642 See, e.g., Inmates of Attica v. Rockefeller, 453 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1971); Rhem v.
Malcolm, 371 F. Supp. 594 (S.D.N.Y), afl'd, 507 F.2d 333 (2d Cir. 1974); Jones v.
Whittenberg, 330 F. Supp. 707 (N.D. Ohio 1971), afl'd, 456 F.2d 854 (6th Cir. 1972).
" Landman v. Royster, 333 F. Supp. 621, 645 (E.D. Va. 1971).
"' See, e.g., Holt v. Sarver, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971); Jones v. Wittenberg, 330
F. Supp. 707 (N.D. Ohio 1971).
6 Rhem v. Malcolm, 377 F. Supp. 995 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (order supplementing
order in 371 F. Supp. 594), aff'd on merits but vacated on remedy, 507 F.2d 333 (2d
Cir. 1974).
4I United States ex rel. Jones v. Rundle, 358 F. Supp. 939, 952 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
' '
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out due7 process, courts have ordered the authorities to restore
them.

64

Preiserv. Rodriguez48 and Wolff v. McDonnell 49 alter this
remedial scheme. Before Preiser,many state prison conditions
cases were brought under the Civil Rights Act in federal district
court. Plaintiffs were not required to exhaust available state
remedies. In Preiser,the Court examined the tension between
federal habeas corpus which compels a state prisoner to seek
redress first in a state forum and the Civil Rights Act which
does not. The Court held that challenges to the length of confinement fall "squarely within the traditional scope of habeas
corpus." 5 ' The equitable remedy of restoring good time credits,
the Court held, is inappropriate in a Civil Rights Act case. This
is true whether the remedy is immediate discharge or an expunging order short of release. Thus, all state prisoner challenges to length of confinement brought in federal district court
must be by habeas corpus, with the corollary that the petitioner must first exhaust state remedies." ' Preiser was reaffirmed by Wolff wherein Wolff established the threshold interest for due process, and held that, under the procedural
structures assailed (which were held defective), prior disciplinary records should not be expunged.652 But Wolff did not deal
with damages.
Several comments are in order. First, there must be an
intelligible and discernible state remedy to exhaust 53 If there
is none, federal habeas corpus may be brought forthwith. Second, a state prisoner may still use the Civil Rights Act to challenge the conditions of his confinement or to sue for damages. 5 4 Alternatively, he may challenge both the length and the
"I Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178, 204 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U. S.
1049 (1972); Landman v. Royster, 333 F. Supp. 621, 657 (E.D. Va. 1971).
,4 411 U.S. 475 (1973).
"' 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 487 (1973).
UI Pryor v. Regan, 370 F. Supp. 150 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Hard v. Boren, 368 F. Supp.
1321, 1325, 1327 (E.D. Ark. 1974); Mukmuk v. Commissioner, 369 F. Supp. 245, 249
(S.D.N.Y. 1974).
52 Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U. S. 539 (1974).
" Wilwording v. Swenson, 404 U.S. 249 (1971).
" Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 499 (1973); Palmigiano v. Mullen, 491 F.
2d 978 (1st Cir. 1973).
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conditions of confinement in federal habeas corpus.655 He may
litigate a state challenge to length of confinement simultaneously with a federal challenge to conditions of confinement. 6
The many possible combinations are patent. Preiser, as
the dissent points out, will lead to duplicated and possibly
conflicting adjudications . 57 Further, the decision may cause

confusion, uncertainty and delay, and allow federal constitutional claims to be frustrated by unsympathetic state courts. 68
The dissent by Justice Brennan suggests that the majority has
chosen the wrong variable; that the habeas corpus cases are
based upon comity, which compels respect for the state judiciary, and that comity is the policy that should be advanced. To
preserve comity, it is improper to classify on the basis of remedies. Rather, prisoner cases required to be brought as habeas
corpus should be sorted from Civil Rights Act cases according
to the decision-making body the prisoner assails. If it is a conviction (i.e. a state judicial decision) that is attacked, the
plaintiff is remitted to habeas corpus which compels him to
exhaust state remedies. If, however, a prison administrative
decision is attacked, the plaintiff may proceed forthwith under
the Civil Rights Act. 59
The dissent thus exposes the majority opinion's critical
defect-the majority confused comity with remedy. Comity
mandates the federal district courts to defer to state courts. In
suggesting that comity requires the federal court to withhold
action when restoration of good time is asked, the Court ignores
the fact that such restoration is merely a remedial device used
in an action in which the federal district court has full jurisdiction. The federal district court has jurisdiction over questions
of denial of constitutional rights by state authorities. In a suit
where such is charged, the plaintiff merely asks that he be
made whole. If from the facts proven the court concludes that
plaintiff was indeed denied due process, it is incumbent upon
the court to fashion a remedy. To recover damages, the plaintiff must first show that his rights were breached and that he
Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 499 (1973).
61 Id. at n.14.
67 Id. at 500-25 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
"5

L' Id.

01 Id. at 521.
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suffered actual damage. Then he must overcome an immunity.
Now Preiser precludes the court from restoring the illegally
taken good time credits. The court can importune or suggest.66
The court can tell the authorities not to do it again. But the
court's remedial hands are partially tied: it cannot extend complete relief. If the federal district court can hear and decide
questions about constitutional rights but not grant a complete
remedy, is it functioning as a court?"6 '
The majority's error is clearer when the result in Preiseris
compared to the pendent jurisdiction doctrine. Under pendent
jurisdiction, if federal jurisdiction exists, the district court may
decide all the questions in the case. When a case is presented
to the district court on a state and a federal theory and both
theories "derive from a common nucleus of operative fact," the
district court has discretion first to consider judicial economy,
convenience and fairness to litigants, and then to discard the
federal theory and decide the case on the state theory.6 2 Preiser
appears to be contrary to almost every policy exhibited by
pendent jurisdiction. The theory of liability is exclusively federal, yet federal courts must defer to state remedies. Economy,
convenience and fairness to litigants dictate a single proceeding when two remedies grow out of "a common nucleus of operative fact." Yet Preiser compels litigants to either delay or
fragment federal remedies. The federal court has the expertise
and the detachment but, under Preiser, is a remedial eunuch.
Wolff's impact on the material discussed herein is less
clear. Damages were not at issue. The Court refused to expunge
records of discipline imposed under the previous procedural
scheme.6 ' Yet the previous scheme, while informal, provided
an opportunity to ventilate the truth of the charged infraction.664 In addition, the Court limited the denial of retroactive
expungement relief to the facts of the case: "we do not think
that the error was so pervasive in the system under the old
procedures to warrant this. . .
' Thus, Wolff's implications
for remedy may be limited.
It0 Heard v. Boren,

368 F. Supp. 1321, 1327 (E.D. Ark. 1974).

Cf. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 162-63 (1803).
", UMW v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725-26 (1966).
" Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 573-74 (1974).
", Id. at 548-53.
" Id. at 574.
"3
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While injunctive relief may operate in either the future or
the past, even a retrospective injunction cannot repair all the
effects of prior deprivations of due process. Restoring good time
does not return the time illegally spent in punitive segregation.
Illegal isolation is much like false imprisonment. Ifthere was
no notice before confinement, it is, under traditional due process, a legal non-event. May the inmate recover money damages?
Several barriers to damages will be considered. The first
set of reasons for judicial unwillingness to impose damages
stems from general hesitancy to interfere in prison administration. Initially, the federal courts have a general reluctance to
interpose the federal judiciary in state administration.6 6 Moreover, prison administration is a specialist task. Judges hesitate
before substituting their judgment for a specialist's expertise.
Judges lack empirical evidence of the effect a change in the
rules may have on the goals of the institution.667 Finally,
judicial decisions may mandate massive and expensive
changes. The court does not control the source of the money.6 8
In Civil Rights Act cases, the courts have developed an
immunity barrier to protect officials from unwarranted damage
verdicts. Immunities are supported by sound policies. Ifofficials were unprotected, the threat of personal liability might
deter people from accepting positions in prison administration.6 6 If officials were easily held liable, the risk of 7liability
0
might inhibit vigorous policy making and innovation.
When the immunity decisions are examined, a good deal
of diversity appears. Many decisions set up a qualified immunity which, stated briefly, defeats personal liability for money
damage when the act was done in good faith. 71 The gravamen
6 See, e.g., Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178, 191 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 1049 (1972). But see Rhem v. Malcolm, 371 F. Supp. 594 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd,
507 F.2d 333 (2d Cir. 1974).
6" Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178, 197 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1049
(1972); Rinehart v. Brewer, 360 F. Supp. 105, 113 (S.D. Iowa 1973), aff'd, 491 F.2d 705
(8th Cir. 1974). But cf. Landman v. Royster, 333 F. Supp. 621, 657 (E.D. Va. 1971).
' Holt v. Sarver, 442 F.2d 304, 309 (8th Cir. 1971).
6 United States ex rel. Jones v. Rundle, 358 F. Supp. 939, 952 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
', Johnson v. Alldredge, 488 F.2d 820, 824 (3d Cir. 1973); Clarke v. Cady, 358 F.
Supp. 1156, 1164 (W.D. Wisc. 1973).
7 Palmigiano v. Mullen, 491 F.2d 978 (1st Cir. 1974); Skinner v. Spellman, 480
F.2d 539 (4th Cir. 1973); United States ex rel. Miller v. Twomey, 479 F.2d 701, 719-21
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of immunity appears to be reliance in good faith upon the
ostensible legality of existing practice. 7 2 Other cases do not
consider the immunity,1 3 apparently do not allow the immunity674 or reject good faith as a defense. 75 The Third Circuit
applies an immunity which looks to the type of decision instead
of the mental state of the official: if policy judgments are questioned, the first question is whether the official is responsible
for making policy; if the decision is within the ambit of official
discretion, immunity is established. 76 Thus, as long as an act
of judgment is reasonably connected with official duties, the
official is immune even though he may be activated by malice
and the act may be unconstitutional. 77 This may be criticized
as expanding absolute immunity beyond reasonable bounds,
protecting officials unnecessarily and circumscribing the aggrieved plaintiffs' opportunity to recover compensatory damages. The Third Circuit test for routine tasks is different. If
judgment is not exercised, the official is not immune from suit
but may escape liability by showing good faith.7 8
Next to be examined is the good faith reliance standard.
The question pursued is how reasonable it is to rely on the
legality of an existing practice. It is also hoped that further
generalizations will emerge concerning the law's progress in
accommodating the compensatory purpose of damages with
(7th Cir. 1973); Clarke v. Cady, 358 F. Supp. 1156, 1163 (W.D. Wis. 1973); Jones v.
Wittenberg, 330 F. Supp. 707, 722 (N.D. Ohio 1971).
7I See Cox v. Cook, 95 S.Ct. 1237, 1238-39 (1975); Skinner v. Spellman, 480 F.2d
539 (4th Cir. 1973); United States ex rel. Miller v. Twomey, 479 F.2d 701, 719 (7th Cir.
1973); Fife v. Crist, 380 F. Supp. 901, 911 (D. Mont. 1974). United States ex rel. Bracey
v. Rundle, 368 F. Supp. 1186, 1190 (E.D. Pa. 1973); Clarke v. Cady, 358 F. Supp. 1156,
1163 (W.D. Wis. 1973). Chief Justice Burger stated qualified immunity this way: "It
is the existence of reasonable grounds for the belief formed at the time and in the light
of all the circumstances, coupled with good faith belief, that affords basis for qualified
immunity. . . ." Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 247-48 (1974).
" United States ex reL Nial v. Walfe, 346 F. Supp. 569, 576 (E.D. Pa. 1972)
(immunity not considered). Cf. United States ex rel. Motley v. Rundle, 340 F. Supp.
807 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (damage hearing following defendant's default).
"I Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178, 205 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1049
(1972) (apparently not allowing immunity).
" United States ex rel. Jones v. Rundle, 358 F. Supp. 939, 948-49 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
'8 Johnson v. Alldredge, 488 F.2d 820, 825-26 (3d Cir. 1973).
Id. at 826. But see Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 248 (1974) (rejecting
absolute executive immunity).
"I Johnson v. Alldredge, 488 F.2d 820, 825 (3d Cir. 1973), citing Pierson v. Ray,
386 U.S. 547 (1967).
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the discretion-protecting function of qualified immunity in a
period of rapid social and legal change.
Immunity is easiest to justify when the prison officials
have relied on a procedure which is later held to be unconstitutional. Future denials of due process may be enjoined but the
officials responsible for the deprivation will not be required to
pay damages to the aggrieved prisoner.879 Like a police officer,
a prison official is not "charged with predicting the future
course of constitutional law.""68 But the surprise cases have
already been written; and a decision that it is unconstitutional
to remove an inmate to punitive segregation without notice and
a hearing can no longer come like a bolt out of the blue. In
addition to legal changes, it is generally understood that prisons are in a execrable state."' These factors tend to discount
blanket claims of good faith reliance.
At present, most courts appear to reject "constructive"
knowledge of due process from social and legal trends and to
require actual knowledge that a practice was unconstitutional
when the deprivation took place. For example, an Alabama
inmate argued that the official's qualified immunity was nullified by a Pennsylvania decision two months before the unconstitutional act. The court upheld the immunity stating "there
was no evidence that the order was called to [the official's]
attention or otherwise could provide a warning to officials of
the Alabama Prison System in such a short time."6 A Fourth
Circuit case is similar. Even though there was a precedent in
the circuit, the court held that if, as a factual matter, the
official reasonably and in good faith relies on the legality of
existing practice, he will be immune from a damage award.6
On the other hand, a Kentucky district court held that the
"9 Cox v. Cook, 95 S. Ct. 1237 (1975); Clarke v. Cade, 358 F. Supp. 1156, 1163
(W.D. Wis. 1973). Wolff strengthens this conclusion. It holds that due process requirements will not be applied retroactively to require the officials to expunge procedurally
defective prison discipline.
"* Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 557 (1967); Eslinger v. Thomas, 476 F.2d 225 (4th
Cir. 1973).
"I See, e.g., Holt v. Sarver, 442 F.2d 304, 309 (8th Cir. 1971) (Lay, J., concurring);
Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1049 (1972);
Hirschkop & Milemann, The Unconstitutionalityof PrisonLife, 55 VA. L. Rxv. 795
(1969).
02 Claybrone v. Thompson, 368 F. Supp. 324, 327 (M.D. Ala. 1973).
60 Skinner v. Spellman, 480 F.2d 539, 540 (4th Cir. 1973).
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authorities did not show good faith in view of clear Supreme
Court precedent. Given the authoritative statement of the law,
the official did not prove a reasonable belief that the act was
constitutionally permissible. 84 The Kentucky judge's approach
approximates the Supreme Court's formulation in Wood v.
Strickland.85 The Court announced a mixed objectivesubjective test with strong "should know" aspects. Ignorance
of "settled, indisputable" law will not justify a constitutional
violation; the official's standard of conduct includes "knowledge of the basic, unquestioned constitutional rights of his
charges." 8 The key to the test is reasonableness. As time passes, courts will be increasingly justified in examining the factual basis for reliance. Since it is unlikely that there should be
a premium on ignorance, at some point a court will be justified
in holding that knowledge was pervasive and that the official
had to know.
How specific must the law be to overcome this barrier and
to constitute knowledge that a particular practice was unconstitutional when it took place? Generally, if the law is "unsettled" when the illegal deprivation takes place, the official will
be immune; as the law becomes more specific, immunity is less
likely to be afforded. 87 If Wood applies to prisons, the officials
are required to be aware of what the constitution requires. But
constitutional commands are sometimes less than crystal clear.
Additional answers to this question are found in the Landman
litigation."88 It is useful to examine a related issue at the same
time. That issue is the degree to which an official defendant
must know of and participate in the unconstitutional deprivation before individual liability may be affixed.
District Judge Merhige, in ruling on liability earlier, concluded that conditions were appalling enough to merit broad
" Preston v. Cowan, 369 F. Supp. 14, 18-19 (W.D. Ky. 1973) (authorities refused
to post a series of letters; immunity depending on the state of the law as of the date of
refusal).
95 S. Ct. 992 (1975).
Id. at 1000-01.
" Cox v. Cook, 95 S. Ct. 1237 (1975); Ault v. Holmes, 369 F. Supp. 288, 293 (W.D.
Ky. 1973); Preston v. Cowan, 369 F. Supp. 14 (W.D. Ky. 1973). Dictum and later
holdings do not refute immunity, but prior Supreme Court precedent refutes immunity. Id. at 18-19.
lu Landman v. Royster, 354 F. Supp. 1302 (E.D. Va. 1973).
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prospective relief.689 At the hearing which led to the instant
order, evidence was introduced on the issue of damages for
deprivations which occurred before the prospective relief. The
court found that one of the inmates was placed in isolation
because he sued to desegregate the prison69 and that Landman
was the victim of "deliberate efforts . . . to de-humanize"
him." 1 There were physical and psychic injuries of some magni92
tude.
The first question on the immunity issue was whether the
prison officials knew that the deprivations of constitutional
rights were contrary to law. In holding that they did, the court
looked to earlier litigation in which Landman had participated.
In 1965, he had initiated a lawsuit charging that certain prison
practices were cruel and unusual punishment. While the district court rejected the cruel and unusual theory and the court
of appeals affirmed,11 the affirming opinion was qualified
throughout. The basis for the decision was the district judge's
factual determinations, and the court of appeals could not hold
these findings of fact to be clearly erroneous.694 There was,
moreover, in 1966 a dearth of prison law. Even so, the court of
appeals discussed corrections theory and expressed a sympathetic and compassionate view. In the next to the last paragraph the court stated, "Where the lack of effective supervisory
procedures expose men to the capricious impositions of added
punishment, due process and Eighth Amendment questions
inevitably arise. 6' 9 5 Landman took the court's advice and
brought the next case on a due process theory.9 8 In dealing with
the damage claim and the immunity, the court placed on the
officials the burden of proving a reasonable belief that the practices were constitutionally permissible.9 The director of the
corrections division denied knowledge, but the court rejected
his testimony. In view of "the clear words" in the 1966 court of
91Landman v.

Royster, 333 F. Supp. 621 (E.D. Va. 1971).
110Landman v. Royster, 354 F. Supp. 1302, 1308 (E.D. Va. 1973).
"I Id. at 1313 (the interested reader should consult the report for details).
,12Id. at 1307, 1313.
'3 Landman v. Peyton, 370 F.2d 135 (4th Cir. 1966).
63 Id.
at 139.
,' Id. at 141.
" Landman v. Royster, 333 F. Supp. 621 (E.D. Va. 1971).
,, Landman v. Royster, 354 F. Supp. 1302, 1318 (E.D. Va. 1973).
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appeals opinion, "ignorance of the law" was "incomprehensible." ' In addition, some of the prison practices were found
to "violate the lowest standards of decency" and to be "of such
a shocking nature that no reasonable man could have believed
6 ' Thus if a responsible defendant
they were constitutional.""
could be identified, plaintiffs were entitled to damages back to
the statute of limitations. '
The inquiry next turns to the extent the defendant must
know and participate to affix personal damage liability. Civil
Rights Act liability is highly individualized, because damages
are granted against officials in their "personal" capacity only.
For, the court held, to allow recovery of damages against officials in their official capacity would be to grant recovery
against the state."0 ' The official must also be alive, the court
held, because in Civil Rights Act cases charging an interference
with "personal" rights the damage remedy fails to survive
against the estate of a deceased defendant." 2 To affix damage
responsibility the plaintiff must also prove the official's actual
conduct. When an official is in a supervisory position, he may
be liable either if he directs a deprivation or if he acquiesces
in the deprivation with actual knowledge that it is taking place.
In Landman, the court held that the cabinet level supervisor was not liable because he was "too far removed" from the
deprivation, did not control the illegal conduct, and lacked any
M,Id. Editor's note. In Cox v. Cook, a case that arose in Virginia, the Supreme
Court said, "We do not regard the uncertain dicta in Landman v. Peyton. . .as laying
down a rule binding on petitioners ....
' Id.

"

95 S. Ct. 1237, 1239 n.3 (1975).

" Id. at 1314-15. The court gave collateral estoppel effect to the 1965 case and
held that, because the cumulative injury was caused by a continuing wrong, the statute
of limitations did not begin to run until the defendant's wrongful conduct stopped. Id.
See also Donaldson v. O'Connor, 493 F.2d 507, 528-29 (5th Cir. 1974), vacated and
remanded, 43 U.S.L.W. 4929 (U.S. June 26, 1975).
,01
Landman v. Royster, 354 F. Supp. 1302, 1315-16 (E.D. Va. 1973).
702 Id. at 1315. But see Pritchard v. Smith, 289 F.2d 153 (8th Cir. 1961) (Civil
Rights Act silent on survival; § 1988 allows court to apply state law; action survived
against administrator of deceased defendant). Cf. Brazier v. Cherry, 293 F.2d 401 (5th
Cir. 1961) (widow allowed to pick up state survival statute to sue defendant for deprivation of deceased spouse's rights: "§ 1988 declares a simple, direct abbreviated test:
what is needed in the particular case under scrutiny to make the civil rights statutes
fully effective?" Id. at 409). Both Pritchardand Brazier are cited in Moor v. County
of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693, 702 n.14 (1973). The Court states: "Properly viewed then, §
1988 instructs federal courts as to what law to apply in causes of action arising under
federal civil rights acts." Id. at 703.
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real knowledge of it."3 The director of the corrections division
was, however, required to respond in damages. He denied responsibility for the deprivation, but the court found that he
approved some of the policies, had specific knowledge of certain illegal confinements and encouraged what appeared to be
a personal vendetta against one of the plaintiffs."' Thus it was
unnecessary to consider other theories such as respondeat superior or negligent failure to supervise."' The director was required to pay three of the plaintiffs a total of $21,265.45 compensatory damages."'
Landman v. Royster follows the proper approach to the
damage issue. If sufficient knowledge that the acts are illegal
and participation in the illegal conduct are found, the interest
in protecting official discretion no longer exists. The dual interests in compensating over-reached inmates and deterring overreaching officials become more prominent. A contrasting and
incorrect approach to damages, the retroactivity analysis, will
be examined next.
United States ex rel. Jones v. Rundle dealt with damages
for an unconstitutional punitive segregation which took place
in 1970. 711 A court of appeals opinion in 1972 held the discipli' Landman v. Royster, 354 F. Supp. 1302, 1317 (E.D. Va. 1973).
7o Id. at 1312-13. See also, United States ex rel. Jones v. Rundle, 358 F. Supp.
939, 948 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (prison superintendent liable because he should have been
aware of unconsitutional procedure; deputy superintendent liable because he was in
charge and did not stop unconstitutional action). But cf. Mukmuk v. Commissioner,
369 F. Supp. 245, 249 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (personal responsibility necessary); Black v.
Brown, 355 F. Supp. 925 (N.D. Ill. 1973) (personal involvement must be alleged to state
claim for damages), aff'd in part, rev'd and remanded in part, 513 F.2d 652 (7th Cir.
1975).
7" Generally, knowledge and participation appear to be required. See, e.g., Anderson v. Nosser, 438 F.2d 183 (5th Cir. 1971), modified en banc, 456 F.2d 835 (5th Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 848 (1972). The perplexing question is the requisite extent
of knowledge and participation. See Dewell v. Lawson, 489 F.2d 877 (10th Cir. 1974);
McDaniel v. Carroll, 457 F.2d 968 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1106 (1972); Roberts v. Williams, 456 F.2d 819 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 866 (1971); Adams v.
Pate, 445 F.2d 105 (7th Cir. 1971); Note, Vicarious Liability UnderSection 1983, 6 IND.
L. REv. 509 (1973).
"I Landman v. Royster, 354 F. Supp. 1302, 1319 (E.D. Va. 1973). This was a
conservative figure. Under the extreme facts presented, the compensatory damages
might have totaled $200,000 and punitive damages may have been merited. In November of 1973, the Landman v. Royster litigation was settled for $43,525.70. Washington
Post, Nov. 23, 1973, at BI, col. 3. See also Preston v. Cowan, 369 F. Supp. 14, 18-19
(W.D. Ky. 1973) ($25 for failing to mail legally-oriented letter).
I" United States ex rel. Jones v. Rundle, 358 F. Supp. 939 (E.D. Pa. 1973).

THE NEW DuE PROCESS

1975]

nary practices unconstitutional. 78 The Jones court, as part of
the immunity issue, held that good faith was not a defense and
thus did not consider whether officials relied on the ostensible
legality of the practice at the time it occurred.0 9 The court
asked whether the 1972 opinion was to be applied retroactively
or prospectively.7 10 In this branch of the case, the court followed
the retroactivity analysis from criminal cases under the Bill of
Rights.' For damages, the Jones court decided that the 1972
opinion was not retroactive. The court stressed three things.
First, the officials had reasonably relied on previous standards.
Second, it is open-ended simultaneously to create new law and
damage liability for past acts. Third, damage liability would
affect both prison administration and administrators. "The
consequence would be the end of the prison administration
because any sensible prison administrator would immediately
resign because it would be virtually impossible for him to protect himself from civil liability. 712 The Jones court applied the
1972 opinion retroactively for equitable relief ordering the authorities to expunge the solitary notation and to restore the lost
good time.1
The retroactivity analysis is questionable for several reasons. First, procedural protections are intended to assure at
least minimal accuracy in the fact-finding process. The Supreme Court has been almost categorical in holding that when
a new constitutional rule improves fact-finding ability, it will
be applied retroactively despite official reliance on the former
practice and the new rule's severe impact on the administra-"
tion of justice.7 14 It follows that decisions requiring notice and
a hearing before imposing prison discipline are, perforce, retroactive because notice and a hearing are so basic to accurate
fact-finding. 715 In denying retroactivity to the 1972 decision, the
I" Gray v. Creamer, 465 F.2d 179 (3d Cir. 1972).
7,United States ex rel. Jones v. Rundle, 358 F. Supp. 939, 949 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
'

Id. at 949-52.

United States ex rel. Arizonica v. Scheipe, 474 F.2d 720 (3d Cir. 1973).
States ex. rel. Jones v. Rundle, 358 F. Supp. 939, 952 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
"' Id. See also Adams v. Carlson, 488 F.2d 619, 627 (7th Cir. 1973). Wolff proscribes expungement relief when the procedure followed was reliable but ultimately
held to be unconstitutional. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 572 (1974).
"I Williams v. United States, 401 U.S. 646, 653 (1971).
71Adams v. Carlson, 488 F.2d 619, 627 (7th Cir. 1973).
"

722 United
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Jones court recognized improvement in fact-finding as a determining factor in retroactivity. But the court chose to apply
the 1972 opinion only prospectively, because the aggrieved
inmate may be partially protected by an injunction and because the consequences of an erroneous decision to impose discipline are not so severe as a criminal conviction. 16
In Adams v. Carlson,1 7 the Seventh Circuit also applied
the retroactivity analysis. This case did not involve damages,
but concerned the question of whether disciplinary hearings
which arose out of a work stoppage in 1972 were to be governed
by a 1973 circuit court decision. The court followed the retroactivity analysis and, emphasizing "the accuracy of the factual
determination", held that the charged infractions must be reheard under the 1973 guidelines. 718 While Adams v. Carlson
does not reach the damage question, the court deals correctly
with the retroactivity variables. Thus, properly applied, the
retroactivity analysis almost always leads to a retroactive application of the decision.
An additional reason to abjure the retroactivity analysis
emerges from a review of the immunity concept. In Jones, the
court determined that the 1972 decision was not retroactive.
The court stressed the threat of personal liability and reliance
on previous judicial decisions. These are precisely the factors
other courts have emphasized in passing on immunity from
damage. In Skinner v. Spellman, the Fourth Circuit held that
the prison official had a qualified immunity in damage actions.
This immunity turned on whether the official "was acting in
reasonable good faith reliance on standard operating procedure. 71 In Barr v. Matteo, Justice Harlan upheld executive
immunity from a defamation suit because "the threat of
[damages] might appreciably inhibit the fearless, vigorous,
76 United States ex rel. Jones v. Rundle, 358 F. Supp. 939, 951 (E.D. Pa. 1973).

While the procedure condemned in Wolff did provide rudimentary notice, the Court
refused retroactive expungement relief noting, (1) less is at stake in prison discipline
than in a criminal trial; (2) officials relied on former practice; (3) retroactivity would
have a significant impact on prison administration; and (4) the formerly prevailing
system did not produce enough error to "warrant this cost or result." Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 544 (1974). Thus a procedure without notice might result in retroactive expungement relief because of inaccuracy.
717488 F.2d 619 (7th Cir. 1973).
71, Id. at 627.
7,1 Skinner v. Spellman, 480 F.2d 539, 540 (4th Cir. 1973).
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and effective administration of policies of government."'7 20
Thus, had the Jones court considered reliance when analyzing
immunity rather than as part of the retroactivity analysis, the
result would almost certainly have been the same. Because of
the ostensible legality of the practice at the time the illegal
discipline occurred, the qualified immunity would bar damages. 72' Thus Chief Judge Lord in a similar case declined to
follow the retroactivity analysis, applied qualified immunity,
and held the official immune.7 22 By stressing reasonable reliance on the apparent legality of the practice, the same result
is reached without torturing the retroactivity analysis.
The retroactivity analysis, moreover, diffuses the inquiry.
It may lead to misplaced emphasis and incorrect decisions. In
Black v. Brown,7 23 the court followed the retroactivity analysis.
Good time credits had been taken, apparently without due
process, but the court refused to restore the credits because it
"would lead to needless and endless litigation. 7 24 Several factors appear to compel an opposite result: inaccurate factfinding is inescapable in ex parte proceedings; a file entry is
relatively easy to change; and the inmate has a high stake in
his liberty. This leads to the conclusion that good time credits
could be restored, with the officials allowed a reasonable period
to retry the charges. The rehearing would not be an unbearable
burden because such rehearings are less complex than a criminal trial."' The threat of a deluge of prisoner litigation seems
an unrealistic fear in view of the possibility of the use of class
actions for plaintiffs and broad injunctive relief. 721 These factors appear to require equitable relief in some form. 72 But, in
7" Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 571 (1959) (plurality opinion).
721 In Adams v. Carlson, 488 F.2d 619 (7th Cir. 1973) the court held that the later

opinion was retroactive to require rehearings but hinted that the immunities applied
to a damage action. Id. at 629 n.16.
m=United States ex rel. Bracey v. Rundle, 368 F. Supp. 1186, 1188-90 (E.D. Pa.
1973).
1 355 F. Supp. 925 (N.D. Ill.
1973), aff'd in part, rev'd and remanded in part,
513 F.2d 652 (7th Cir. 1975) (adopting views very similar to those stated in the previous
textual paragraph).
n' Id. at 927.
", Adams v. Carlson, 488 F.2d 619, 628 (7th Cir. 1973).
Cf. Preston v. Cowan, 369 F. Supp. 14, 21-22 (W.D. Ky. 1973). But see Wheeler
v. Procunier, 508 F.2d 888 (9th Cir. 1974).
7" United States ex rel. Jones v. Rundle, 358 F. Supp. 939 (E.D. Pa. 1973), granted
equitable relief and gave the grant of equitable relief as a reason to deny a damage
remedy. Id. at 951-52.
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applying the retroactivity analysis, the court may emphasize
one factor over others. The court in Black v. Brown incorrectly
stressed the effect on administration of justice of applying the
decision retroactively. The retroactivity analysis, it may be
concluded, creates theoretical and practical problems. The
immunity analysis turns on a factual inquiry, analyzes the proper variables and better serves the interests of all concerned.
From the discussion above, one general conclusion is clear.
The courts hesitate before awarding an inmate compensatory
damages. When the law is non-existent or uncertain, this is
justified under a qualified immunity. Compensatory damages
will be awarded only in exacerbated instances.
Will inmates be awarded damages when the officials break
law that is certain beyond doubt? To answer this question, we
turn again to the Landman litigation.7 In 1971 the district
court ordered extensive changes in prison practices. Plaintiffs
charged that the officials violated the injunction and asked the
court to hold the officials in civil contempt. 29 The defendants
could not assert that they relied on the ostensible legality of
conduct which was contrary to an injunction that defined the
law. The court found that the officials had violated the 1971
injunction, another injunction and "simple fairness." The officials, the court said, failed to recognize "that a prison administration is not a fief unto itself' and attempted to "envelop the
system with a massive veil of secrecy."a' The officials and their
attorneys, the court speculated, either did not understand the
injunction or intended to "thwart" it. 731 The officials failed to
inform both the lower-level employees and the inmates of the
order and its terms. They also refused to implement the procedural protections required by the order. Finally, the officials
isolated inmates in high security areas both arbitrarily and
without due process. These acts, the court held, constituted
contempts 3 2 The conduct may have been criminal contempt
Im See also Preston v. Cowan, 369 F. Supp. 14, 18-19 (W.D. Ky. 1973) (clear
Supreme Court precedent: no immunity).
72 Landman v. Royster, 354 F. Supp. 1292 (E.D. Va. 1973).
13 Id. at 1299.

Id.
Id. at 1300. See generallyDobbs,, Contempt of Court:A Survey, 56 Com*ma L.
REv.183 (1971).
731
11
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and serious enough to impose a punitive fine."3 The court classified the contempt as civil and imposed a coercive sanction.7 34
It fined the named, living defendants $25,000 but suspended
the fine upon the condition that the injunction's terms be "car' Even though
ried out on every level of the prison system."735
this extensive coercive remedy was ordered, no remedial relief
was ordered. The court doubted that there had been a quantifiable injury and noted that, in any event, there was no evidence
73 8
of compensable loss.
Contempt is a distinct remedy for denials of due process.
For compensatory contempt there must be an injunction which
binds the defendants, breach of the injunction, and damages.
Remedial or compensatory damages may be awarded as part
of the civil contempt sanction. 77 But, as illustrated by the
contempt branch of Landman, it takes very compelling facts
to overcome judicial reluctance. For this there are several reasons: contempt is both extraordinary and flexible; courts pause
to think before finding contempt; finally, after contempt is
found, courts mold the remedy carefully. 78 Federal courts,
moreover, are disinclined to hold state and local government
officials in contempt.3 9 When a government official is found in
contempt, courts tend to threaten sanctions in the future
rather than to impose sanctions immediately. 70 One purpose of
civil contempt is to coerce: to encourage the defendant to obey
an injunction. A threat of future, tangible sanctions may ac7- Dobbs, supra note 732, at 235-49, 261-63. In Landman v. Royster, 354 F. Supp.
1292, 1300 (E.D. Va. 1973) the court found a lack of "willfulness." This is inconsistent
with almost every other factual conclusion in the opinion.
"- Landman v. Royster, 354 F. Supp. 1292, 1300-02 (E.D. Va. 1973).
"4 Id.
at 1301-02. See Dobbs, supra note 732, at 244-45. This was dissolved along
with the injunction when the case was settled. Washington Post, Nov. 23, 1973, at BI,
col. 3.
"4 Landman v. Royster, 354 F. Supp. 1292, 1302 (E.D. Va. 1973).
Leman v. Krentler-Arnold Hinge Last Co., 284 U.S. 448 (1932).
"4 Harthman v. Witty, 480 F.2d 339 (3d Cir. 1973); United States v. Swingline,
Inc., 371 F. Supp. 37 (E.D.N.Y. 1974); United States v. Greyhound Corp., 370 F. Supp.
881 (N.D. Ill.), aff'd, 508 F.2d 529 (7th Cir. 1974).
"I See, e.g., United States v. Barnette, 346 F.2d 99 (5th Cir. 1965); Class v.
Norton, 376 F. Supp. 496 (D. Conn. 1974) (contempt citation not warranted though
there was substantial and widespread noncompliance. But officer, in individual capacity, had to pay $1,000 in attorney's fees to petitioner).
"I See, e.g., Woolfolk v. Brown, 358 F. Supp. 524, 534-35 (E.D. Va. 1973); Doe v.
Harder, 310 F. Supp. 302 (D. Conn.), appeal dismissed, 399 U.S. 902 (1970).
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complish this purpose. But another purpose of civil contempt
is to compensate. If compensation is merited, it should be
awarded.
E.

Summary

Part II collects remedies available to one whose due process rights have been violated. It demonstrates that courts have
adopted traditional legal and equitable remedies and applied
them to due process cases. Significant problems, nevertheless,
remain.
Equitable remedies include injunctions which may be
broad or narrow. Defendants may be compelled to reform procedure in an entire institution or to reinstate a discharged employee. Injunctions are enforced by contempt or the threat of
contempt. The equitable order to expunge should be particularly noted in a record-oriented society. If an entry is wrongfully placed in a file, the court may order it extirpated. 41
The injunctive remedy has two drawbacks. First, many
injunctions are prospective. They tell the defendant not to do
it again4 2 but the defendant pays no price for his illegal conduct and the plaintiff receives no compensation for his loss.
The court can, however, order damages or substituted relief.
Damage remedies comprehend nominal damages, 743 actual
7,,See Wellmer v. Minnesota State Junior College Bd., 487 F.2d 153, 156 (8th Cir.
1973); Strickland v. Inlow, 485 F.2d 186, 190 (8th Cir. 1973), vacated and remanded
sub nom. Wood v. Strickland, 95 S.Ct. 992 (1975); Sullivan v. Murphy, 478 F.2d 938,
968 (D.C. Cir. 1973); United States v. McLeod, 385 F.2d 734 (5th Cir. 1967); Tatum
v. Morton, 386 F. Supp. 1308, 1315 (D.D.C. 1974); Marin v. University of Puerto Rico,
377 F. Supp. 613 (D.P.R. 1974); Warren v. National Ass'n of Sec. Prin., 375 F. Supp.
1043 (N.D. Tex. 1974); Lykken v. Vavreck, 366 F. Supp. 585, 598 (D. Minn. 1973);
Dobbs, supra note 732. Interestingly, in Irby v. Gowan, 380 F. Supp. 1024 (S.D. Ala.
1974), the court ordered an entry of "Dismissed-Non-Cooperative" expunged from
teacher's personnel records even though the court held for the defendant school officials that the teacher was non-tenured, thus having no contractual right to remain
employed; and the entry and dismissal were held not to impose a "stigma" in the Roth
sense. The entry created no stigma because it was not publicized by the school officials.
The court merely said that since a letter of resignation was subsequently accepted by
the school system, the entry should be expunged "in the spirit of equity." Id. at 1031.
The expungement remedy is broad indeed.
7I Note, Governmental Employee Liability, 21 U.C.L.A.L. Rav. 624, 635-36
(1973).
1,3Basista v. Weir, 340 F.2d 74, 87 (3d Cir. 1973); Berry v. Macon County Bd.of
Educ., 380 F. Supp. 1244 (M.D. Ala. 1974); Thonen v. Jenkins, 374 F. Supp. 134
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damages 7 4 compensation for impalpable losses 74 5 and punitive
or exemplary damages. 746 Damages may compensate and deter,
and thus ameliorate some problems left by an injunction.
The injunction's second drawback is that it is difficult to
administer. Rules 25(d) and 65(d) cast a responsibility net over
successors, agents, employees and those "in active concert or
participation." The court may be required to supervise carefully by retaining jurisdiction and calling for periodic reports.
When, as is generally true in Civil Rights Act lawsuits, the
injunction binds state or local government officials, the court
is thrown into a political thicket. Generally, judges affix legal
consequences to discerned past conduct and leave uniform,
prospective rulemaking to the legislature. The broad injunction
in a Civil Rights Act case strains this generalization.
The problems of administering equitable relief are anticipated by the problems of managing a class action. If the defendants are within the injunctive responsibility net, an injunction binding them will protect as adequately as a plaintiff
class. But if both the plaintiffs and the defendants are diffused,
defining the groups benefiting and bound presents excruciating problems.7 47 In the consumer or "property" class actions,
the defendants are not held together by agency or concert.
This difficulty in defining and administering relief may be one
practical reason for decisions finding an absence of state
action in creditor conduct under ex parte statutes. When the
groups are ill defined, a great deal of the decision's effect depends upon the defendant's propriety and good faith. 7 1 Per(E.D.N.C. 1974) ($100 nominal damages awarded); Simmons v. Russell, 352 F. Supp.
572, 580 (M.D. Pa. 1972). Dobbs, supra note 732, at 191.
"I Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178, 205 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1049
(1972); Landman v. Royster, 354 F. Supp. 1302 (E.D. Va. 1973).
Lykken v. Vavreck, 366 F. Supp. 585, 596 (D. Minn. 1973); Cf. Magnett v.
Pelittier, 488 F.2d 33 (1st Cir. 1973); Gonzales v. Fairfax Brewster School, Inc., 363 F.
Supp. 1200, 1205 (E.D. Va. 1973).
711 Donaldson v. O'Connor, 493 F.2d 507 (5th Cir. 1974); Lykken v. Vavreck, 366
F. Supp. 585, 596 (D. Minn. 1973); For a collection of cases, see Annot., Punitive
Damages for Violations of Federal Civil Rights Acts, 14 A.L.R. Fed. 608 (1973).
00. Fiss, IN r cIONs 500-04 (1972).
"'
Compare Schneider v. Margossion, 349 F. Supp. 741, 746 (D. Mass. 1972), aff'd
sub nom. Ruotolo v. Gould, 489 F.2d 1324 (1st Cir. 1974) (clerks not certified as
defendant class because it appeared that decision will be obeyed) with Callahan v.
Wallace, 466 F.2d 59 (5th Cir. 1972) (after supreme court affirmed case, state attorney
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haps the better remedy from an invalidating decision is that it
may stir an inactive legislature into action. Significant and
general reform may result from an unwelcome dialogue.749
The damage remedy is intended to compensate and deter.
But there are several barriers to damages in due process cases.
First, many courts are hostile to any damage remedy in due
process cases. 70 Not much can be said about these cases except
that they are wrong.
Second, many due process-civil rights cases embody genuine measurement problems. Constitutional rights are valuable.
When constitutional rights are impaired, damages may be
inferred.7 1 But when defendants exclude plaintiffs from a political speech they really do not care to attend, how are plaintiffs
injured?752 If a plaintiff is injured physically or mentally, arrested, confined, fired or subjected to bad publicity, damages
can be awarded. 713 But when a "wholesale assault upon the civil
rights and liberties of numerous citizens, in violation of the
First, Fourth, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments . . ."I"
causes no "injury," there is not much to compensate. The law,
injuries, for exhowever, has always compensated intangible
75 5
defamation.
and
arrest
ample, false
There is a lesson to be learned from copyright infringement
cases. When infringement damages are difficult to measure or
small, but part of a pattern of illegal behavior, the courts look
beyond the particular case to the general purpose of damages.
The damage award, in addition to restitution and compensation, is "designed to deter illegal conduct," thus, "even for
uninjurious and unprofitable invasions of copyright, the court
may, if it deems just, impose a liability within statutory limits
to sanction and vindicate the statutory policy. '756 Surely congeneral apparently advised that opinion only applied to particular county: instant case
necessary to attain an injunction against a defendant class).
"I Osmond v. Spence, 359 F. Supp. 124 (D. Del. 1972).
710 See, e.g., Williams v. Eaton, 443 F.2d 422 (10th Cir. 1971).

"I United States ex reL. Motley v. Rundle, 340 F. Supp. 807, 810-11 (E.D. Pa.
1972).

752 This is one of the problems Judge McMillan left for later in Sparrow v. Goodman, 361 F. Supp. 566 (W.D.N.C. 1973).
M Lykken v. Vavreck, 366 F. Supp. 585, 596 (D. Minn. 1973).
" Sparrow v. Goodman, 361 F. Supp. 566, 584 (W.D.N.C. 1973).
7 D. DOBBS, REWMIES § 7.13 (1973).
7" F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Contemporary Arts, Inc., 344 U.S. 228, 233 (1952).
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stitutional rights are as highly valued as copyright. In addition,
assessing damages calls the government to account. But while
the Copyright Act contains a minimum damage schedule,7 57 the
Constitution, unfortunately, does not. Surely this does not
mean that the government can ignore the Constitution with
impunity or that the government responds to a lower standard
than a private person. Nonetheless, the idea of imposing minimum damages to deter illegal conduct might be adapted to
constitutional violations.
Third, sovereignty's perquisites exacerbate the search for
a solvent defendant. The immunities cannot be interposed to
prevent a defendant from obeying an injunction, 78 but the law
prevents plaintiffs from suing the entity at all'59 and attenuates
liability except from actual participants and superiors who direct or acquiesce.7"' The policy of the personal immunities is to
protect the official who legitimately but erroneously exercises
official discretion.78 ' The immunity decisions are characterized
only by diversity.
Scheuer v. Rhodes712 will bring needed clarity to the immunities. First, the Court rejected blanket claims of executive
immunity. Second, it stated the factors to be analyzed in
passing on personal or qualified immunity:
[I]n varying scope, a qualified immunity is available to officers of the executive branch of Government, the variation
dependent upon the scope of discretion and responsibilities
of the office and all the circumstances as they reasonably
appeared at the time of the action on which liability is sought
I" Copyright Act § 101, 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1952); See also 18 U.S.C. § 2520 (Supp.

1974) (civil damage schedule for illegal wiretap).
7 See, e.g., Stephen v. Drew, 359 F. Supp. 746 (E.D. Va. 1973).

, Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974) (sovereign immunity); Moor v. County
of Alemeda, 411 U.S. 693 (1973) (Civil Rights Act jurisdiction). Professor Kenneth
Davis suggests that § 1983 should be amended to allow recovery against a municipality
for deliberate torts committed by police officers. Davis, supra note 464.
,0 Downs v. Department of Public Welfare, 368 F. Supp. 454,464 (E.D. Pa. 1973);
Lykken v. Vavreck, 366 F. Supp. 585, 599 (D. Minn. 1973); McGhee v. Moyer, 60
F.R.D. 578, 586 (W.D. Va. 1973).
"7 See, e.g., Strickland v. Inlow, 485 F.2d 186, 189-91 (8th Cir. 1973), vacated and
remanded sub nom. Wood v. Strickland, 95 S. Ct. 992, 1001 (1975); Stephen v. Drew,
359 F. Supp. 746 (E.D. Va. 1973); McGhee v. Moyer, 60 F.R.D. 578, 585 (W.D. Va.

1973).
712416 U.S. 232 (1974).
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to be based. It is the existence of reasonable grounds for the
belief formed at the time and in light of all the circumstances,
coupled with good faith belief, that affords basis for qualified
immunity of executive officers
for acts performed in the
6 3
course of official conduct.
This standard focuses judgment on the critical issues, good
faith and legitimate discretion. It combines the "objective"
and the "subjective" standards artfully enough to reach substantial justice in most cases and should eliminate both excessively broad and excessively narrow immunity decisions.
The immunity analysis is sufficiently serviceable to accomodate damage awards to legal change. The criminal law
retroactivity analysis is a device to face the problem but shirk
a solution. Granting or denying a class action leaves the retrospectivity question unsolved and may conceal the real issues."'
Injunctions and declaratory judgments change the rules prospectively without affecting past conduct.7 61 But if it is necessary to evaluate the ostensible legality of past conduct, only the
immunity formula allows the fact-finder to analyze the defendant's state of mind in light of the then available facts and
7 66
law.
The damage remedy, it must be concluded, is too often an
aspiration rather than a policy. Even when the imposing legal
barriers are surmounted, plaintiffs frequently cannot find a
solvent, responsible defendant.7 67 Nevertheless, even the possi71 Id. at 247-48. See also Wood v. Strickland, 95 S. Ct. 992, 1001 (1975): "we hold

that a school board member is not immune from liability for damages under § 1983 if
he knew or reasonably should have known that the action he took within his sphere of
official responsibility would violate the constitutional rights of the student affected,
or if he took the action with the malicious intention to cause a deprivation of constitutional rights or other injury to the student."
,"I Schneider v. Margossian, 349 F. Supp. 741 (D.Mass. 1972), aff'd sub nom.
Ruotolo v. Gould, 489 F.2d 1324 (1st Cir. 1974).
765 Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 719 (1973); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (declaratory judgment but no injunction assuming future obedience); Marin v. University of
Puerto Rico, 377 F. Supp. 613 (D.P.R. 1974) (declared unconstitutional but not enjoined; court presumes that the university will heed declaratory judgment).
76 See Baxter v. Birkins, 311 F. Supp. 222 (D. Colo. 1970) (no personal liability
for conduct colorably legal but unconsitutional in retrospect).
'" See, e.g., SouTHERN JusTm 55-56 (L. Freedman ed. 1967) (case settled for
costs); Washington Post, Feb. 22, 1974, at Cl, col. 7-8. (jury awards inmates $8,000
from guards: one guard no longer works at the jail; the other suspended without pay;
appeal considered but money for legal fee lacking; neither jail nor city responsible).
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bility of recovering damages may have several salutary, though
noncompensatory, effects. First, when a damage remedy is
known to be available, official behavior tends to become more
civilized. 6 Second, once a lawsuit is commenced, the request
for damages prevents the declaratory-injunctive part of the
case from becoming moot. 69 Third, the media and professional
organizations tend to pick up the fact of the judgment; and
even though the judgment is uncollectable, it has an educational or socializing effect.
The non-utility of the damage remedy is palpably unsatisfactory. Two things may be suggested to invigorate damages as
a remedial tool. The insolvent defendant problem can be ameliorated by allowing recovery on official bonds.7" A more general
and more satisfactory solution is for the governing body to
purchase insurance for its employees.7 ' Neither of these devices interfere unduely with sovereignty's perquisites because
there is no "liability which must be paid from public funds in
the state treasury.7 7 2 Both will compensate for actual losses.
Today a victorious case seldom generates enough recovery
to compensate the plaintiff, much less to remunerate his lawyer. Moreover, the plaintiff, generally represented by a private
attorney, frequently faces a defendant represented by sophisticated government counsel.7 Correcting denials of constitutional rights vindicates the public interest but, as observed
above, often does little more.
I"Washington Post, Feb. 22, 1974, at C1. col. 7-8. Warden is quoted as saying that
damage verdict for prisoners against guards "will help curb brutality of prisoners by
guards who in the past have thought their word would automatically prevail over that
of an inmate."

14 McGhee v. Moyer, 60 F.R.D. 578, 585 (W.D. Va. 1973); Blye v. Globe-Wernicke
Realty Co., 300 N.E.2d 710, 714, 347 N.Y.S.2d 170, 174 (1973).
"I Whirl v. Kern, 407 F.2d 781, 796 (5th Cir. 1969); Gaston v. Gibson, 328 F. Supp.

3 (E.D. Tenn. 1969); City of Advance v. Maryland Cas. Co., 302 S.W.2d 28 (Mo. 1957).
" Verkuil, Immunity or Responsibility for UnconstitutionalConduct: The Aftermath of Jackson State and Kent State, 50 N.C.L. REv. 548, 558 (1972). After the
Landman litigation was settled, the Virginia authorities purchased liability insurance
for welfare and institution's employees. Washington Post, Feb. 22, 1974, at C4, col. 8.
"2 Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 664 (1974). Professor Kenneth Davis has
suggested a third alternative: to amend § 1983 to allow recovery of damages from a
municipality for deliberate torts committed by municipal police officers. Davis, supra
note 464.
M" See, e.g., Heard v. Boren, 368 F. Supp. 1321 (E.D. Ark. 1974) (defendants sued
as individuals but represented by state attorney general).
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While winning plaintiffs occasionally recover attorney's
fees,"' the substantial although intangible public benefit is
inadequately considered. Instead the courts focus on the defendant's conduct seeking, it seems, callous defiance. When a lawsuit is not fee-generating but advances the public interest in
the government obeying the law, the plaintiff is acting as a
"private attorney general." It follows that his attorney should
be compensated, in order to make it financially possible for
77
him to vindicate the public interest. 1
In later Civil Rights Acts, Congress has recognized the
above mentioned factors and provided for attorney's fees.
None, however, are mentioned in § 1983. Allowing attorney's
fees more liberally under § 1983, which is now over a century
old, would advance Congress' expressed policy to allow
attorney's fees in civil rights cases. 777 In any event, Congress
should consider amending § 1983 to bring it into line with more
recent statutory statements of policy. Then the courts could
focus on whether the law was clear and whether defendant's
conduct was clearly unreasonable.
"I Taylor v. Perini, 503 F.2d 899 (6th Cir. 1974) (award of attorney fees against
defendant individually not barred by eleventh amendment); Comist v. Richland
Parish School Bd., 495 F.2d 189 (5th Cir. 1974); Strickland v. Inlow, 485 F.2d 186,
191 (8th Cir. 1973), vacated and remanded sub nom. Wood v. Strickland, 95 S. Ct.
992 (1975); Gilpin v. Kansas State High School Act. Ass'n, Inc., 377 F. Supp. 1233,
1244-53 (D. Kan. 1974); Sterzing v. Fort Bend Ind. School Dist., 376 F. Supp. 657, 663
(S.D. Tex. 1972); Warren v. National Ass'n of Sec. School Prins., 375 F. Supp. 1043,
1048 (N.D. Tex. 1974); Thonen v. Jenkins, 374 F. Supp. 134 (E.D.N.C. 1974); Diamond
v. Thompson, 364 F. Supp. 659, 668 (M.D. Ala. 1973). But see Lykken v. Vavreck, 366
F. Supp. 585, 597-98 (D. Minn. 1973) (A.C.L.U. attorney); Griffin v. Jackson Parish
School Bd., 60 F.R.D. 671 (W.D. La. 1973).
'n Brandenburger v. Thompson, 494 F.2d 885, 888-89 (9th Cir. 1974). See
generally Naussbaum, Attorney's Fees in PublicInterest Litigation, 48 N.Y.U.L. REv.
301 (1973); Mause, Winner Takes All: A Reexamination of the Indemnity System, 55
IOWA L. REv. 26 (1969); Note, Awarding Attorney's Fees to the "Private Attorney
General", 24 HASTINGS L.J. 733 (1973). Editor's note. The Supreme Court rejected the
private attorney general theory of awarding attorney's fees in Alyeska Pipeline Service
Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 95 S. Ct. 1612 (1975).
6 20 U.S.C. § 617 (Supp. 1974) (school desegregation); 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(b)
(Supp. 1974) (public accommodation); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (Supp. 1974) (employment discrimination).
7 Cf. Bradley v. School Bd. of Richmond, 416 U.S. 696 (1974). But see Fleishman
Dist. Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714 (1967) (comprehensive statutory trademark protection scheme without referring to attorney's fees provided for in parallel
patent and copyright acts: attorney's fees precluded).
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Two additional remedial-tactical issues remain to be considered. Most due process cases are class actions in federal
courts. While both choices are sound in many cases, there are
times when the proper course of action is to consider alternatives. The class action's utility cannot be denied. A class action
allows the parties to aggregate small claims into an economical
lawsuit and the court to concentrate on small injuries to many
people. There is a concomitant risk, however, that a large
plaintiff class will alter the focus from an individual grievance
to the substantive principle's broad implications and the difficulties inherent in implementing wide spread relief. A defendant class should be examined more skeptically. When an
agency or concert nexus ties the defendant group together, an
injunction may do as well. When there is no nexus, the cost of
notice may be prohibitive.
Due process plaintiffs almost always choose a federal
forum. This is usually the correct choice, but for some cases a
state forum might be considered. If plaintiff alleges a constitutional deprivation, federal jurisdiction appears to be clear. But
the Civil Rights Act plaintiff must sue a "person" who acted
"under color of law." Difficulties grow out of this near contradiction in both the property and the mental health cases. A
state forum may avoid these problems; the litigation may concentrate on the alleged constitutional deprivation. For example, in many of the opinions holding against the plaintiff in
self-help repossession cases, it is not certain whether the courts
turn the case on lack of fourteenth amendment state action or
on the absence of color of law depriving the court of Civil Rights
Act jurisdiction. A state forum avoids the federal jurisdiction
issue and focuses directly on the constitutional issue.
Plaintiff's attorneys have felt in the past that the federal
bench is more amenable to due process interests. Exhibiting a
touching faith in constitutional remedies, good tort theories
have been passed up in favor of dubious constitutional
claims."' The present course of Supreme Court decisions is to
limit federal jurisdiction under the Civil Rights Act 77 and to
Gonyaw v. Gray, 361 F. Supp. 366 (D. Vt. 1973). Compare Johnson v. Horace
711
Mann Mut. Ins. Co., 241 So.2d 588 (La. Ct. App. 1970).
'n, Prieser v. Rodriguez, 412 U.S. 507 (1973); Moor v. County of Alemeda, 411 U.S.

693 (1973); City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 411 U.S. 475 (1973).
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cease expanding due process principles."' Some state courts
may be more receptive to due process claims than federal
courts.78 1 If the lawsuit is to be brought in federal court, the
plaintiff should bear in mind the common law torts and pendant jurisdiction.
Conclusion
Michigan's Institute for Social Research reports that the
public is cynical toward government and that this cynicism is
rising sharply. In the fall of 1973, 66 percent of the sample
responded that they trusted the government only "some of the
time," an increase of 20 percentage points over a similar survey
taken one year earlier. Fifty-three percent think that "quite a
few" government officials are crooked, in contrast to 38 percent
a year earlier. But between 1972 and 1973 confidence in the
72
Supreme Court increased from 26 to 39 percent.
The public respects the judicial system in part because of
continuity and principled decisions, but this respect is fragile. 7 3 Also, law reaches the public through remedies. If a substantive theory is not realized in practice, the public may conclude that the law displays one set of values and uses another.
Due process compels institutions to broaden participation in
decision-making to those affected by the decisions. It exposes
institutional contradictions and ameliorates their effect. But
the court system cannot correct all institutional blunders: the
vast majority of decisions must be made on an administrative
level. This is the long term effect of a remedial decision in a
due process case. It must be weighed when passing on a discrete
lawsuit.
In the past twenty years, the educational system has probably been scrutinized more carefully than any other. Racial
discharges are clearly illegal. Yet a southern regional confer1,1 Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974); Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S.
134 (1974).
7I Compare Adams v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 520 P.2d 961,113 Cal. Rptr.
145 (1974) with Adams v. Southern Cal. First Nat'l Bank, 492 F.2d 324 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 95 S. Ct. 325 (1974). But cf. Kruger v. Wells Fargo Bank, 520 P.2d 441, 113
Cal. Rptr. 449 (1974). See, Comment, Scaling the Welfare Bureaucracy: Expanding
Concepts of Governmental Employee Liability, 21 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 624, 663 (1973).
782 Washington Post, Jan. 8, 1974, at A7, col. 1.
"I Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 629 (1974) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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ence on employment displacement in education estimates that
31,500 black teachers have lost their jobs because of school
desegregation.784 The advance sheets bring a steady stream of
lies, 75 sexism, 76 violence, 77 psychiatric tyranny, 78 9 campaigns
against dissenters, 7 0 class-room shouting matches, 9' police
state tactics,7 2 and bad grammar. 793 Discounting the peril of
7
generalizing social or even legal trends from decided cases, it
may appear that the rising generation's minds are shaped in an
atmosphere where conformity is mandated, free inquiry is stifled and eccentricity is squelched. Educational institutions,
moreover, are ostensibly open institutions, in contrast to pris75
ons and mental hospitals which are "total institutions"
where change might be expected to come more gradually.
Thus, one who seeks fundamental change concludes that
due process is a cop-out. The reformer should aim his efforts
at the substantive rules.798 The impoverished tenant appreciates notice before being evicted. Notice allows him to get his
71 The black teaching force decreased from 21% of the total teaching force to 19%
between 1954 and 1970 in seventeen southern and border states. Smith & Smith, For
Black Educators:IntegrationBrings the Axe, 6 THE URBAN REV. No. 3 at 8 (1973).
7u Wellner v. Minnesota State Junior College Bd., 487 F.2d 153 (8th Cir. 1973);
Smith v. Losee, 485 F.2d 334 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 908 (1974).
7,Johnson v. University of Pittsburg, 359 F. Supp. 1002 (W.D. Pa. 1973).
" Kota v. Little, 351 F. Supp. 1059, 1064 (E.D.N.C. 1971), aff'd, 473 F.2d 1 (4th
Cir. 1973).
In United States v. Chesterfield County School Dist., 484 F.2d 70 (4th Cir. 1973);
Lee v. Macon County Bd. of Educ., 453 F.2d 1104 (5th Cir. 1971).
'" Stewart v. Pearce, 484 F.2d 1031 (9th Cir. 1973). See generally S. HALLECK,
supra note 552.
7" Rampey v. Allen, 501 F.2d 1090 (10th Cir. 1974); Smith v. Losee, 485 F.2d 334
(10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 908 (1974); Jablon v. Trustees of Cal. State
Colleges, 482 F.2d 997 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1163 (1974); Rainey v.
Jackson State College, 481 F.2d 347 (5th Cir. 1973); Lusk v. Estes, 361 F. Supp. 653
(N.D. Tex. 1973).
7
Furumoto v. Lyman, 362 F. Supp. 1267, 1272 (N.D. Cal. 1973).
732 Zumwalt v. Trustees of the Cal. State Colleges, 109 Cal. Rptr. 344 (Ct. App.
1973).
"I Kota v. Little, 351 F. Supp. 1059, 1063 n.6 (E.D.N.C. 1971).
71,Shuchman, An Attempt at A "Philosophy of Bankruptcy," 21 U.C.L.A.L. Rav.
403, 405-09 (1973).
7,"E. GoFF AN, supra note 625, at 1-12. B. ENNIs, PRtsoNERs OF PsYcmuTRY (1972)

(an excellent book); Oran, Judges and Psychiatrists Lock up Too Many Poeple,
PSYCHOLOGY TODAY, August 1973, at 20; Goldfarb, America's Prisons:Self-Defeating
Concrete, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY, January 1974.
"I Cf. Note, Entitlement,Enjoyment and Due Process of Law, 1974 DUKE L.J. 89,
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meager possessions together. But he would rather not be
evicted at all. To paraphrase the late Professor Chafee: thirsty
people don't want due process; they want beer.
Nonetheless, due process promotes sound and fair decisions under existing substantive rules. This advances both legitimacy and effectiveness. In addition, due process educates
the participants, raising political consciousness. It prevents the
groveling dependency mentioned by Orwell:
At the time I could not see beyond the moral dilemma that
is presented to the weak in a world governed by the strong:
Break the rules, or perish. I did not see that in that case the
weak have the right to make a different set of rules for themselves; because even if such an idea had occurred to me, there
was no
one in my environment who could have confirmed me
797
in it.

Thus, if social change is viewed as an evolutionary process, due
process performs a valuable office.
This virtue can be converted into a defect. Due process is
a powerful instrument of conservative social control precisely
because more participate. It requires change agents to channel
efforts through existing institutions and holds out the hope that
fundamental transformation is possible. Procedure is a waning
majority's first line of defense. It trains conformity, stamps
autocracy with legitimacy's imprimature, and leads only to
delayed or cosmetic modifications. This method of varying authority's forms without altering power realities is called "formal co-optation.1 798 The leaves fall, but the roots, the trunk

and the branches stay the same.
The author cannot refute this argument. He merely replies
that due process is only part of the effort to build a better
society.
7 G. ORwELL,A COLLECTION OF ESSAYS 40 (Harbrace ed. 1953).
P. SELZNICK, TVA AND THE GRASSROOTS 13-15 (1949) reprinted in VITAL PROBLEMS FOR AmRIFc

N Socmrr 239-41 (J. Winter, J. Rabon, M. Chesler eds. 1968).

